1118 
133 


JUAN  LEETS 


UNITED  STATES 


AND 


LATIN  AMERICA 


DOLLAR  DIPLOMACY 


NEW  ORLEANS,  DECEMBER,  1912 


UNITED  STATES 


LATIN    AMERICA 


DOLLAR  DIPLOMACY 


JUAN    LEETS 


New    Orleans,    December,    1912< 


NEW  ORLEANS 

The  L.  Graham  Co.,  Ltd.,  Printers 
1912 


incroh  Libraiy 


FOREWORD. 

To  the  Honorable,  the  United  States  Senate,  Members  of  the  House 
of  Representatives  and  the  American  Public: 

Inspired  by  that  profound  sense  of  justice,  which  has  permeated 
the  citizenship  of  the  great  American  Eepublic  since  its  founda- 
tion, and  with  an  abiding  confidence  in  the  integrity  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  these  people  in  the  United  States  Congress,  I  beg  to 
present  the  humble  memorial  of  citizens  of  the  republics  of  Central 
America,  who  have  suffered  from  the  consequences  of  the  coercive 
and  iniquitous  policies  of  the  Department  of  State,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  Philander  C.  Knox. 

The  purpose  of  this  feeble  memorial  is  two-fold:  1.  To  acquaint 
the  American  public  and  the  members  of  the  Senate  and  of  the 
House  of  Eepresentatives  with  some  of  the  details  of  Mr.  Knox's 
so-called  "Dollar  Diplomacy,"  as  applied  to  the  Central  American 
republics;  2.  To  exert  what  influence  our  facts  may  possess  in 
making  for  a  restoration  of  the  bonds  of  true  friendship  between 
the  peoples  of  Latin-America  and  the  United  States,  which  the 
ruinous  and  selfish  policies  of  Mr.  Knox  have  sundered. 

In  this  work  I  have  been  aided  by  some  of  the  most  brilliant 
statesmen  of  Central  America,  all  laboring  with  a  patriotic  impulse 
snd  an  earnest,  sincere  desire  to  establish  justice  where  iniquity 
and  false  pretense  have  wrought  naught  but  ruin  and  devastation, 
misunderstanding,  discord  and  bitterness.  In  this  memorial,  as 
well  as  in  personal  testimony  before  the  senate  committee  charged 
with  the  investigation  of  matters  relating  to  the  Nicaraguan  revo- 
lution, I  have  sought  to  substantiate  all  of  my  charges  with  docu- 
ments ;  and,  in  not  a  single  instance,  have  I  inscribed  a  statement 
which  I  believed  to  be  less  than  the  truth. 

Although  the  facts  which  I  herewith  present  show  that  the  great 
foundation  principles  of  liberty  and  justice  of  the  mother  of  re- 
publics have  been  ignored  and  hidden  in  the  intricacies  of  the  false 
doctrines  emanating  from  the  Department  of  State,  the  citizen* 
of  the  smaller  republics  to  the  south  have  yet  a  firm  faith  in  the 


4 

people  of  this  great  country  and  place  this  earnest  appeal  before 
their  representatives  in  the  hope  of  arousing  an  interest  in  Mr. 
Knox's  dealings,  which  will  result  in  a  searching  investigation  and 
eventual  justice. 

•While  the  result  of  the  recent  presidential  and  congressional  elec- 
tions in  the  United  States  assures  an  early  change  in  the  personnel 
of  the  State  Department,  with  perhaps  a  marked  change  in  the 
policies  which  this  government  will  pursue  in  its  foreign  relations, 
the  injustice  inflicted  upon  Central  America,  through  the  pernicious 
"Dollar  Diplomacy,"  has  been  too  great  to  be  ignored  by  people 
of  patriotic  impulses.  For  that  reason  we  are  unwilling  to  forget 
the  past  and  leave  the  people  of  the  United  States  in  ignorance 
of  the  noxious  schemes  and  wrongful  acts  which  have  been  per- 
petrated under  the  cloak  of  "diplomacy." 

In  this  memorial  we  have  striven  to  present  in  detail  a  true 
picture  of  the  interference  of  the  State  Department  in  Central 
American  affairs  and  the  results  of  the  Knox  policy.  Summarized, 
briefly,  we  attempt  to  show: 

1.  Under  the  pretext  of  giving  aid  to  the  small  Central  Amer- 
ican republics,  the  State  Department  has  used  what  it  is  pleased 
to  term  "Dollar  Diplomacy"  to  force  upon  these  peoples  loan  con- 
tracts which  would  give  to  a  coterie  of  Wall  Street  bankers  not 
only  millions  of  dollars  tainted  with  illegitimacy,  opportunity  far 
immense  graft,  but  an  absolute  license  to  exploit  the  vast  resources 
of  the  countries  and  even  administer  their  governmental  affairs. 

2.  The  terms  of  the  loan  contracts  which  Secretary  Knox. has 
so  assiduously  sought  to  fasten  upon  Nicaragua  and  Honduras  are 
vicious,  and,  when  truthfully  revealed  to  the  American  public,  will 
produce  expressions  of  abhorence  and  indignation. 

3.  The  Knox  policy  of  dealing  with  Central  America  has  in- 
stilled a  pronounced  anti-American  feeling,  where  before  naught 
but  feelings  of  friendship  toward  the  people  of  this  great  republic 
existed;  turmoil  and  strife,  revolution  and  poverty  have  been  the 
baneful  results. 

4.  In  one  instance  Mr.  Knox  has  given  active  support  to  a 
revolution  in   Nicaragua,  in  another  instance  he  has   opposed   a 
revolution  and  sacrificed  the  lives  of  American  soldiers  that  he 
might  keep  in  power  a  usurper  and  traitor,  the  poor  tool  of  the 


Secretary  in  his  scheme  to  deliver  the  country  over  to  Xew  York 
bankers. 

5.  Mr.   Knox  adjudged  Zelaya  a  dictator  in  Nicaragua  and 
drove  him  from  power,  setting  up  a  government  which  has  brought 
poverty  in  the  stead  of  prosperity;  discord  in  the  stead  of  har- 
mony ;  despotism  in  the  stead  of  liberty ;  on  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Knox 
has  insistently  supported  the  worst  tyrant  and  dictator  that  Latin- 
America  ever  knew  in  President  Estrada  Cabrera,  of  Guatmala, 

6.  With  the  full  knowledge  of  the  State  Department  filibuster- 
ing expeditions  have  been  permitted  to  leave  Gulf  ports  for  Central 
America,  and  in  one  instance  the  knowledge  of  the  departure  of 
such  an  expedition  was  used  as  a  bludgeon  in  a  desperate  effort 
to  force  the  President  of  Honduras  to  approve  a  Morgan  loan 
contract,  which,  it  was  well  known,  was  distasteful  alike  to  the 
president,  the  congress  and  the  people  of  Honduras. 

7.  Designing  American  financiers  desired  American  intervention 
in  the  recent  Nicaraguan  imbroglio,  on  the  other  hand,  they  were 
wont  to  have  the  United  States  Government  adhere  to  a  policy  of 
non-intervention  in  Mexico.     In  Nicaragua,  except  for  the  killing 
of  two   American  members   of   the  Nicaraguan  army,   in   actual 
battle,   American  life  was  never  endangered,  nor  was  American 
property  destroyed;  in  Mexico  a  number  of  Americans  have  been 
wantonly  killed,  scores  of  others  have  been  wounded,  some  have 
been  held  for  ransom,  and  millions  of  dollars  of  American  property 
have  been  destroyed.    In  Nicaragua  Mr.  Knox  intervened ;  in  Mexico 
he  has  adhered  to  the  policy  of  non-intervention.    These  are  facts : 
the  inference  is  of  something  un-American. 

8.  Facts  concerning  acts  of  the  State  Department  in  its  rela- 
tions with  Central  America  frequently  have  been  concealed  from 
the  American  public,  or  else  distorted  or  exaggerated.     Sometimes 
semi-official  statements  given  the  press  in  Washington  for  American 
consumption  have  been  totally  at  variance  with  the  true  facts  and 
not  infrequently   there  has  been   apparent  a   desire  to   prejudice 
public  opinion  in  favor  of  the  attitude  of  Mr.  Knox  and  his  co- 
workers  through  such'  distortion. 

Among  many  of  the  documents  which  I  present  here,  and  among 
tho?e  which  I  have  already  laid  before  the  senate  committee,  some 
of  the  more  important  were  entrusted  to  me  bv  Senora  Hortencia 


6 

C.  de  Madriz,  widow  of  the  former  President  of  Nicaragua,  Dr. 
Jose  Madriz.  At  the  time  of  Dr.  Madriz' &  untimely  death,  in 
May,  1911,  he  was  engaged  in  preparing  a  history  of  the  State 
Department's  relations  to  the  1909  revolution  in  Nicaragua,  and 
Senora  Madriz  desires  that  the  documents  and  facts  which  he  col- 
lected be  now  given  to  the  American  Congress  and  public,  not 
only  in  vindication  of  the  memory  of  this  great  statesman,  but  for 
the  benefit  which  may  accrue  to  the  American  people,  through 
knowledge  of  the  pernicious  acts  committed  by  certain  officials  of 
the  American  Government. 

In  my  testimony  before  the  senate  sub-committee,  presided  over 
by  Senator  A.  B.  Fall,  at  El  Paso,  in  October,  I  found  the  com- 
mittee anxious  to  secure  light  on  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Knox  and  his 
agents  in  the  Central  American  republics.  I  placed  in  Senator 
Fall's  hands  many  of  the  most  important  documents  which  I 
brought  to  this  country,  satisfied  that  the  cause  of  a  weak  nation, 
my  adopted  country,  was  in  good  hands.  On  my  trip  to  El  Paso 
I  was  accompanied  by  the  well-known  Honduranian  counsellor,  Dr. 
Angel  Ugarte,  as  my  legal  adviser. 

Although  born  in  Eussia,  I  am,  with  all  my  heart  a  Central 
American  and  have  been  honored  in  my  adopted  country  with 
important  governmental  positions.  It  is  the  cradle  of  my  wife 
and  of  my  children  and  it  is  my  earnest  desire  to  do  all  within  my 
power  toward  building  up  its  prosperity  and  making  of  it  a  country 
wherein  we  may  enjoy  liberty  and  the  blessings  of  a  stable  Repub- 
lican Government.  I  have  dedicated  all  of  my  efforts  and  endeavors 
to  this  cause,  which,  always,  will  remain  sacred.. 

JUAN  LEETS. 

Xew  Orleans,  December,  1912. 


DOLLAR  DIPLOMACY. 

.  The  policy  applied  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Philander  C. 
Knox,  to  Latin  America  during  the  presidency  of  Mr.  Taft,  was 
termed  by  its  originators,  "Dollar  Diplomacy." 

We  propose  in  this  essay  to  analize  this  particular  policy,  and 
show  its  disastrous  consequences  to  those  countries  to  which  it  was 
applied,  namely^  "Latin  America."  Before  going  into  details,  we 
wish  to  recall  to  memory  the  policy  of  the  United  States  toward  the 
other  republics  on  the  American  continent  as  it  was  pursued  prior 
to  the  advent  of  this  so-called  "Dollar  Diplomacy." 

During  most  of  the  time  of  the  existence  of  this  great  nation,  its 
public  men  have  been  animated  by  a  desire  to  maintain  an  attitude 
of  "NOISTINTEFEKENCE"  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  other 
countries,  and  this  attitude  has  been  supported  by  the  opinion  of 
the  masses  in  general.  This,  beyond  doubt,  is  one  of  the  reasons 
for  the  astounding  growth  and  rapid  progress  of  the  United  States 
of  America,  whose  government,  for  more  than  a  century,  was,  rela- 
tively, the  most  economically  administered  of  any  in  the  world. 
In  pursuing,  for  so  long,  this  admirable  policy  the  succeeding  ad- 
ministrations fulfilled  the  high  ideals  of  the  country's  father, 
George  Washington,  who,  with  divine  forethought,  realized  the 
great  destiny  in  store  for  his  country,  provided  his  contemporaries, 
as  well  as  future  generations,  followed  and  obeyed  his  wise  counsel. 

"THE  MONROE  DOCTRIXE." 

James  Monroe,  one  of  the  many  distinguished  statesmen  pro- 
duced by  the  American  nation,  in  full  accord  and  sympathy  with 
the  high  ideals  and  doctrines  of  General  Washington,  realized  that 
in  order  to  assure  the  permanency  of  the  sacred  principles  upon 
which  this  great  republic  was  founded,  it  was  absolutely  es&ential 
that  none  of  the  European  powers  should  be  permitted  to  establish 
large  colonial  governments  on  the  American  continent. 

When  the  Latin- American  colonies  freed  themselves  from  Spain, 
a  "sacred  alliance"  was  entered  into  in  Europe,  the  monarch's  then 
reigning  in  absolutism  binding  themselves  to  send  their  armies  to 
reconquer  for  Spain  those  La  tin- American  countries  which  had 
just  ceased  to  be  dependencies  of  Spain. 

The  establishment  of  monarchial  regimes  on  the  American  con- 
tinent, upheld  by  some  of  the  great  Powers  of  Europe,  would  have 


8 

been  a  constant  source  of  anxiety,  and  a  never  ceasing  menace,  to 
the  United  States  of  America,  and  would  have  resulted,  ultimately, 
in  making  a  republican  form  of  government  on  this  continent  im- 
possible. 

It  would  have  impeded  the  consummation,  of  Washington's  policy, 
as  outlined  by  him  for  the  future,  as  this  country  would  have  had 
to  maintain  a  large  and  costly  army  and  navy  in  consequence  of 
the  advent  of  monarchical  powers  on  this  continent,  thus  fastening 
upon  the  United  States  the  same  cancer"  that  has  been  sapping  the 
life  of  old  Europe. 

Monroe,  great  statesman  and  patriot  that  he  was,  understood  and 
foresaw  all  this,  which  resulted  in  his  giving  to  the  world  his  fa- 
mous doctrine,  "AMERICA  FOR  THE  AMERICANS,"  a  doctrine 
at  that  time  perfectly  well  understood,  though  later  on  subjected 
to  many  varying  interpretations,  and,  therefore,  very  much  dis- 
cussed. 

Monroe,  beyond  any  doubt,  purposed  to  insure  for  his  own  coun- 
try, and  for  all  the  other  republics  on  the  American  continent, 
the  blessings  of  independence  and  the  tranquility  of  peace.  Nobody 
at  that  time,  much  less  the  noble  author  of  that  Doctrine  himself, 
imagined  that  at  some  future  day,  this  very  same  doctrine  might  be 
construed  into  a  menace  of  the  autonomy  of  those  very  same  Latin- 
American  countries  which  it  was  precisely  the  intention  of  Monroe 
to  protect  against  such  a  contingency.  That  this  doctrine,  designed 
to  be  a  protection,  has  been  twisted  into  a  menace  to  the  integrity 
of  the  Latin-American  countries,  is  precisely  what  we  propose  to 
demonstrate  in  this  essay. 

"PAN- AMERICANISM." 

*To  perpetuate  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  in  a  spirit  to  facilitate 
its  operation,  Mr.  James  G.  Elaine,  Secretary  of  State  in  the  Har- 
rison administration,  and  originator  of  the  "Pan-Americanism" 
idea,  advocated  the  first  Conference  of  Delegates  of  the  American 
Nations,  which  Conference  was  held  in  Washington,  in  1889. 

As  a  result  of  this  first  Conference,  the  International  Bureau  of 
American  Republics  was  created  and  entrusted  with  the  organiza- 
tion of  future  conferences,  which  have  been  held  periodically,  with 
a  view  of  bringing  together  the  peoples  of  the  different  races  and, 
thereby,  the  nations  thus  represented. 


Another  great  statesman,  Mr.  Elihu  Root,  while  Secretary  of 
State,  under  the  Eoosevelt  administration,  fostered  "Pan- Ameri- 
canism" and  became  one  of  its  most  enthusiastic  propagandists. 
He  was  personally  present  at  a  Conference  which  was  held  in  Rio 
de  Janeiro  in  1906,  later  visiting  the  Argentine  Republic,  Chili,  and 
other  countries,  and  still  later,  in  1907,  visiting  Mexico,  where  he 
delivered  several  speeches,  now  famous  because  they  made  such  a 
favorable  impression  in  all  Latin- America,  and  created  such  strong 
sympathy  between  those  countries  and  the  United  States.  There 
Mr.  Root,  on  his  own  behalf,  as  well  as  in  his  capacity  as  Secretary 
of  State,  guaranteed  that  the  policy  of  his  government  toward  the 
peoples  and  the  governments  of  all  Latin- American  countries  was 
a  policy  of  fraternity  and  good  will,  and  that  the  smallest,  as  well 
as  the  greatest,  of  these  countries  could  rest  assured  of  their  inde- 
pendence and  autonomy,  and  the  integrity  of  their  territory.  These 
same  declarations  were  ratified  by  him  before  the  "Central  Ameri- 
can Peace  Conference,"  assembled  in  Washington  in  the  fall  of 
1907*. 

*After  having  nearly  concluded,  we  have  received  some  newspapers 
from  Central  America,  in  which  there  is  a  speech  of  Mr.  Root's  repro- 
duced in  Spanish,  and  which  speech  is  supposed  to  have  been  made  in 
the  United  States.  The  tendencies  displayed  in  this  speech  lead  us 
to  believe  that  it  is  apocryphal. 

A   free    translation    shows: 

In  this  speech  Mr.  Root  declared  that  the  United  States  is  the 
"Modern  Rome,"  chosen  by  God  to  arbitrate  not  only  thei  destinies  of 
all  America,  but  of  Europe  and  Asia  as  well.  He  said  that  his  coun- 
try is  destined  to  control  all  of  the  American  Continent  and  that  it  is 
necessary  only  to  determine  the  means  to  accomplish  this.  He  declares 
the  natural  Frontier  of  the  United  States  Territory  the  Panama  Canal, 
and  that  it  will  cause  surprise  in  the  latter  half  of  the  Twentieth  Cen- 
tury that  in  the  Map  of  the  United  States  to-day  was  not  comprised 
Mexico,  Central  America  and  all  the  Antilles  and  that  it  is  only  a 
question  of  time  when  the  Flag  of  the  United  States  will  be  seen  float- 
ing over  aril  these  territories,  at  the  same  time,  pronouncing  all  Latin- 
Americans  as  unfit  for  a  Republican  form  of  Government  and  unfit  for 
the  Yankee  Citizenship  (as  if  they  should  be  destined  to  be  the  Helots 
of  their  compatriots),  because  the  two  races  are  antithetical,  un— 
amalgamable  and  separated  by  a  deep  abysm.  He  said  that  there  is 
sufficient  justification  for  the  annexation  and  that  all  that  is  necessary 
for  its  consummation  is  a1  joint  Resolution  on  the  part  of  Congress,  and 
he  predicts  that  it  will  be  carried  out  no  matter  which  of  the  three 
contending  parties  was  successful  in  the  presidential  election. 

We  cannot  conceive  that  a  man  who  has  captured  for  himself  the 
sympathies  of  all  the  American  Continent,  because  of  his  professed 
ideals  in  regard  to  Pan -Americanism  could  be  the  author  of  such  utter- 
ances, less  can  we  believe  that  this  great  Statesman  should  so  impru- 
dently offer  a  challenge,  not  only  to  the  American  Continent,  but  to 
all  Nations  of  the  world,  threatening  some  with  taking  away  from 
them  their  possessions  in  the  Caribbean  Sea. 

We  trust  that  when  Mr.  Root  reads  these  lines,  written  by  one  who 
has  always  had  none  but  sentiments  of  the  highest  admiration  for  him, 
he  will  hasten  to  reassure  La-tin-America,  and  principally,  to  protest 
against  the  authenticity  of  this  speech,  which  the  press  attributes  to 
him,  or  to  give  the  authentic  version  of  his  speech,  should  his  speech 
have  been  m'isconstrued. 

As  we  have  not  seen  this  country's  press  publish  such  an  important 
speech,  nor  discuss  it,  we  are  justified  in  belieiving  that  it  is  not 
authentic. 


10 

If  this  policy,  so  firmly  maintained  by  Mr.  Boot,  had  been  con- 
tinued, the  confidence  of  the  Latin- American  countries  in  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  .would  have  increased,  whereas,  to- 
day, it  is  an  absolute  fact  that  the  former  feeling  of  respect  and 
good  will,  as  expressed  by  these  Latin- American  countries,  has  been 
converted  into  a  constant  feeling  of  alarm  and  distrust,  and  in  some 
cases  the  love  felt  for  all  that  was  Anglo-American  has  been  changed 
into  a  deep-seated  hatred — nevertheless,  we  Latin- Americans  recog- 
nize the  fact  that  the  fault  rests  not  with  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  but  with  its  recent  Government. 

Instead  of  upholding  the  sane  policy  of  Mr.  Boot,  which  had 
as  its  basic  principle  the  harmony,  the  well-being  and  the  prosperity 
of  the  whole  American  Continent,  there  has  been  substituted  a 
policy  full  of  deceit,  falsehood  and  schemes  to  give  protection  to 
privileged  financial  speculations.  Mexico,  Santo  Domingo  and 
Central  America  are  at  the  present  moment  the  victims  of  the  course 
steered  by  the  State.  Department  of  the  United  States;  and  while 
it  is  our  aim  to  demonstrate  principally  where  Central  America  has 
been  wronged,  and  more  especially  Nicaragua,  for  the  reason  that 
all  are  in  the'  same  position,  we  shall  make  a  short  enumeration  of 
what  has  happened  to  the  other  countries  named  in  respect  to  their 
dealings  with  the  State  Department. 

REVOLUTIONS  IN  MEXICO. 

This  country,  during  the  long  regime  of  General  Porfirio  Diaz, 
enjoyed  an  era  of,  progress  and  elevated  itself  to  a  condition  of 
notable  prosperity,  made  possible  by  a  peace  of  more  than  thirty 
years'  duration.  It  is  true  Mexico  did  not  improve  so  far  as  the 
education  of  its  masses  is  concerned,  nor  did  the  masses  improve 
in  the  enjoyment  of  political  liberties,  and  this  is  the  only  serious 
fault  to  be  found  with  Porfirio  Diaz.  He  did  not  educate  the 
Mexicans  to  appreciate,  nor  prepare  them  for  the  task  of  maintain- 
ing his  highly  fruitful  endeavors,  which  crumbled  in  the  first  on- 
slaught of  a  revolutionary  hurricane,  which  swept  the  country,  and 
is  tearing  at  the  vitals  of  that  country  even  now. 

Until  1909  the  Government  of  the  United  States  had  naught  but 
laudable  comments  for  General  Diaz  and  his  way  of  governing 
bis  country,  setting  him  up  as  a  model  for  other  southern  republics, 
for  which  reason  it  is  easily  assumed  that  if  he  became  "persona 


11 

non  grata"  with  the  State  Department  shortly  afterwards,  this 
change  in  affection  should  not  be  attributed  to  the  State  Depart- 
ment's remorse  for  not  having  caused  Diaz  to  grant  his  people  a 
more  pronounced  form  of  democratic  government.  We  do  not 
know  the  real  cause  for  this  change  of  affection,  but  we  can  "put 
things  together."  Toward  the  end  of  1909  a  revolution  broke  out 
in  Nicaragua  against  President  Jose  Santos  Zelaya,  toward  whom 
Secretary  Knox  had  shown  a  great  deal  of  aversion,  and  which  aver- 
sion culminated  in  Zelaya  having  to  resign  the  presidency  and  leave 
3iis  country.  President  Diaz,  of  Mexico,  came  to  Zelaya's  assistance 
by  conveying  him  to  Mexico  aboard  one  of  the  Mexican  war  vessels, 
and  this  act  of  Diaz's  brought  about  a  diplomatic  encounter  between 
the  two  countries,  and  although  this  incident  was  satisfactorily 
terminated,  apparently,  we  are  justified  in  believing  that  Mr. 
Knox  thereafter  felt  a  deep  hatred  for  General  Diaz,  when  we  taka 
into  consideration  what  happened  afterwards. 

In  1910  a  revolution  broke  out  in  Mexico,  first  localized,  but 
later  spreading  all  over  the  country  rapidly.  This  movement  was 
well  supplied  with  the  sinews  of  war,  money  and  arms;  the  Ameri- 
can frontier  was  practically  kept  open  for  the  introduction  of  arms 
into  Mexico,  and  American  capital  was  coming  abundantly  to  the 
support  of  the  revolution.  Then  the  American  government  sent 
to  the  Mexican  frontier  thousands  of  soldiers  and  mobilized  a  power- 
ful squadron  of  war  vessels  with  the  avowed  purpose  of  sending 
same  to  Mexican  ports,  which  naturally  was  taken  as  the  announce- 
ment of  an  intended,  intervention,  giving  for  a  reason  the  pretext 
of  having  to  protect  the  lives  and  property  of  American  citizens; 
and  in  order  to  preserve  a  pretext  for  intervention,  perhaps,  indis- 
putable aid  was  given  the  revolution. 

Perhaps,  due  to  the  stand  taken  by  Congress,  or,  perhaps,  for 
the  reason  that  the  State  Department  convinced  itself  of  the  fact 
that  an  armed  intervention  in  MeyiVo  would  nipan  an  immediate 
cessation  of  all  inner  strife  and  a  union  of  all  Mexicans,  who  then 
would  have  taken  up  arms  against  the  invader,  no  intervention  in 
that  country  took  place.  The  Government  of  General  Diaz  fell,  but, 
unfortunately,  this  has  not  terminated  the  revolutionary  spirit, 
Out  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  victors  against  Diaz  there  arose 
malcontents,  who  have  continued  the  strife  with  varying  success  to 
the  present  day,  to  the  great  misfortune  of  that  unhappy  country. 


12 

In  this  second  epoch  of  the  revolution  the  conduct  of  the  State 
Department  has  been  entirely  different.  There  are  to-day  along  the 
frontier  but  some  hundreds  of  soldiers,  and  these  have  been  suffi- 
cient to  maintain  the  neutrality  of  American  territory.  The  pres- 
ent revolution  has  been  deprived  of  the  necessary  elements  of  war, 
and  denied  other  resources  of  United  States,  because  any  violations 
of  the  neutrality  laws  are  now  severely  punished,  in  accordance  with 
&  proclamation  of  Mr.  Taft,  intended  to  stop  such  violations. 
Further,  federal  troops  of  the  Mexican  Government  were  allowed 
to  cross  into  American  territory,  in  order  that  they  might  give 
battle  to  rebel  forces,  which  otherwise  would  have  been  out  of  their 
reach. 

This  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  State  Department  during  the 
two  distinct  revolutions,  the  one  against  Diaz  by  Madero,  and  now. 
the  one  against  Madero  in  turn,  invites  the  suspicion  that  the  pres- 
ent government  of  this  country  has  had  no  determined  policy  to- 
ward parties  or  persons  in  Mexico,  but  hopes  for  a  prolonged  strife 
in  order  to  satisfy  ulterior  ambitions  or  desires,  which,  fortunately, 
will  never  materialize,  now  that  there  is  reason  to  expect  a  radical 
change  in  the  policy  to  be  observed  toward  the  Latin-AmericaD 
countries  during  the  approaching  probable  change  of  administra- 
tion. 

In  relating  what  has  taken  place  in  Mexico,  we  would  emphasize 
the  fact  that  we  are  in  no  way  allied  to  either  one  of  the  factions  en- 
gaged in  that  disastrous  strife.  It  is  rather  our  purpose  to  expose 
the  attitude  of  the  present  American  administration  and  the  criss- 
crossings  resorted  to  in  its  policy,  in  this  particular  case  toward 
Mexico,  and  in  general  toward  all  Latin- America. 

"DOCTRINE  KNOX." 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  we  have  related  before,  was  willingly 
accepted  by  the  peoples  of  all  Latin- America ;  but  when  later  on 
an  amplification  was  invented  to  signify  the  right  of  tutelage  of 
the  United  States  of  North  America  over  the  other  republics  of  the 
continent,  this  interpretation,  odious,  arbitrary  and  pernicious  to 
all  Latin-America,  met  with  vigorous  protest  in  all  Latin- America, 
where  public  opinion  was  unanimous  in  expressing  itself  9s  follows: 

"The  good  we  saw  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  the  guaranty  of 
our  right  to  an  autonomous  political  life,  but  if  this  doctrine  is 


now  to  be  construed  into  meaning  that  the  United  States  will  pro- 
tect us  against  Europe  for  the  purpose  of  -dominating  us,  arid  dictat- 
ing to  us  at  pleasure,  we  cannot  see  where  we  are  benefitted  any 
longer ;  in  fact,  it  would  mean  that  we  may  'jump  from  the  frying 
pan  into  the  fire/ 

Recently,  under  the  Taft  administration,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
Mr.  Knox,  has  seen  fit  to  add  to  the  supopsed  right  of  tutelage  over 
the  Latin- American  Kepublics,  an  assumption  even  more  pernicious 
and  objectionable,  that  of  policing  these  countries,  and,  further,  has 
sought  to  impose,  especially  on  Central  America,  a  financial  pro- 
tectorate which  would  deprive  these  countries  of  the  administration 
of  their  own  fiscal  affairs. 

During  his  first  year  as  Secretary  of  State,  it  seems  that  Mr. 
Knox  saw  a  vision  of  himself  as  the  savior  of  Central  America,  in- 
suring for  these  countries  peace  and  prosperity  by  his  efforts  to 
bring  about  the  resurrection  of  a  nation  that  had  once  been  known 
as  ^"Republic  of  Central  America/'  and  composed  of  the  states  of 
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Salvador,  Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica.  How- 
ever, these  altruistic  thoughts  were  shortly  afterwards  vanquished 
by  his  instincts  of  commercialism,  and  it  was  then  that  he  conceived 
the  idea  of  carrying  out  his  plans  of  imposing  a  financial  tutelage 
on  those  countries  by  delivering  them  into  the  hands  of  syndicates 
of  financiers  in  Wall  Street,  farmed  for  that  special  purpose,  and 
who  were  thus  privileged  to  exploit  those  countries,  while  the  people 
of  the  United  States  derived  no  benefit  whatsoever. 

A  close  examination  of  the  financial  impositions  on  these  ocun- 
tries,  brought  about  by,  and  a  result  of,  the  "Dollar  Diplomacy," 
justifies  us  in  making  the  statement  that  they  were  the  cause  of 
the  last  revolutions  in  several  of  the  countries  bordering  on  th? 
Caribbean  Sea. 

Now  let  us  see  how  the  originators  and  defenders  of  the  "Knox 
Doctrine"  represent  the  same  to  the  masses,  and  how  they  try  to 
defend  and  justify  it.  President  Taft  himself,  in  his  speeches  and 
messages,  and  Mr.  Knox,  in  lecturing  before  universities  and  in 
addressing  voters,  have  emphasized  always  the  assertion  that  this 
policy  would  lead  to  an  assurance  of  peace  and  progress  in  the 
Latin- American  countries,  would  bring  about  prosperity,  and  that 
dollars  would  take  the  place  of  the  rifle  bullets  that  had  been  flying 
about  there.  They  also  asserted  that  since  Americans,  as  agents 


14 

of  the  United  States  Government,  would  take  charge  of  the  Custom 
Houses  in  these  countries,  the  principal  inducement  for  revolutions 
would  disappear,  asserting  that  these  revolutions  originated  only  be- 
cause those  who  start  revolutions  hope  thereby  to  make  themselves 
rich:  That  this  policy  had  proved  a  success  in  Santo  Domingo, 
.where  it  has  been  enforced  for  several  years:  That  the  proposed 
loans  to  these  countries  would  result  in  the  utmost  benefit  to  them, 
and  secure  their  protection ;  and,  in  general,  they  have  endorsed  the 
plans  of  a  few  bankers,  favored  by  the  State  Department,  who 
would  derive  benefits  by  exploiting  these  countries. 

SANTO  DOMINGO. 

As  the  present  Government  has  always  pointed  to  Santo  Domingo 
for  a  justification  of  its  policy,  let  us  see  what  has  really  taken 
place  in  that  country  since  a  financial  protectorate  was  imposed  on 
it  by  the  American  Government.  More  than  fifteen  years  ago,  a 
group  of  American  financiers  undertook  the  settlement  of  Santo 
Domingo's  foreign  debt,  a  condition  being  that  the  administration 
of  the  Custom  Houses  should  be  exercised  by  American  employes 
of  the  American  syndicate,  which  was  formed  for  that  purpose. 
This  transaction  would  have  resulted  in  a  complete  failure  for  these 
speculating  bankers,  had  it  not  been  that  they  succeeded  in  obtain- 
ing the  support  of  the  United  States  Government,  which  forced  a 
treaty  on  the  government  of  that  island,  in  which  it  was  stipulated 
that  the  President  of  the  United  States  should  in  future  appoint 
the  collectors  of  customs  on  the  island,  that  these  collectors  should 
have  the  power  to  use  their  own  discretion  in  the  management  of  the 
same,  and  leaving  to  the  Collector  General  the  supervision  of  the 
foreign  debt  and  its  settlement.  It  is  plainly  seen  that  from  then 
on  the  privileged  bankers  derived  all  the  benefit  while  running  no 
risk  whatsoever,  as  they  were  guaranteed  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States. 

Now,  if  this  financial  imposition  had  borne  good  results,  there 
would  have  been  some  excuse  for  this  policy,  considering  the  cir- 
cumstances, particularly,  that  at  that  time  it  actually  prevented 
various  European  nations  from  taking  action  against  Santo  Do- 
mingo, through  the  use  of  war  vessels,  which'  had  been  sent  to  en- 
force the  collection  of  debts  of  the  government  due  their  subjects. 
But  this  object  could  have  been  accomplished  by  simply  putting 


15 

forward  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  was  asserted  by  distinguished 
public  men  of  South  America.  The  whole  undertaking  proved  a 
failure,  and  has  never  done  for  the  country  what  its  originator? 
claimed  for  it.  although  it  is  to  be  admitted  that,  due  to  an  efficient 
management,  the  income  derived  from  the  customs  increased  ma- 
terially during  the  first  years,  while  in  later  years  the  revenues  have 
remained  stationary. 

As  to  the  honesty  and  integrity  of  these  officials  appointed  by 
the  President  of  the  United  States,  may  it  suffice  to  refer  to  the 
scandal  in  which  the  Collector  General  of  Santo  Domingo  was  in- 
volved, and  which  was  aired  by  the  press  of  this  country.  That  none 
of  the  purposes  of  the  enforced  financial  tutelage  over  Santo  Do- 
mingo materialized,  viz:  the  settlement  of  the  foreign  debt  and 
''maintenance  of  peace,"  is  history.  In  proof  of  our  assertion 
relative  to  the  foreign  debt,  we  shall  quote  the  more  authoritative 
report  of  a  meeting  of  bondholders  of  the  foreign  loan  of  Santo 
Domingo,  which  took  place  in  London  in  1910.  This  report  says: 

"The  Council  regret  to  report  that  no  steps  have  yet  been  taken 
to  remedy  the  injustice  to  the  British  holders  of  Santo  Domingo 
bonds,  under  the  settlement  of  1908.  At  the  time  the  Honduras 
proposals  were  brought  forward  in  1909,  the  Council  were. given 
to  understand  that  the  matter  would  have  prompt  attention;  but 
beyond  further  vague  assurances  that  the  subject  was  not  being 
lost  sight  of,  nothing  has  apparently  been  ldone." 

In  consequence,  the  foreign  credit  of  Santo  Domingo  has  not  im- 
proved, and  is  really  worse  than  before  the  advent  of  the  American 
officials,  for  the  very  good  reason  that  now  it  is  not  given  to  the 
government  to  promote  the  betterment  of  the  credit  of  its  own 
country. 

As  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  that  country,  the  failure  could 
not  be  more  marked,  for  in  the  course  of  fifteen  years  of  the  North 
American  supervision  of  the  finances  of  that  country,  two  presi- 
dents have  been  assassinated,  and  a  series  of  revolutions  have  taken 
place,  all  due  to  the  unrest  created  amongst  the  masses,  who  sus- 
pected their  executives  to  be  tools  in  the  hands  of  a  foreign  power. 
Especially,  during  the  last  two  years,  we  are  justified  in  asserting 
that  this  unfortunate  country  has  not  enjoyed  a  single  moment  of 
true  and  perfect  peace,  in  spite  of  (or,  perhaps,  because  of)  the 
fact  that  all  these  insurrections  were  suffocated  by  the  pressure 


16 

brought  to  bear  in  the  presence  of  American  war  vessels.  Very  re- 
cently this  pressure  proved  inadequate,  and  it  was  found  necessary 
to  despatch  to  that  country  formidable  expedition  of  marines,  with- 
out it  being  known  whether  this  expedition  went  in  support  of  the 
government  or  of  the  revolutionists.* 

Why,  then,  do  President  Taft  and  Secretary  Knox  insist  in  laud- 
ing their  scheme  of  intervention  in  Santo  Domingo,  and  why  do 
they  continue  representing  this  intervention  as  something  that  ought 
to  be  practiced  in  the  other  Latin  American  countries  ? 

They  themselves  cannot  be  bona  fide  believers  in  what  they  ac- 
claim, for  do  not  the  facts,  and  facts  known  to  the  world  at  large, 
belie  them. 


Let  us  pass  to  a  study  of  the  results  of  this  "benevolent  and 
fraternal  policy"  in  those  countries  of  Latin- America,  where  it  was 
imposed,  or  where  efforts  were  made  to  impose  it. 

COSTA  EICA. 

About  four  years  ago  an  agreement  was  entered  into  by  the 
Costa  Eican  Government  and  a  syndicate  of  bankers  of  New  York, 
with'  a  view  to  obtaining  a  settlement  of  the  foreign  debt  and  a  new 
loan;  the  principal  condition  being  the  delivery  of  the  Custom 
Houses  to  collectors  to  be  named  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States.  The  conditions  were  very  similar  to  those  imposed  on  Santo 
Domingo,  but  with  the  difference  that  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  was  not  named  one  of  the  contracting  parties. 

The  Costa  Eican  Congress  did  not  approve  this  contract,  seeing 
in  it  a  menace  to  its  national  sovereignty.  Afterwards  a  very  simi- 
lar contract  was  entered  into  with  Mr.  Minor  C.  Keith,  in  substance, 
in  fact,  identical  with  the  other  contract  proposed  as  far  as  the 
financial  part  of  it  was  concerned,  but  no  mention  was  made  of  any 
intervention  by  a  foreign  government. 

*The  Revolution  in  Santo  Doming-o  has  been  put  to  an  end,  through 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States  Government,  whose  Delegate 
declared  himself  in  favor  of  the  Revolution,  resulting  in  the  down-fall 
of  President  Victoria  and  the  elevation  to  the  Presidemcy  of  the  Bishop 
of  the  Diocese. 

It  is  curious  to  see  that  the  Diplomacy  of  a  country,  most  of  its 
people  being  Protestant,  should  favor  as  chief  of  the  government  of  a 
foreign  country  the  head  of  the  Catholic  Church,  the  most  intolerant 
of  all  sects,  and  which  will  deprive  of  religious  liberty  not  only  the 
natives,  but  the  foreigners  as  well.  This  must  be  another  one  of  the 
so-called  benefits  of  "Dollar  Diplomacy." 


IT 

This  latter  contract  was  ratified  by  Congress  and  is  in  force  at 
this  present  moment.  We  do  not  propose  to  applaud  this  contract, 
which  might  have  been  arranged  with  greater  advantage  to  the 
country,  but,  for  the  fact  that  there  was  nothing  contained  in  that 
agreement  that  could  'possibly  endanger  the  sovereignty  of  Costa 
Rica,  it  did  not  cause  any  ill  feeling  among  the  masses  and  did  not 
irritate  public  opinion.  Otherwise,  it  might  have  caused  riots,  even 
in  this  peaceful  country. 

GUATEMALA. 

Similar  propositions  of  financial  support  were  made  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Guatemala  at  about  the  same  time  that  the  Costa  Rican 
Congress  vetoed  the  offer  made  that  country,  and  this  offer  to 
Guatemala  was  recommended,  although  rather  informally,  by  the 
State  Department.  Guatemala's  executive  would  not  assume  the 
responsibility  or  accepting  or  rejecting  the  proposition,  and  referred 
it  to  the  Congress,  which  body  returned  it  without  commenting  on 
it  except  to  recommend  to  the  President  to  use  his  own  judgment. 

Well  known  as  is  the  despotic  form  of  government  in  Guatemala^ 
in  justice  to  the  President,  we  must  say  that  when  he  turned  over 
tc  the  Congress  this  loan  proposition  he  clearly  proved  that  he  did 
not  favor  such  negotiations  an'd  merely  desired  to 'delay  a  decision 
and,  at  the  same  time,  maintain  himself  in  the  good  graces  of  the 
State  Department  and  of  Mr.  Knox.  With  his  recognized  astute- 
ness, President  Cabrera  has  succeeded  in  continuing  his  system  of 
delay  and  has  prevented  any  action  by  the  Congress  of  Guatemala 
up  to  this  time.  This  conduct  proves  that,  if  he  lacks  strength  of 
character,  the  president  certainly  manifests  a  good  deal  of  prudence 
by  which'  he  maintains  himself  in  power  and  in  favor  with  the  State 
Department,  whose  plans  relative  to  the  other  Central  American 
countries  he  has  always  aided  and  abetted,  as  we  shall  prove  later 
on. 

HONDURAS. 

Simultaneously  with  the  propositions  made  the  other  two  coun- 
tries named,  the  State  Department  approached  Honduras,  through 
the  American  Minister  at  Tegucigalpa,  intimating  to  the  Honduran 
Government  the  advisability  of  sending  a  representative  to  Wash- 
ington with  a  view  to  taking  advantage  of  the  offer  of  a  syndicate 


18 

of  Wall  Street  bankers  to  settle  the  foreign  debt,  to  advance  funds 
for  the  carrying  out  of  progressive  public  works,  and  for  the  re- 
demption of  the  internal  debt,  assuring  the  government  that  this 
proposition  would  be  more  advantageous  to  the  country  than  the 
settlement  made  with  the  Minister  of  Great  Britain,  who  was  at 
the  same  time  representing  the  foreign  bondholders.  (See  Ad- 
denda "A.") 

Before  this  took  place  the  State  Department  had  used  its  in- 
fluence in  inducing  the  Foreign  Office  in  London  to  annul  the 
settlement  made  through  the  British  Minister.  The  Hondurau 
Government  sent  a  commission  to  Washington  and  New  York,  who 
listened  to  the  propositions  of  the  bankers,  which'  were  conditional 
upon  the  signing  with  the  American  Government  of  an  agreement, 
by  virtue  of  which  the  said  government  would  assume  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  Honduran  Custom  Houses,  through  the  medium 
of  employes,  whose  appointment  and  dismissal  should  be  made  at 
the  pleasure  of  the  President  of  the  United  S"tates,  and  who,  there- 
fore, would  not  be  responsible  to  Honduras. 

The  loan  was  to  amount  to  Ten  Million  Dollars  at  a  rate  of  emis- 
sion of  88%  bearing  interest  at  5%  and  1%!  for  amortization.  Of 
these  millions  not  even  ten  per  cent  were  to  reach  Honduras,  and 
the  greater  part  of  this  same  ten  per  cent  was  to  be  invested  in 
railroad  supplies,  machinery,  rolling  stock,  etc. 

As  to  the  other  terms  and  conditions  of  this  negotiation,  un- 
doubtedly an  acceptance  would  have  been  tantamount  to  Honduras 
having  to  give  up  its  sovereignty  and  the  proceeds  of  its  fiscal  in- 
come, for  the  benefit  of  this  group  of  bankers,  backed  up  by  the 
State  Department,  thus  placing  the  country  at  the  mercy  of  its  so- 
called  protectors.  Reduced  to  cold  figures,  Mr.  Knox's  proposition 
was  this :  That  Honduras  would  have  to  pay  in  forty  years  more 
than  Twenty-six  Million  Dollars,  instead  of  the  Eight  Millions  it 
would  have  had  to  pay  if  the  settlement  made  with  the  British 
Minister  had  been  kept  in  force,  which  latter  proposition  contained 
no  pitfalls,  nor  degrading  conditions  and  stipulations.  In  spite  of 
this,  President  Taft,  as  well  as  Mr.  Knox,  persisted  in  proclaiming 
to  the  world  that  they  were  holding  out  a  "generous  hand"  to  the 
Latin-American  countries,  in  order  to  lighten  the  weight  of  their 
foreign  debts,  when  in  truth  they  were  devising  means  to  corner 


19 

these  countries  in  such  a  way  as  to  force  them  into  political  distress, 
and  final  inability  to  maintain  their  sovereignty,  thus  forcing  them 
sooner  or  later  into  having  to  ask  the  United  States  for  annexation 
or  for  a  complete  and  perpetual  protectorate.  In  such  a  situation, 
these  countries  would  be  under  the  dominion  of  the  Executive  of 
the  United  States,  who  would  be  ruling  over  them  without  having 
to  assume  any  responsibility  to  his  own  people,  because,  in  a  given 
case,  he  could  unburden  this  on  his  allies,  the  group  of  financiers, 
over  whom  the  courts  of  the  United  States  would  have  no  jurisdic- 
tion, for  the  reason  that  if  they  committed  punishable  acts,  these 
^vrere  committed  in  a  foreign  country,  and  the  laws  of  that  oppressed 
country  roulcl  never  reach  them,  for  the  reason  that  their  influence 
would  aid  them  in  avoiding  being  held  responsible. 

This  loan  proposition  was  held  secret  here  in  the  United  States 
as  well  as  in  Honduras.  In  Honduras  because  pressure  had  been 
brought  to  bear  on  the  President  by  the  State  Department  and  the 
tanking  syndicate  not  to  publish  it,  so  that  only  a  few  of  his 
Ministers  may  have  had  knowledge  of  the  same. 

The  Envoy  of  Honduras  in  Washington  refused  to  sign  this 
Xoan  Treaty  and  contract,  acting  under  instructions  from  his  gov- 
ernment, until,  in  July,  1910,  Honduras  was  surprised  by  an 
attempted  revolution,  consisting  of  an  armed  expedition  invading 
the  Atlantic  Coast  of  Honduras.  Although  the  American  navy 
had  been  very  watchful  on  similar  and  previous  occasions,  when 
this  expedition  was  sailing  the  Bay  of  Honduras,  the  American  war- 
ships did  not  appear. 

This  revolution  proved  a  fiasco,  but  the  State  Department  took 
advantage  of  it,  in  giving  the  then  Executive  of  Honduras  to  under- 
stand, first,  through'  his  own  envoy  at  Washington,  and  again, 
through  the  American  Minister  at  Tegucigalpa,  that  only  on  the 
condition  that  he  accept  the  tendered  Loan.  Proposition,  could  he, 
the  President  of  Honduras,  insure  himself  against  a  repetition  of 
revolutionary  uprisings  as  the  State  Department  would  then  bind 
•itself  to  crush  same. 

The  President,  General  Miguel  E.  Davila,  whose  sole  ambition 
was  to  retain  himself  in  power  at  any  price,  then  began  to  change 
liis  instructions  to  his  financial  agent,  and  at  the  same  time,  Envoy 
Extraordinary  at  Washington,  then  in  New  York,  General  Juan  E. 


20 

Paredes.  He  still  instructed  his  representative,  however,  not  to- 
submit  to  any  clause  which  could  possibly  endanger  the  sovereignty 
of  Honduras.  In  order  to  break  President  Davila's  resistance,  the- 
extreme  was  reached  in  having  the  press  of  this  country  publish 
hints  that  should  President  Davilla  not  accept  the  Loan  Proposi- 
tion in  toto  pretty  soon,  it  would  be  accepted  anyway  by  Honduras,, 
as  a  revolution  in  that  country  was  unavoidable,  and  that  the  head 
ond  leader  of  the  revolution  had  beforehand  pledged  himself  to  ac- 
cept the  proposition.  When  President  Davila  shortly  thereafter  re- 
quested the  United  States  to  prevent  the  sailing  of  that  much 
heralded  revolutionary  expedition,  at  the  same  time  accusing  the 
President  of  Guatemala  of  having  given  this  intended  expedition 
his  support,  the  premptory  answer  he  received  from  Washington 
was  "Sign  the  proposed  Financial  Project  first/' 

Finally  Davila  gave  orders  to  sign  the  Loan  Treaty,  which  in- 
struction the  Honduran  representative  at  first  refused  to  obey,  but 
finally  complied  with,  after  having  filed  a  protest,  on  the  tenth  of 
January,  and  after  the  announced  revolution  had  already  been 
started  and  two  ports  had  been  taken.  However,  the  Honduran 
representative  irrevocably  refused  to  sign  the  contract  with  the 
bankers.  The  truth  of  this  incident  has  been  repeatedly  vouched, 
for  by  Mr.  Paredes  in  various  pamphlets  which  he  has  published  in 
the  United  States.  Copies  of  some  of  the  most  important  docu- 
ments we  attach,  Addenda  "B." 

When  this  revolutionary  expedition,  which  started  from  the  At- 
lantic Coast  of  the  United  States,  reached  the  Coast  of  Honduras,, 
after  having  taken  aboard  their  vessel,  somewhere  along  the  coast 
of  Guatemala,  some  war  supplies  that  had  been  offered  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  that  country,  there  were  two  American  war  vessels  in  these 
waters,  but  they  took  no  action  to  detain  the  expedition.  The 
American  cruiser,  Tacoma,  went  alongside  the  Hornet,  the  leading 
vessel  of  the  expedition,  to  ascertain  if  this  vessel  had  violated  the 
neutrality  laws  of  the  United  States,  but  the  Tacoma's  commander- 
declared  that  he  found  nothing  suspicious  aboard.  After  Davila 
had  signed  the  Loan  Treaty,  the  same  Tacoma  was  ordered  to  cap- 
ture the  Hornet,  but  the  Hornet  had  had  time  to  land  the  war  sup- 
plies she  had  had  aboard. 

This  Loan  Treaty  was  almost  unanimously  vetoed  and  declined 


21 


oy  the  Honduran  Congress  on  the  last  day  of  January,  the  State 
Department,  however,  insisting  right  along  that  the  agreement  with 
the  banking  syndicate  should  also  be  accepted  and  signed.  The 
signature  was  affixed  to  the  agreement  in  February,  not,  however,  by 
the  same  Envoy,  who  had  been  recalled,  but  by  the  permanent  Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary.  It  is  worth  relating  that  when  the  Honduran 
Congress  refused  to.  ratify  the  Loan  Treaty  the  American  navy 
showed  once  more,  and  openly,  a  marked  partiality  for  the  revo- 
lutionists. 

When  the  State  Department  offered  its  good  offices  with  a  view 
to  bringing  about  peace,  a  note  was  addressed  to  the  American 
Minister  at  Tegucigalpa,  to  the  commander  of  the  American  Squad- 
ron and  to  the  two  warring  factions,  containing  the  basis  upon 
^vhich  the  United  States  would  undertake  to  mediate,  one  of  the 
terms  being  that  Puerto  Cortez  should  be  declared  a  neutral  zone, 
whereupon  the  commander  of  the  Tacoma  insisted  that  the  garri- 
son of  the  constitutional  government  should  vacate  the  port,  which 
demand  was  complied  with,  the  port  remaining  under  the  protection 
of  the  foreign  consuls  and  the  men-of-war,  but  chiefly  under  the 
protection  of  the  declaration  of  neutrality  which  had  been  issued 
by  the  State  Department. 

Therefore,  when  President  Davila  was  informed  by  the  American 
Minister  in  person,  who  stated  that  he  had  come  in  representation 
of  the  Commander  of  the  Tacoma,  that  he,  Davila,  was  to  authorize 
the  delivery  of  Porto  Cortez  into  the  hands  of  the  revolutionists, 
his  surprise  can  be  imagined.  Of  course,  Davila  refused,  stating 
that  his  refusal  was  based  upon  the  assurance  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment that  Porto  Cortez  should  be  a  neutral  zone,  etc.,  as  related  by 
us,  but  the  American  Minister  became  insistent  the  following  day, 
and  after  a  few  hours  of  discussion  of  h'is  demand,  when  he,  no 
doubt,  became  annoyed,  he  said  to  Davila:  "It  is  useless  to  lose 
&ny  more  time.  The  port  has  been  in  the  hands  of  the  revolutionists 
since  yesterday,  and  if  you  care  to  be  assured  of  the  American  offer 
of  mediation,  you  had  better  consider  the  delivery  of  Puerto  Cortez 
to  your  opponents  as  a  "fait  accompli."  The  truth  is  that  the  port 
had  been  delivered  to  the  revolutionists  even  before  President  Da- 
vila had  been  asked  for  his  authorization. 

Mr.  Knox,  in  his  offer  of  mediation,  stated  as  another  clause  of 


22 

his  stipulations,  that  President  Davila  should  deposit  the  executive- 
power  in  a  third  person,  so  as  to  bring  about  a  termination  of  the- 
inner  strife,  and  that  this  third  party  should  be  entirely  impartial,, 
so  as  to  give  guarantees  to  all  Hondurans,  of  all  factions,  alike. 
Eegardless  of  this,  and  obeying  explicit  instructions  from  Mr. 
Knox  himself,  his  emissary,  Mr.  Dawson — to  whose  decision  the 
delegates  to  the  Peace  Conference  held  at  Puerto  Cortez  pledged 
themselves,  appointed  Dr.  Francisco  Bertran  as  the  person  in  whom. 
President  Davila  should  deposit  the  executive  power. 

We  do  not  care  to  discuss  the  personal  merits  of  Dr.  Bertran, 
but  the  fact  remains  that  he  was  affiliated  with  the  revolution,  and 
actively  engaged  in  the  ranks  of  the  revolutionists,  and  was  be- 
sides known  as  one  of  the  most  intimate  friends  of  the  revolutionary 
leader.  This  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  an  understanding  and  a 
peaceable  settlement  of  their  differences  could  not  be  arrived  at 
among  the  Honduranians,  because  the  ruler,  in  fact,  being  the 
victorious  revolutionist,  all  the  promise  of  a  guaranty  to  all  Hon- 
durans of  other  affiliations  have  proved  an  illusion  up  to  this  date, 
contravening  the  assurances  given  by  the  State  Department  in  its 
offer  of  mediation. 

However,  this  two-faced  policy  of  the  State  Department  resulted 
in  a  benefit  to  Honduras.  The  victorious  opponent  of  President 
Davila,  favored  by  the  State  Department,  also  remained  unsatisfied, 
and  as  public  opinion  in  Honduras  had  always  been  manifestly  in 
opposition  to  the  proposed  loan  negotiations,  the  new  President  has 
not  ratified  that  Loan  Project  up  to  the  present  day,  thus  frustrating 
the  hopes  of  the  banking  syndicate,  who  had  placed  full  confidence 
in  him,  and  who  have  since  made  him  new  propositions  more  ad- 
vantageous than  the  old  ones. 

The  new  President  was  greatly  assisted  by  the  adverse  stand  taken 
against  this  loan  policy  by  the  American  Senate,  which  attitude 
was  greatly  admired  and  applauded  in  all  Latin- America.  The 
action  of  the  United  States  Senate  in  declining  to  approve  this  loan 
convention  was  principally  due  to  the  energetic  efforts  of  a  few 
Central  Americans,  particularly  Dr.  Policarpo  Bonilla,  former 
President  of  Honduras,  who  presented  astounding  revelations  to  • 
the  Senate  regarding  the  vicious  terms  of  the  proposed  contracts 
and  the  insincerity  of  the  State  Department's  attitude.  Had  the  - 


23 

Senate  approved  the  treaty,  the  State  Department  would,  no  doubt, 
have  dared  to  press  energetically  the  new  President  into  yielding 
to  its  demand,  and  he,  knowing  from  personal  experience  to  what 
extremes  the  State  Department  might  go  in  order  to  accomplish  its 
purposes,  might  probably  have  imitated  his  predecessor  in  order  to 
remain  in  the  executive  chair. 

We  believe  that  we  have  succeeded  in  clearly  demonstrating  that 
the  last  two  revolutions  in  Honduras  were,  if  not  actual  creations 
of  the  State  Department,  at  least,  well  known  beforehand  and 
tolerated  by  the  same  as  a  necessary  consequence  of  its  coercive 
Dollar  Diplomacy. 

In  continuing  we  shall  proceed  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the  State 
Department  in  connection  with  .the  two  last  revolutions  in  Nicara- 
gua, all  of  which  will  lead  us  to  the  conclusion  that  Knox's  policy 
in  Central  America,  and  in  general,  in  all  Latin- America,  must 
necessarily  be  unanimously  condemned. 

NICAEAGUA. 

Simultaneously  with'  the  Loan  Propositions  made  the  other  Cen- 
tral American  countries,  President  General  Jose  Santos  Zelaya,  ol 
Nicaragua,  was  approached.  He,  however,  would  not  even  agree  to 
discuss  the  proposition,  and  proceeded  to  arrange  a  loan  in  Europe, 
one  of  the  main  objects  of  this  loan  being  the  settlement  of  the 
American  debt,  Considering  the  especial  zeal  which  Secretary  Knox 
has  sought  to  bring  about  an  acceptance  of  these  loan  propositions, 
it  seems  that  this  loan  policy  had  become  with  him  a  personal  hobby, 
and  a  matter  of  personal  pride,  and  it  can  be  easily  deduced  that 
Zelaya' s  refusal  meant  that  from  that  very  moment  his  govern- 
ment was  condemned  to  disappear.  Enormous  claims  against  Nica- 
ragua were  initiated  or  resurrected  and  vigorously  pushed,  some 
of  these  claims  being  nothing  sliort  of  monstrous,  but  Zelaya  never 
gave  cause  for  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations,  because  he 
offered  such  favorable  settlements  with  the  claimants  that  neither 
they  nor  the  State  Department  could  find  a  pretext  to  refuse  these 
offers. 

But  Mr.  Knox  was  determined  to  punish  Zelaya,  as  he  might 
have  expresed  himself,  for  his  stubbornness  and  a  revolution  was 
not  long  in  forthcoming. 

The  Military  Chief  on  the  Atlantic  Coast  of  Nicaragua,  Juan  J. 


Estrada,  brought  up  by  Zelaya,  and  a  man  in  whom  Zeleya  had 
confidence,  declared  himself  in  rebellion  against  Zeleya,  making 
common  cause  with  the  other  malcontents  in  the  country.  From 
the  very  beginning  of  this  revolution,  it  could  be  seen  that  it  had 
merited  the  benevolent  consideration  of  the  State  Department,  and 
that  American  Consul  Moffat,  in  Bluefields,  was  notoriously  an 
accomplice.  The  revolutionists  were  allowed  to  openly  acquire 
war  supplies  and  ammunitions  of  all  kinds  in  the  United  States, 
?nd  were  amply  supplied  with  funds  by  American  capitalists.  All 
of  this  was  done  openly,  and  with  the  benevolent  and  even  com- 
placent consent  of  the  American  authorities. 

As  one  of  the  best  proofs  of  our  assertions,  we  shall  submit  also 
the  report  given  to  the  Xew  York  Times  recently  by  former  Presi- 
dent of  Nicaragua,  Juan  J.  Estrada,  leader  of  that  revolution. 
(Addenda  C.) 

But  in  order  to  take  action  against  Zelaya  openly  and  with  a  free 
hand,  Mr.  Knox  had  to  avail  himself  of  some  pretext  to  open 
hostilities.  If  such  a  pretext  had  not  happened  to  present  itself, 
surely  Knox  would  have  fabricated  one,  but  it  so  happened  that  it 
presented  itself  in  the  execution  of  Groce  and  Cannon,  the  two 
American  adventurers  who  had  been  actively  engaged  in  the  ranks 
of  the  Estrada  revolution,  and  who  had  been  taken  prisoner  when 
in  the  act  of  blowing  up  with  dynamite  some  government  river 
boats,  and  who  had  been  condemned  to  death  by  a  court  martial. 

We  do  not  want  to  discuss  the  legality  of  this  sentence,  because 
it  is  of  no  importance  in  the  case,  and  we  can  admit,  if  necessary, 
that  it  was  not  legal,  although  the  fact  that  they  were,  when  taken 
prisoner,  in  arms  against  the  government  and  engaged  in  dynamit- 
ing government  transport  steamers,  forfeited  them  their  right  to 
protection  of  the  American  Government,  in  accordance  with  uni- 
versal precedence.  This  was  recognized  recently  by  President  Taft 
himself,  when  cautioning  all  American  citizens  residing  in  Mexico 
to  abstain  from  siding  one  way  or  the  other  in  the  political  strife, 
and  that  a  contravention  would  cause  the  loss  of  right  to  protection 
by  the  United  States  Government.  Had  Cannon  and  Groce  been 
in  the  rank  and  file  of  the  revolution  for  the  sake  of  the  gain  that 
there  was  in  it  for  them,  they  should  have  been  left  to  the  conse- 
quences of  such  a  hazardous  venture.  If  enthusiasm  and  belief  in 
the  justice  of  the  cause  had  led  them,  to  join  the  revolution  to  com- 


25 


bat  a  despot,  they  had  to  take  the  chances  and  risks  that  all 
patriots  take  of  falling  into  the  hands  of  such  despots.  Besides, 
nobody  who  violates  the  International  Law  can  afterwards  claim 
immunity  from  it. 

The  most  the  State  Department  should  have  done,  and  there  i3 
precedent  for  such  action,  was  to  intervene  in  a  friendly  spirit  in 
behalf  of  the  accused  in  order  to  spare  them  capital  punishment. 
Mr.  Knox  had  ample  time  to  do  this,  if  he  had  really  wished  to 
save  the  victims,  but  he  did  not  intend  to  'do  so,  nor  did  he  ever 
try  to  do  so;  and  in  his  memorable  note  addressed  to  the  Charge 
d?  Affairs  of  Nicaragua,  which  note  was  dated  December  1st,  1909, 
and  which  he  claimed  was  caused  by  the  execution  of  Cannon  and 
Groce,  he  ignored  all  the  principles  of  international  law,  annulled 
all  precedence,  and  returned  to  the  civilization  of  the  Middle  Ages, 
when  brute  force  was  the  only  source  of  justice. 

In  this  note,  Knox,  in  his  selfsufficiency,  pronounced  the  sen- 
tence imposed  upon  Cannon  and  Groce  unjust,  declared  Zalaya's 
government  tyrannical  and  despised  by  public  opinion,  and  asserted 
that  all  Nicaragua  had  risen  in  arms.  This  was  not  the  truth,  it 
being  well  known  that  the  revolution  was  at  that  time  localized  on 
part  of  the  Atlantic  Coast.  He  declared  Zelaya  the  perturber  of 
peace  in  Central  America  and  a  violator  of  the  Washington  con- 
ventions, who  had  merited  the  complaints  from  the  other  govern- 
ments of  Central  America,  who  considered  his  stay  in  power  a 
constant  menace.  This  latter  assertion  of  Knox's  was  based,  pro- 
bably, upon  representations  made  to  the  State  Department  by  the 
President  of  Guatemala,  who  has  been  a  tool  in  the  hands  of  Knox 
and  a  willing  helpmate  in  his  policy  of  intervention  in  the  other 
Central  American  countries. 

With  this  act  Knox  constituted  himself  judge  over  an  inde- 
pendent nation,  and  resolved  to  disavow  the  legitimacy  of  the  gov- 
ernment presided  over  by  Zelaya,  breaking  off  the  customary  diplo- 
matic intercourse  with  him,  and  declaring  Zeleya's  government  a 
defacto  government,  which  would  merit  the  same  consideration  as 
the  defacto  government  of  the  revolution. 

We  do  not  believe  that  there  is  another  incident  in  the  diplomatic 
history  of  the  civilized  world  that  may  be  compared  with  the  act 
Ave  have  just  related. 


26 

The  proceeding  of  the  State  Department  would  have  been  much 
less  scandalous  had  it  lived  up  to  its  much  heralded  resolutions. 
However,  it  did  not  do  so.  It  sided  openly  and  without  regard  for 
appearance  with  the  revolution,  which  it  assisted  with  its  moral 
and  material  power  to  become  victorious  over  Zelaya;"  as  shall  be 
proven  later  on.  (Addenda.  D.) 

Zelaya,  stunned  by  the  violent  attitude  of  the  State  Department, 
committed  the  grave  error  of  depositing  the  executive  power  in 
the  man  who  was  the  choice  of  Congress,  according  to  the  Con- 
stitution, when  he  should  have  used  his  best  endeavors  to  gain  a 
decisive  victory  over  the  revolutionists,  thereby  compelling  the 
revolutionists  to  consider  his  separation  from  the  executive  power 
as  the  best  solution  of  the  conflict;  and  then,  should  the  State 
Department  not  have  been  satisfied.  Zelaya  would  have  compelled 
Knox  to  support  the  revolution  with  armed  force  to  enable  them 
to  gain  the  victory.  Zelaya's  premature  move  of  separating  him- 
self from  the  country's  executive  power,  just  at  the  moment  when 
the  forces  of  both  warring  factions  were  lined  up  for  a  decisive 
battle,  naturally  produced  a  state  of  demoralization  in  the  rank  and 
file  of  the  government  troops,  bringing  about,  in  consequence,  tho 
defeat  at  Recreo,  which  served  to  inspire  the  revolutionary  forces 
with  new  vigor  and  confidence,  and  encouraged  them  to  continue 
the  revolt  against  Zelaya's  .successor,  Dr.  Jose  Madriz.  This  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  it  was  well  known  that  Dr.  Madriz  had  been 
a  political  exile  during  the  Zelaya  regime  for  more  than  eleven 
years,  and  was,  therefore,  far  from  being  responsible  for  the  act? 
attributed  to  Zelaya.  But  what  tended  more  than  anything  else  to 
prolong  this  strife  against  Madriz  was  the  stand  taken  by  the  State 
Department,  in  refusing  to  recognize  the  government  of  Dr.  Madriz, 
in  spite  of  its  having  been  legally  constituted,  within  the  .prescrip- 
tions of  the  Washington  Treaty,  and  regardless,  as  well,  of  the  fact 
that  the  Madriz  government  had  been  recognized  by  all  the  other 
civilized  nations,  excepting  Guatemala  and  Salvador.  These  two 
countries  had  been  influenced  by  the  State  Department  to  withhold 
their  recognition,  in  violation  of  the  said  treaty,  the  attitude  of 
the  State  Department  being  based  on  its  stand  that  it  would  pursue 
toward  the  Madriz  government  the  same  policy  it  had  outlined  to 
Zelaya's  Minister  in  Washington. 


27 

The  struggle  then  continued  even  more  sanguinary  than  before, 
"but  surmounting  all  these  unfavorable  influences,  the  forces  of  the 
Madriz  government  routed  the  revolutionary  troops  in  the  interior 
of  the  country,  thus  leaving  the  revolutionists  reduced  to  one  strong- 
hold in  Kama,  and  its  base  of  supplies,  Bluefields,  on  the  Atlantic 
Coast.  To  accomplish  this,  the  army  of  the  government  made 
superhuman  efforts  and  sacrifices,  and  only  after  a  march  through 
morasses  and  never  ending  swamps,  where  hundreds  of  men,  horses 
and  conveyances  were  left  buried  in  the  mire,  did  the  loyal  troops 
succeed  in  reaching  the  aforenamed  two  strongholds  of  the  rebels 
on  the  Coast,  Kama  and  Bluefields,  precisely  simultaneously  with 
maritime  government  expeditions,  who  were  then  occupying  the 
ports  and  all  the  river  outlets  along  the  Coast.  After  a  combine-J 
attack,  they  captured  the  bluff,  the  key  to  the  port  and  town  of 
Bluefields.  When  preparing  to  attack  Bluefields  by  land  and  sea, 
American  marines  were  landed,  and  the  commander  of  the  squadron 
gave  official  notice  that  he  would  not  permit  any  hostile  acts  against 
the  town  01  Bluefields;  that  he  would  not  allow  the  detention  of 
any  mercantile  vessel,  not  even  to  be  searched  for  contraband  of 
war,  and  that  he  would  not  allow  the  collection  of  import  duties 
by  the  Madriz  government  at  the  Bluff  Custom  House,  which  had' 
always  been  the  legal  custom  house  for  the  port  of  Bluefields;  that 
the  revolutionists  were  to  levy  custom  duties  at  a  new  Custom 
House,  which  had  been  established  when  they  lost  the  Bluff  Fort, 
in  front  of  which,  and  covered  by  its  artillery,  all  vessels  were 
obliged  to  pass  in  going  to  and  coming  from  the  so-called  new 
Custom  House.  A  logical  consequence  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
American  commander  was  that  the  revolutionists,  being  guaranteed 
the  safety  of  Bluefields  by  the  presence  of  American  marines, 
massed  all  their  forces  for  the  defense  of  Rama,  and  being  assured 
of  Bluefields  as  a  base  of  supplies,  as  the  marines  were  there  with 
the  avowed  purpose  of  defending  the  town  against  an  attack  by 
the  Madriz  forces,  that  the  demoralization  which  had  been  notice- 
able in  the  ranks  of  the  revolutionists  was  replaced  by  a  firm  con- 
fidence in  an  ultimate  victory;  and  that  the  lack  of  munitions  of 
war  which  had  been  noticeable  in  the  revolutionary  headquarters 
was  replaced  by  an  abundance  of  everything  necessary  for  a  cam- 
paign, for  American  marines,  covered  by  the  American  flag,  were 


28 

Bent  aboard  all  incoming  vessels,  neutral,  American  or  revolutionary, 
thus  rendering  the  importation  of  all  war  material  safe  and  sure  for 
the  carrying  on  of  the  revolution.  The  American  commander 
would  previously  notify  the  commander  of  the  fort  at  the  Bluff, 
and  the  chief  of  the  Nicaraguan  navy,  that  should  an  attempt  be 
made  to  detain  these  vessels,  or  should  a.  shot  be  fired  at  them,  it 
would  be  considered  a  declaration  of  wor;  against  the  United  States, 
and  that  then  the  American  war  vessels  would  bombard  the  fort  and 
sink  the  Nicaraguan  war  vessels. 

Upon  representations  made  by  the  Madriz  government  to  Nor- 
way's, by  whom  Madriz  had  been  recognized  as  the  legitimate  Presi- 
dent of  Nicaragua,  the  Norwegian  Government  prohibited  all  ves- 
sels flying  the  Norwegian  flag  from  transporting  contraband  of  war 
to  the  revolutionists,  or  disobeying  in  any^  manner  the  orders  of  the 
legitimate  government  of  Madriz ;  but  the  commander  of  the  Ameri- 
can i  squadron,  supported  expressly  by  the  State  Department,  in- 
stigated the  masters  of  these  Norwegian  steamers  to  disobey  the 
orders  of  the  government,  and  putting  American  marines  aboard 
their  vessels,  guaranteed  them  an  unmolested  entry  into  the  port. 
The  Norwegian  Vice-Consul  at  Bluefields,  Mr.  Clancy,  who  had 
apprised  his  government  what  had  taken  place,  was  dismissed  from 
his  position  of  Vice-Consul  of  the  United  States,  which  office  he 
was  hording  also. 

The  ultimate  result  of  all  this  was  that  the  Madriz  forces  realized 
that  it  would  be  useless  to  continue  fighting  against  such  odds,  and 
as  it  was  not  possible  for  the  land  force  to  maintain  their  position 
any  longer,  a  general  retreat  was  ordered,  under  the  circumstance? 
equal  to  a  defeat.  When  these  disheartened  troops  arrived  back  in 
the  interior,  they  contaminated  the  balance  of  the  army,  and  before 
long  every  man  in  the  ranks  was  convinced  that  they  had  been 
fighting  a  hopeless  battle,  not  against  the  revolutionists,  but  against 
the  power,  gigantic  in  comparison,  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States.  Dr.  Madriz  realized  that  to  continue  the  strife  would  mean 
useless  spilling  of  more  blood,  and  he  deposited  the  executive  power 
in  a  deputy  named  by  Congress,  who,  in  turn,  turned  it  over  soon 
afterwards,  to  the  leader  of  the  revolutionists.  We  publish  attached 
the  proofs  of  what  we  have  related,  and  especially  the  proofs  .of  the 
complicity  of  the  State  Department.  We  furthermore  attach  a 


publication  written  by  Dr.  Madriz  relative  to  these  facts,  which  he 
had  written  with  the  intention  of  submitting  same  to  the  Nica- 
raguan  Congress,  which,  however,  he  was  not  given  the  time  to  do. 
(Addendas  E  y  F.) 

To  anybody  who  personally  knew  Dr.  Madriz,  who  was  a  highly 
civil  man,  cultured,  learned  and  highly  patriotic  and  honest,  it 
must  have  been  surprising  to  witness  Mr.  Knox's  unberiding  efforts 
in  continuing  to  give  battle  to  Dr.  Madriz,  when  he  should  have 
given  him  his  moral  support  in  order  that  he  might  have  succeeded 
in  reorganizing  and  pacifying  his  country,  which  would  have  pre- 
vented the  sacrifice  of  more  than  4,000  Nicaraguan  lives  and 
millions  worth  of  property;  the  more  so  when  Dr.  Madriz  showed 
plainly  through  his  propositions  made  with  a  view  to  establishing 
peace,  that  his  personal  ambition  would  not  stand  in  the  way  of 
peace,  and  that  if  the  adversaries  insisted,  he  would  renounce  his 
candidacy  when  a  definite  government  would  be  agreed  upon. 

It  is  of  no  use  that  Mr.  Knox  offers  the  excuse  that  he  did  not 
know  Dr.  Madriz,  for  we  are  sure  that  he  had  sufficient  information 
from  one  who  should  merit  his  confidence,  Admiral  Kimball,  the 
Commander  of  the  American  Squadron  in  Pacific,  waters  of  Nica- 
ragua, who  was  in  personal  contact  with  President  Madriz,  and 
who  formed  the  same  opinion  of  esteem  of  Dr.  Madriz  that  we 
have  expressed.  It  is,  perhaps,  because  of  Admiral  Kimball- s 
sincerity  when  addressing  the  State  Department  in  favor  of  Dr. 
Madriz  that  he  was  withdrawn  from  his  post  before  the  termination 
of  the  controversy.  And,  as  it  had  become  a  matter  of  self-love 
with  Mr.  Knox  to  push  ahead  his  Dollar  Diplomacy  at  all  costs, 
Dr.  Maidriz  was  objectionable  to  him,  just  on  account  of  his  sterling 
qualities,  which  made  Knox  sure  that  Dr.  Madriz  would  never  be- 
come a  tool  in  his  hands,  to  execute  schemes  involving  in  truth 
treason  to  his  country,  and  its  complete  ruin.  Knox  needed  un- 
scrupulous men,  who  would  profess  to  political  creeds  like  this  one, 
uSo  long  as  we  succeed  in  keeping  the  Liberals  out  of  power,  we 
will  willingly  submit  to  the  tutelage  of  any  foreign  power,  if  neces- 
sary, even  to  that  of  China." 

Being  intimately  aware  of  the  men  he  had  at  h'is  bidding  in 
Nicaragua,  the  Dawson  Convention  was  the  necessary  consequence 
and  result,  the  Convention  which  has  been  kept  secret  in  Nicaragua 


30 


by  the  Executive  to  such  an  extent  that  he  has  refused  to  show  it 
even  to  the  Nicaraguan  Congressmen  who  asked  for  it. 

Here  in  the  United  States,  to  our  knowledge,  the  complete  text 
of  the  Dawson.  Treaty  has  never  been  published ;  neither  in  Nicara- 
gua, nor  here  in  the  United  States,  has  this  treaty  ever  been  ap- 
proved by  the  respective  legislative  bodies,  and  it  can  never  be 
ratified  for  the  very  good  reason  that  it  was  not  a  pact  between  two 
governments,  but  between  an  agent  of  the  State  Department  on  one 
side,  and,  on  the  other,  some  of  the  chieftains  of  the  revolution, 
who,  with  the  criminal  complacency  of  the  traitor,  were  demonstrat- 
ing their  gratitude  for  the  support  given  them  in  coming  into 
power. 

However,  the  State  Department  has  elevated  this  Dawson  Con- 
vention to  the  height  of  a  venerable,  sacred  treaty,  far  superior  to 
the  laws  and  the  constitution  not  only  of  Nicaragua,  but  of  the 
United  States  as  well,  since  a  pretended  violation  of  this  conven- 
tion caused,  and  ma'de  even  more  sanguinary,  the  last  war  in  that 
unhappy  country. 

From  what  has  filtered  out  to  the  public  of  this  Dawson  Treaty, 
we  know  the  following:  That  the  treaty  was  entered  into  between 
Mr.  Dawson  and  five  men  who  represented  themselves  as  conspicuous 
personages  of  the  Conservative  Party,  namely,  Adolfo  Diaz,  Luis 
Mena,  Juan  J.  Estrada,  EmilianD  Chamorro  and  Fernando  Solar- 
zano,  none  of  whom  could  represent  Nicaragua  legally,  or  be  placed 
in  charge  of  such  engagements,  which  have  later  been  fulfilled,  and 
of  which  the  scope  cannot  yet  be  foreseen.  Among  Mr.  Dawson 
and  the  men  named,  it  was  covenanted  that  Mr.  Estrada  should 
continue  in  the  Presidency  for  two  years,  and  that  during  this  time 
Adolfo  Diaz  should  be  Vice- President,  and  that  when  elections 
were  to  take  place,  the  five  men  nominated,  (who  had  been  converted 
by  themselves  and  by  the  grace  of  Mr.  Dawson  into  "Great  Electors77 
of  Nicagarua),  would  select  from  their  midst  the  President  and 
Vice-President  for  the  next  term,  thus  annulling  the  popular  vote, 
or,  more  properly  speaking,  making  of  it  a  repugnant  farce. 

Then  a  disagreement  occurred  between  two  of  the  "Great  Elec- 
tors," President  Estrada  and  the  Minister  of  War,  Luis  Mena,  in 
consequence  of  which  the  latter  was  imprisoned,  but  the  American 
Minister,  Northcott,  intervened,  and  compelled  the  President  to 


31 

reinstate  Mena  in  his  position  and  status,  whereupon  Estrada,  who 
resented  the  interference  of  the  American  Minister,  notified  him 
that  it  should  make  impossible  his  permanency  in  his  office.  When 
the  American  Minister  insisted,  Estrada  turned  the  presidency  over 
to  Adolfo  Diaz. 

A  short  time  before  that,  as  Estrada  and  Mena  were  not  satis- 
fied with  the  constitution,  as  dictated  by  the  National  Assembly, 
or  rather,  with  the  political  tendencies  of  this  Assembly,  it  having 
been  elected  by  the  partisans  of  Emiliano  Chamorro,  they  dissolved 
the  Assembly,  and  called  together  a  new  one,  which  was  satisfactory 
to  Mena,  but  which  in  the  matter  of  principles  and  as  a  legitimate 
representation  of  public  opinion,  did  not  differ  much  from  the 
previous  one. 

This  Assembly  being  in  session,  the  "Knox-Castrillo"  treaty  was 
convened  upon  as  a  basis  for  a  loan,  which  contract  was  signed  by 
Castrillo  and  a  group  of  bankers  of  New  York.  Both 
the  proposed  treaty  and  contract  were  made  known  to 
the  National  Assembly,  but  as  this  Assembly  was  under 
Mena's  thumb,  and  as  Mena  was  opposed  to  this  negotia- 
tion, he  was  allowed,  in  order  to  overcome  his  opposition,  to  have 
himself  elected  President  by  this  very  same  Assembly  for  the  next 
Presidential  term,  without  anybody  recalling  the  Dawson  pact,  of 
which,  afterwards,  this  election  was  denounced  as  a  violation. 
Mena's  election  having  taken  place  without  a  protest  from  the 
Electors  constituted  by  the  Dawson  pact,  nor  from  the  American 
Minister,  the  way  was  smoothed  for  the  ratification  of  the  Castrillo 
agreements.  The  Assembly  was  not  given  time  to  discuss  the  nego- 
tiations, an  immediate  decision  being  'declared  imperative  in  a  single 
session,  and  they  were  approved  by  a  majority  of  the  Assembly,  this 
majority  having  been  carefully  prepared  beforehand.  The  voices 
of  six  patriotic  members,  who  protested  in  vain,  were  unheeded,  as 
was  a  protest  from  two  of  the  Secretaries  of  the  Executive,  who 
consequently  resigned  their  posts  in  order  not  to  be  accomplices  in 
the  sale  of  their  country. 

The  conduct  of  the  State  Department  appears  throughout  this 
incident  as  phenominally  curious,  or  more  than  that,  absurd.  In 
this  great  country,  where  free  institutions  are  a  fact,  and  where 
the  Eepublican  form  of  government  has  always  been  considered  a 


32 

model  worthy  of  copying,  and  a  stimulus  to  the  Latin- American 
countries,  the  government,  it  seems,  is  determined  to  encourage  the 
Government  of  Nicaragua,  not  only  to  break  its  own  laws,  but  all 
the  principles  of  a  true  democracy.  Unfortunately  this  has  been 
the  tendency  of  the  State  Department  right  along  in  its  relations 
with  its  neighbors  to  the  south,  for  during  the  last  few  years  it 
has  regularly  been  the  policy  of  Mr.  Knox  to  intervene  in  favor 
of  the  tyrannical  factions  in  those  countries,  and  against  the  legiti- 
mate interests  of  the  masses.  Whenever  the  State  Department  has 
given  its  support  to  revolutions,  it  has  never  taken  an  interest  in 
making  sure  that  the  revolution  thus  supported  would  guarantee 
later  on  a  sane  and  responsible  government,  to  justify,  or  at  least, 
explain,  the  intervention.  This  phenomena  is  explained  by  the  fact 
that  the  policy  of  the  State  Department  was  not  inspired  by  a  de- 
sire to  further  the  mutual  interests  of  the  countries,  but  rather,  for 
transitory  personal  interests,  or  with 'a  view  to  furthering  the  plans 
of  and  assisting  those  privileged  financial  speculators.  Had  the 
motive  been  a  different  one,  and  had  the  interventions  resulted  in 
the  establishing  of  true  liberal  regime,  with  law  and  order  and 
honesty  in  the  administrations,  on  account  of  the  assistance  re- 
ceived, the  interferences  in  these  countries  might  have  been  par- 
doned, and  would  have  been  appreciated  finally,  even  if  the  na- 
tional pride  of  these  countries  had  been  hurt  and  resentment  aroused 
in  the  beginning. 

The  Castrillo  agreements  are  built  up  on  the  same  basis  as  the 
propositions  made  Honduras  and  other  countries  named,  but  con- 
tain some  terms  and  conditions  which  are  even  more  aggravating 
to  Nicaragua.  As  Nicaragua  had  but  an  insignificant,  and  rela- 
tively well  taken  care  of,  foreign  debt,  Dollar  Diplomacy  had  to 
resort  to  the  plan  of  amortization  of  the  internal  debt  of  Nicara- 
gua, represented  by  depreciated  paper  money  in  actual  circulation, 
to  find  a  pretext  for  seizing  the  custom  houses  of  the  country;  and 
in  order  to  secure  the  absolute  control  of  financial  conditions  in 
the  country,  a  mixed  Commission  of  Claims  was  created  in  which 
United  States  citizens  form  a  majority,  these  Americans  having 
been  appointed  by  the  State  Department  or  its  representatives.  It 
is  left,  in  fact,  to  this  Commission's  discretion  to  raise  the  figures 
of  this  internal  debt  to  the  height  they  may  deem  convenient,  or 


33 


to  favor  claims  of  friends  of  theirs  as  they  may  see  fit.  The  con- 
tract loan  is  Fifteen  Million  Dollars  at  90</c  emission,  beside  other 
expenses  and  costs,  with  o%  interest  per  annum,  and  1%  amortiza- 
tion. 

We  do  not  intend  to  examine  the  details  of  this  negotiation,  be- 
cause it  has  been  amply  discussed  by  two  political  exiles  from 
Xicmragua,  Drs.  Espinoza  and  Irias.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  it  is 
the  most  ruinous  negotiation  ever  carried  out  in  any  country  at  any 
time,  as  everybody  who  goes  to  the  trouble  of  reading  this  Contract 
will  have  to  affirm. 

These  Castrillo  Contracts  contain  the  clause  that  their  validity 
depends  on  a  ratification  by  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  this 
being,  in  fact,  the  basis  for  all  these  understandings,  excepting  an 
advance  loan  of  a  million  and  a  half  to  be  made  on  the  condition  of 
delivery  of  the  custom  houses  to  American  collectors. 

We  Central  Americans  were  confident  that  this  transaction  would 
never  take  place  and  be  carried  out,  because  we  were  sure  that  the 
American  Senate  would  never  sanction  such  a  monstrous  proposi- 
tion; but,  undoubtedly  with  a  view  to  compelling  this  high  legis- 
lative body  into  a  ratification,  his  "anticipated  loan"  clause  was 
inserted,  which  permitted  Secretary  Knox  to  begin  trying  out  his 
system  in  Central  America,  But  something  more  scandalous  was 
committed.  Knox,  no  doubt,  thinking  that  Nicaragua  might  still 
escape  him,  and  that  too  many  resources  were  still  left  the  country 
to  make  an  escape  good,  forced  an  additional  loan  contract  on  this 
country  to  the  amount  of  Seven  Hundred  Fifty  Thousand  Dollars, 
taking  in  guaranty  the  National  Eailroad  and  river  and  lake  steam- 
ers, on  conditions  which  make  these  national  properties  appear  to 
have  been  almost  given  away.  It  is  but  natural  to  suppose  that  with 
the  ingress  of  such  large  sums  of  money,  the  Xicaraguan  Govern- 
ment should,  at  least  in  the  beginning,  have  been  in  comfortable 
monetary  circumstances,  and  the  country  in  a  favorable  economic 
condition,  but  the  truth  is  that  never  in  the  history  of  that  country 
has  the  treasury  been  emptier  than  then,  nor  has  the  poverty  of  the 
masses  ever  been  so  noticeable,  and  the  stagnation  of  commerce 
and  progress  more  pronounced.  The  reason  for  this  is  clear;  of  all 
these  sums  that  were  apparently  being  loaned  nothing  reached  the 
public  treasuries  of  Nicaragua,  and  of  the  resources  derived  from 


34 

the  Custom  Houses  of  the  country,  but  a  very  small  percentage  has 
been  turned  over  by  the  American  collectors  to  the  government. 

When  the  "Knox-Castrillo"  Convention  was  submitted  to  a  Com- 
mittee of  the  Senate,  although  a  final  decision  was  not  possible  on 
account  of  lack  of  majority,  it  was  very  evident  that  the  Commit- 
tee was  not  in  favor  of  this  proposition,  and  it  could  plainly  be 
seen  that  the  Senate  would  never  ratify  the  treaty,  notwithstanding 
the  new  American  interests  created  ad  hoc,  and  in  such  an  unjust 
and  arbitrary  way. 

No  doubt,  the  group  of  financiers  received  assurances  from  the 
State  Department  that  their  interests  would  be  protected  at  all 
costs,  whereupon  the  bankers  resolved  to  retain  in  its  totality  the 
^sum  collected  through  the  various  fiscal  agents,  thus  openly  violat- 
ing the  agreement,  and  reducing  the  Nicaraguan  Government  to 
the  most  miserable  existence.  In  spite  of  this,  or,  perhaps,  for  this 
very  reason,  the  government  delivered  into  the  hands  of  the  banking 
syndicate  the  National  Eailroad  and  steamers,  in  the  hope  that  for 
this  consideration,  some  part  of  the  money  collected  might  be 
turned  into  the  empty  treasury  of  the  country,  begging  for  a  gift, 
and  this  will  have  to  be  repeated,  or  the  government  will  not  be 
able  to  exist,  depending  as  it  does  on  the  mercy  of  its  projectors. 

Knox's  avowed  purpose,  the  rehabilitation  of  Nicaragua's  foreign 
credit,  has  not  materialized  either.  Formerly  Nicaragua  had  al- 
ways succeeded  in  paying  strict  attention,  and  with  relative  regu- 
larity, to  its  foreign  loan;  but  since  this  new  financial  protectorate 
has  been  imposed  on  Nicaragua,  no  attention  whatever  has  been 
paid  to  living  up  to  its  obligations  with  the  foreign  creditors  of  the 
country,  who  are  numerous,  and  among  whom  there  are  some 
Americans  who  are  not  enjoying  the  special  favor  of  the  State  De- 
partment, and  who,  therefore,  are  deploring  the  change  that  has 
a  a  ken  place. 

The  question  arises  "Has  peace  been  assured  that  country  in  ex- 
change for  all  the  evils  it  has  suffered?"  We  shall  look  into  this. 

It  was  easily  to  be  seen,  in  Nicaragua  as  well  as  abroad,  that 
the  election  of  General  Mena,  brought  about  by  the  National  As- 
sembly, was  not  looked  upon  with  favor  by  the  State  Department, 
the  reason  given  being  that  this  election  was  not  in  conformity  with 
the  Dawson  pact,  and  at  the  same  time  letting  it  be  understood  that 


35 


the  favorite  of  the  State  Department  was  the  actual  President, 
Adolf o  Diaz,  who,  it  is  believed  (which  supposition  was  justified 
by  the  events  which  later  took  place),  was  encouraged  by  the  Ameri- 
can Minister  to  relieve  General  Mena  from  his  post  as  Minister  of 
War,  which  position  Mena  had  secured  for"  himself  through  the 
favoritism  of  a  previous  American  minister.  No  doubt,  this  minis- 
ter assured  Diaz  of  the  support  of  the  American  Government  in 
case  difficulties  should  arise,  which  caused,  or  was  at  least  the 
occasion,  of  the  last  revolution  in  Nicaragua. 

Mena  had  the  support  of  the  armed  forces  in  the  country.  The 
greater  part  of  all  the  officers  in  the  army  were  his  creations,  arid 
it  was  notoriously  known  that  Mena  was  the  real  power  in  the 
government. 

It  is  to  be  presumed  that  Knox  was  convinced  that  his  favored 
candidate  could  not  succeed  himself  through'  the  vote  of  a  public 
election,  and  in  order  that  Mena's  advantage  of  the  control  of  the 
•army  might  be  counterbalanced,  and  to  ignore  public  opinion  as  rep- 
resented by  the  Liberal  Party,  a  civil  war  was  necessary,  in  which 
Diaz  was  to  be  victorious,  aided  by  outside  support.  Had  the  State 
Department  wished  to  avoid  the  loss  of  life  in  Nicaragua  of  the 
last  two  revolutions,  it  could  easily  have  done  so  by  disembarking 
armed  forces  and  by  the  military  occupation  of  the  most  important 
strategic  points  throughout  the  country,  as  it  has  done  lately. 

However,  the  State  Department  proceeded  in  a  directly  opposite 
way.  The  removal  of  General  Mena  from  the  Ministry  of  War. 
advised  by  the  American  Minister,  was  a  step  which  had  to  bring 
the  results  which  were  presently  realized.  Mena,  having  in  his 
possession  most  of  the  armament  in  the  country,  placed  all  that  he 
could  in  the  hands  of  his  followers,  and  then,  securing  the  help 
of  the  Liberals  from  the  eastern  part  of  the  country,  he  succeeded  in 
bringing  an  army  of  volunteers  together,  superior  in  numbers  and 
quality  to  the  forces  Diaz  could  muster  against  him.  Mena  suc- 
ceeded in  a  very  short  time  in  seriously  menacing  the  capital,  and 
in  taking  a  good  many  important  towns. 

Public  sentiment  was  from  the  very  beginning  in  favor  of  the 
uprising,  because  the  government  of  Diaz,  which  never  had  enjoyed 
popular  favor,  became  positively  hated,  and  unpopular  from  the  very 
moment  it  entered  upon  the  loan  negotiations,  which  meant  the  sell- 


36 

ing  of  the  country.  But  the  uprising  against  Diaz's  government  did 
not  spread  over  the  country  until  the  Diaz  forces  became  reduced  to 
Managua,  and,  no  doubt,  the  capital  would  have  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  the  revolution,  had  it  not  been  for  the  defense  for  the 
presidential  palace  by  American  marines.  It  was  then  that  the 
masses  in  Leon,  who  had  up  to  then  remained  passive,  rose  up  in 
arms  as  one  man,  and  attacked  the  government  garrison,  which  was 
annihilated.  They  also  decimated  the  armed  expedition  sent  to 
subjugate  them,  and  recalled  to  the  country  some  of  the  exiled  lead- 
ers, whose  orders  for  an  uprising  they  had  not  expected.  Only  a 
few  days  elapsed  before  the  government  troops  were  concentrated 
at,  and  reduced  to  the  capital,  Managua,  and  to  parts  of  the  De- 
partments Eivas  and  Ch'ontales,  and  those  ports  which  had  been 
occupied  and  held  for  the  government  by  American  marines. 

The  material  support  thus  given  the  Diaz  cause  by  the  one  hun- 
dred marines  was  not  so  great  as  the  moral  prestige  it  gave  it,  and 
naturally  it  caused  a  great  deal  of  demoralization  among  the  ranks 
of  the  assailants.  Even  in  tho?e  moments,  the  State  Department 
could  have  avoided  further  bloodshed  by  declaring  itself  openly,  and 
announcing  irrevocably  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
had  resolved  to  use,  if  necessary,  armed  force  to  put  down  the 
revolution,  as  it  did  later  on,  but  this  course  was  not  pursued,  and 
it  was  given  out  that  armed  intervention  had  been  resorted  to  solely 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  lives  and  property  of  American 
citizens  comprising  in  the  property  interests  the  Nicaraguan  Xa- 
iional  Railroad  lines  and  steamers,  which  were  undisputed  Xk-ara- 
guan  property,  but  which  had  been  delivered  into  the  hands  of  the 
American  speculators  a  few  days  previously  an'd  in  a  great  hurry, 
very  likely  in  anticipation  of  the  revolutionary  movement  to  be  pro- 
voked. 

Admiral  Sutherland  declared  expressly  that  if  the  railroad  and 
steamship  lines  were  returned  to  him  by  the  revolutionists,  he 
would  observe  a  strict  neutrality,  and  that  he  would  abstain  froin 
transporting  either  troops  or  war  supplies  of  either  belligerents, 
thus  obtaining  control  of  both  railroad  and  steamers,  without  any 
resistance  having  been  offered.  However,  once  in  possession  of  the 
railroa'd  lines  and  stations,  and  the  American  forces  having  estab- 
lished themselves  firmly  in  protected  positions  along  these  lines,, 


37 

Sutherland  invented  the'  pretext  of  having  to  go  to  the  rescue  of  a 
French  school  for  girls  who  were  perishing  from  hunger.  All  of 
this  was  pure  fabrication,  as  there  were  no  pupils  at  that  school 
except  native  children,  who  had  the  protection  and  support  of  their 
parents  or  guardians,  and  who  were  suffering  no  greater  hardship? 
than  any  of  the  other  residents  of  Granada.  A  considerable  force 
entrained  in  Managua  for  Granada  and  when  this  force  was  deemed 
sufficient  in  the  stronghold  of  Mena,  the  latter  was  asked  to  sur- 
render, having  been  told  that  in  case  of  his  noncompliance,  armed 
force  would  be  used  against  him,  and  that  no  quarter  would  lie 
given  the  vanquished,  whereupon  Mena  surrendered  without  having 
offered  resistance. 

Admiral  Sutherland  tried  these  tactics  with  GeTm^al  (Doctor) 
Benjamin  Zeledon,  but  this  leader,  being  young  and  a  valiant 
patriot,  although  convinced  that  he  would  be  routed,  and  perhaps 
lose  his  life,  resolved  to  defend  the  honor  of  Nicaragua,  and  refused 
to  surrender. 

The  American  forces,  after  the  fortifications  protecting  Masaya 
had  been  attacked  ineffectively  by  the  Diaz  forces  for  three  days, 
started  to  shell  the  Barranca  Forts,  and,  having  silenced  the  revo- 
lutionary fire,  took  the  positions  by  storm.  A  simultaneous  attack 
was  made  by  the  so-called  Diaz  Government  forces  upon  the  town 
of  Masaya,  nearby,  which  was  captured  a  few  hours  later  than 
Barranca.  Zeledon,  although  wounded,  succeeded  in  escaping,  but 
was  overtaken  and  put  to  death  the  same  day.  This  military  action 
of  the  American  landing  forces  cost  the  lives  of  four  marines  and 
one  hundred  Nicaraguan  government  dead,  besides  a  proportionate 
number  of  wounded,  it  being  unknown  to  us,  up  to  the  present, 
what  losses  the  revolutionists  suffered. 

Leon  and  some  other  towns  in  the  North  were  still  in  the  hands 
of  the  revolutionists,  although  suffering  for  lack  of  war  supplies. 
Admiral  Sutherland  then  demanded  the  surrender  of  all  the  revo- 
lutionary leaders,  and  these,  convinced  of  the  impossibility  of 
success  against  the  American  invading  forces,  and  in  order  to  avoid 
further  bloodshed,  surrendered;  but  the  masses,  highly  inflamed 
by  the  injustice  committed  against  their  country,  tried  to  offer 
resistance.  Unorganized  as  they  were,  the  machine  guns  of  the 
American  marines  were  turned  upon  them.  A  similar  incident 


38 

had  taken  place  in  Chichigalpa.  From  the  American  engagements 
resulted  a  total  loss  of  eleven  marines  killed  and  a  larger  number 
of  these  wounded,  while,  as  published  in  the  press  of  the  country,, 
there  were  hundreds  of  Nicaraguan  victims,  killed  and  wounded,, 
many  of  them  non-combatants. 

It  seems  that  the  State  Department  has  tried  to  make  the  Senate 
appear  responsible  for  its  actions.  This  is  indicated  by  certain 
press  articles  inspired  by  the  State  Department,  and  by  a  declara- 
tion made  by  Mr.  Taft  in  a  speech  at  Beverly,  in  which  he  asserted 
tfhat  the  responsibility  for  the  occurrence  in  Nicaragua  rests  with 
the  Senate,  and  that  the  Senate  alone  is  responsible  for  the  fact 
that  dollars  have  not  substituted  rifle  bullets,  because  the  Senate 
had  not  ratified  the  Loan  Treaty  which  would  have  given  the 
custom  houses  of  the  country  into  the  hands  of  American  collectors, 
thus  doing  away  with  the  inducement  and  object  of  revolution. 
This  declaration  made  by  President  Taft  gives  reason  to  suspect 
that  he  is  not  aware  of  a  good  many  of  the  acts  of  his  Secretary 
of  State,  for  the  fact  is  that  the  Nicaraguan  custom  houses  had 
been  under  the  administration  of  American  collectors  for  many 
months  before  the  revolution  started,  and  it  can  be  safely  asserted 
that,  instead  of  promoting  peace  in  this  country,  as  was  claimed 
for  "Dollar  Diplomacy,"  this  delivery  of  the  country's  resources 
to  the  American  banking  syndicate  actually  was  the  cause  of  the 
war. 

Another  attempted  justification  of  armed  intervention  in  Nica- 
ragua was  that  the  President  de  facto  of  Nicaragua  himself  had 
asked  for  it.  Just  as  good  a  justification  would  be  the  claim  that 
the  Secretary  of  the  State  Department  himself  had  asked  for  this 
intervention,  for  the  President  of  Nicaragua  was  but  a  creature  of 
Secretary  Knox's,  and  a  docile  instrument  in  his  hands. 

We  must  recognize  that,  in  the  minds  of  those  men  who  com- 
posed the  government  at  Managua,  there  remained  a  sense  of 
shame,  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that,  when  reports  were  sent  out 
to  the  other  Central  American  countries  relative  to  the  victory  won 
over  the  revolutionists  at  Masaya,  no  mention  was  made  of  the  fact 
that  this  victory  was  gained  through  the  co-operation  of  the  Amer- 
ican marines.  It  is  evident  that  the  government  officials  at 
Managua  must  have  been  assured  of  the  consent  of  the  American 
Minister  to  ignore  the  part  of  the  American  marines  in  the 


39 

"glorious  triumph,"or  else  they  would  not  have  dared  to  do  so. 
But  even  this  false  sense  of  shame  was  lost  when  the  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Belations  at  Managua  expressed  officially  the  regrets  of 
the  Nicaraguan  nation  to  the  government  and  people  of  the  United 
States  for  the  loss  of  the  marines  whose  lives  were  sacrificed  in 
engagements  against  the  insurgents,  not  having,  indeed,  a  single 
word  to  say  in  honor  of,  or  in  sympathy  with,  the  hundreds  of 
Nicaraguans  who  lost  their  lives  in  these  same  engagements. 

Another  excuse  the  State  Department  gave  for  its  intervention 
in  Nicaragua  was  that  the  city  of  Managua  had  been  bombarded" 
by  the  revolutionists,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Managua  was  a 
defenseless  place,  and  that  the  lives  of  many  non-constants  had 
been  lost  in  consequence.  The  truth  is  that  Managua  is  not  a 
defenseless  town,  since  it  is  protected  by  the  fortifications  on- 
Tiscapa  Hill,  which,  by  the  way,  constitute  the  strongest  fortifica- 
tion in  all  Nicaragua.  Moreover,  the  government  had  at  this  time 
almost  all  the  troops  at  its  disposition  concentrated  here. 

If  the  State  Department  thought  that,  according  to  International' 
law,  it  had  a  right  to.  prevent  the  bombardment  of  the  town, 
it  should  have  compelled  the  Nicaraguan  government  to  have  its 
forces  meet  the  revolutionists  on  a  distant  battlefield,  where  it 
then  would  have  been  decided  who  was  entitled  to  the  occupation 
of  the  capital,  instead  of  ostentatiously  pretending  (for  which  there 
is  no  precedent  in  known  history)  that  it  was  because  of  the  risk 
to  non-combatants  that  they  had  determined  to  prevent  one  of  the 
contending  armies  from  a  decisive  victory  through  the  capture  of' 
the  best  stronghold  of  the  enemy.  Had  the  State  Department  taken 
this  just  and  impartial,  though  arbitrary,  stand,  it  might  have- 
meant  an  immediate  settlement  of  all  differences,  and  a  termina- 
tion of  the  war  right  there  and  then.  However,  in  such  a  proceed- 
ing, there  was  the  danger  that  the  State  Department  would  have 
to  resign  itself  to  seeing  the  revolution  victorious,  a  victory  which 
nobody  could  question  for  a  moment,  and  would  have  had  to  con- 
tent itself  with  seeing  the  people  of  the  country  overthrow  a  treach- 
erous government  that  had  been  the  protege  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment, and  the  edifice  of  "Dollar  Diplomacy,"  erected  at  so  high  a 
cost,  crumble  down  into  nothingness.  If  the  State  Department 
intended  to  uphold  its  policy  toward  Nicaragua,  it  could  not  act 


40 

otherwise  than  it  did,  and  to  show  clearly  its  partiality,  it  went 
so  far  as  to  order  the  American  forces  to  co-operate  in  the  bom- 
bardment of  Masaya,  and  threatened  the  towns  of  Granada  and 
Leon  with  a  similar  fate,  none  of  them  so  well  protected  as  Managua, 
without  taking  into  consideration  the  danger  to  the  non-combatants. 

Another  pretext  of  the  State  Department  for  its  intervention 
was  the  excesses  said  to  have  been  committed  by  the  revolutionists. 
Whenever  the  stories  of  such  excesses  were  related  in  the  press, 
emanating  frequently  from  official  sources  in  Washington,  in  most 
cases  such  accounts  were  fabrications  or  intentional  misrepresenta- 
tions in  order  to  predispose  public  opinion  in  the  United  States 
toward  armed  intervention  in  Xicaragua,  long  beforehand  decided 
upon  by  the  State  Department.  It  is  undeniable  that  some  abuses 
may  have  been  committed  by  the  revolutionary  forces,  but  it  is 
notoriously  known  that  the  conduct  of  the  so-called  government 
troops  was  far  more  to  be  condemned.  We  have  before  us  proofs 
which  entitle  us  to  the  assertion  that,  during  no  civil  war,  the 
United  States  not  excepted,  was  there  ever  less  harm  done  to  lives 
and  property  of  non-combatants,  with  especial  reference  to  the 
foreigners  in  Xicaragua,  than  in  this  last  revolution. 

If  the  excesses  committed  in  Xicaragua  by  revolutionists  had  been 
a  justification  for  intervention,  and  not  a  simple  pretext,  the  State 
Department  should  have,  long  ago,  and  with  much  more  right,  used 
force  to  intervene  in  Mexico,  as  has  been  pointed  out  repeatedly  by 
the  press  of  the  United  States.  But  Mexico  is  not,  like  Xicaragua, 
a  poor  and  feeble  country,  nor  are  there  at  the  head  of  the  govern- 
ment or  of  the  revolution  in  Mexico  men  who  would  ask  for  inter- 
vention, and  thus  become  traitors  to  their  own  country.  An  inter- 
vention in  Mexico  would  mean  an  international  affair  of  very  grave 
consequences  to  the  United  States,  and  a  war  that  would  cost  the 
United  States  tens  of  thousands  of  soldiers  and  very  likely  hundreds 
of  millions  of  dollars.  It  would  mean  a  war  of  conquest,  and,  to 
retain  the  territory  acquired,  a  powerful  army  of  occupation  for 
more  than  two  generations. 

If  all  the  governments  of  Central  America  had  lived  up  to  their 
duty,  proving  Central  American  solidarity,  by  at  least  voicing  a 
word  of  protest  to  satisfy  public  opinion,  so  clearly  manifested 
against  any  foreign  invasion,  perhaps  this  attitude  of  Central  Amer- 
ica would  have  caused  Mr.  Knox  to  pursue  the  same  prudent  policy 


41 

with  Xicaragua  as  that  pursued  with  Mexico.  But  no  doubt  the 
Presidents  were  counseled  to  refrain  from  making  demonstrations 
by  the  fear  with  which  Mr.  Knox  has  succeeded  in  inspiring  them. 
It  is  this  fear  of  Mr.  Knox  which  caused  some  of  these  Presidents 
to  repress  public  demonstrations,  as  well  as  the  press,  and  to  im- 
prison the  writers  who  had  assumed  the  duty  of  giving  voice  to 
the  indignation  felt  by  the  masses;  and,  what  is  more  curious  yet, 
in  some  cases  it  \vas  even  forbidden  to  reproduce  manifestations  of 
protest  originated  and  published  in  the  United  States  by  patriotic 
Central  Americans,  as  well  as  Anglo-Americans,  lovers  of  justice. 

After  all  that  has  happened,  to  explain  its  inconsequence,  the  State 
Department  insists  that  it  has  not  fomented  war  in  Nicaragua,  and 
that  the  American  forces  were  sent  to  Xicaragua  solely~lor  the 
purpose  of  protecting  the  lives  and  interests  of  Americans,  although 
the  State  Department  cannot  now,  nor  can  it  ever,  prove  that  there 
was  a  single  instance  where  a  foreigner  had  suffered  in  person  or 
property,  and  it  is  evident  that  the  State  Department,  on  the  pre- 
tense of  an  imaginary  danger,  has  sacrificed  the  lives  of  those 
marines  who  were  killed  in  Nicaragua  to  "Dollar  Diplomacy." 

The  State  Department's  intervention  in  this  last  revolution  in 
Xicaragua  has  caused  death  and  suffering  to  thousands,  for,  without 
this  intervention,  the  revolution  would  have  been  victorious  in  a 
few  days  and  the  civil  strife  would  have  come  to  an  end ;  but  worse 
than  that  for  the  United  States,  it  has  resulted  in  the  depreciation 
of  the  American  army  in  the  estimation  of  all  Latin  America,  who 
saw  these  American  soldiers,  considered  to  be  in  their  own  country 
the  defenders  of  law  and  liberty,  converted  into  tools  of  tyranny 
and  oppression  in  Xicaragua. 

Does,  perhaps,  Mr.  Knox  think  that  the  success  of  the  American 
arms  in  Xicaragua  so  easily  obtained,  is  a  matter  of  glory,  in- 
stead of  disgrace,  to  the  American  army  ?  Mr.  Knox  must  be  satis- 
fied with  his  labors,  otherwise  he  would  not  have  gone  to  the  ex- 
treme that  he  did.  He  has  kept  the  army  of  occupation  in  Xica- 
ragua, not  for  the  purpose  of  guaranteeing  the  free  election  of  a 
President  for  the  next  term,  but  for  the  guaranty  of  the  election 
of  his  protege,  Adolfo  Diaz,  and  he  has  accomplished  his  aim,  for, 
on  the  2nd  of  Xovember,  under  the  reign  of  martial  law,  with  the 
citizens  terrorized  by  the  bayonets  of  the  American  marines,  the 
traitor  Diaz  was  elected,  supposedly  without  any  opposition. 


4 

I 

42 

On  the  same  day,  the  people  were  called  to  elect  deputies,  because 
Diaz,  assuming  dictatorial  power  in  the  country,  and  supported 
by  the  American  government,  had  dissolved  the  National  Assembly, 
which  was  the.  very  same  Assembly  to  which  he  owed  that  faint 
shadow  of  legality  of  his  executive  power,  and  also  the  same 
Assembly  that  declared  Diaz'  presidency  ended  when  the  last  revo- 
lution broke  out  because  of  his  treasonable  attitude. 

To  give  an  idea  of  the  electoral  liberties  enjoyed  by  the  citizens  of 
Nicaragua  during  the  last  election,  we  insert  a  copy  of  the  message 
sent  out  by  the  Commander-in-General  of  the  Mcaraguan  Army, 
Emiliano  Chamorro,  which  message  was  addressed  to  all  military 
and  civil  authorities  in  the  country,  and  in  which  all  functionaries 
were  incited  to  make  certain  the  election  of  those  candidates  named 
by  Chamorro,  for  the  reason  that  these  were  the  candidates  chosen 
in  conformity  with  the  famous  "Dawson  Pact": 

"ADMINISTRATIVE  OFFICES, 
"MANAGUA,  October  25,  1 :15  P.  M. 
"Commandants  of  Posts  and  District  Prefects: 

"I  beg  to  advise  you  that  we,  the  principal  leaders  of  the  Kevolu- 
tion  of  October,  met,  and  in  order  to  comply  with  the  Dawson  Pact 
have  in  common  accord  designated  as  the  candidates  of  the  Con- 
servative Party  for  the  first  constitutional  period : 
"Adolf o  Diaz  for  President; 
"Fernando  Zolorzano  for  Vice-president. 

"I  take  pleasure  in  acquainting  you  with  this  fact  so  that  you 
may  urge  our  friends  and  religious  fellow-believers  to  exert  the 
necessary  efforts  at  the  polls  to  accomplish  the  triumph  of  the  before 
mentioned  candidates. 

"With  all  consideration,  I  am 

"Affectionately, 

"EMILIANO  CHAMORRO/' 

This  same  Chamorro  addressed  a  telegram  to  the  President  of 
Honduras,  of  which  we  herewith  insert  a  copy.  This  telegram  was 
intercepted  at  Leon,  as  stated  in  "The  Daily  News"  of  Salvador, 
under  date  of  September  4th,  which  is  our  source  of  information 
in  this  particular  instance.  This  telegram  saysr 


43 

"We  have  to  trust  in  the  final  outcome.  We  are  counting  on  the 
support  of  the  United  States,  who  will  not  delay  in  making  their 
power  felt  by  the  Liberals  and  the  other  enemies  of  our  cause." 

Therefore,  if  we  were  lacking  other  proofs  of  the  criminal  con- 
spiracy between  those  in  power  in  Nicaragua  and  the  foreign 
invaders,  this  telegram  would  be  sufficient  proof;  but  there  is  a 
document  existent  which  will  pass  into  the  history  of  American- 
diplomacy  as  one  of  the  most  scandalous  proofs  of  the  abuse  of  a 
weak  country  by  the  powerful  government  of  the  United  States,, 
equalled  only  by  that  Note  of  Mr.  Knox's  to  which  we  have  already 
referred. 

The  document  we  allude  to  is  a  note  addressed  by  the  American 
Minister  in  Nicaragua,  Mr.  Weitzel,  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Ministry 
of  Foreign  Relations  in  Managua,  a  copy  of  which  we  attach.  (See- 
Addenda  «G.") 

We  make  mention  of  this  document  here,  because  it  demonstrates 
that  the  last  election  in  Nicaragua  was  a  farce,  and  might  be  called 
ridiculous  were  it  not  that  the  sanguinary  events  preceding  it  con>- 
mand  seriousness.  This  has  been  a  farce  in  which  the  State  Depart- 
ment participated  directly,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  pretends  to 
be  desirous  of  showing  Latin  America  what  true  republicanism  is. 
Mr.  Weitzel  say,  among  other  things :  "By  repudiating  Zelaya, 
whose  regime  of  barbarism  and  corruption  was  put  at  an  end  by  the 
Nicaraguans  themselves,  after  a  sanguinary  war,  the  United  States 
government  condemned,  not  only  the  individual,  but  the  whole 
system,  and  it  could  not  possibly  tolerate  any  movement  in  Nica- 
ragua that  has  in  view  a  re-establishment  of  this  destructive  regime. 
The  government  of  the  United  .States  will,  therefore,  oppose  any 
attempt  at  the  restoration  of  Zalayism,  and  will  give  its  efficient 
moral  support  to  the  cause  of  good  government  in  Nicaragua,  legally 
constituted,  and  resulting  in  benefit  to  the  Nicaraguan  people, 
whom  it  has  long  been  the  aim  of  the  United  States  government  to 
aid  in  its  endeavors  for  peace  and  prosperity,  under  a  benevolent 
constitutional  government  of  law  and  order/' 

As  what  Weitzel  terms  Zelayism,  or  more  accurately  speaking, 
not  Diazism,  would  have  re-established  itself  in  Nicaragua,  beyond 
all  doubt,  through  a  FREE  election, — it  was  to  the  interests  of  the 
invading  government,  or,  rather,  the  State  Department,  that  no 
President  should  be  elected  except  its  accomplice,  Diaz. 


44 

This  assertion  of  Mr.  Weitzel  has  been  precisely  the  hobby  horse 
of  Mr.  Knox's  for  the  last  couple  of  years  to  provoke  disturbances 
in  Central  America.  To  prove  the  correctness  of  our  opinion  we 
propose  to  go  into  details. 

The  State  Department  has  stated  that  it  not  only  condemned 
Zelaya  as  an  individual,  but  his  system  of  government  as  well. 
We  shall  not  discuss  whether  the  State  Department  had  a  right 
to  judge  the  executive  of  an  independent  country,  as  we  have 
already  expressed  our  views  en  this  question,  but  since  it  claims 
to  have  condemned  the  "system"'  it  was  but  natural  to  expect  that 
the  State  Department  would  use  every  endeavor  to  secure  in  the 
new  government  in  Nicaragua,  its  own  creation,  a  "model  re- 
publican government,"  a  government  of  administrative  honesty,  and 
of  marked  patriotism;  nobody  could  have  expected  to  see  the 
.State  Department  encouraging  with  its  protection  this  new  govern- 
ment in  Nicaragua  in  committing  outrages  against  the  persons  and 
property  of  its  citizen — in  systematic  robbery,  and  the  vilest  of 
treasons. 

However,  it  is  plainly  to  be  seen  that  this  kind  of  a  government 
had  to  be  the  choice  of  the  State  Department,  if  it  wanted  to  see 
•its  financial  policy  in  Nicaragua  succeed,  for  no  honest  lawabiding 
and  patriotic  government  would  have  lent  itself  to  further  the 
intentions  of  Dollar  Diplomacy  in  Nicaragua.  Strange  to  say, 
the  State  Department  was  very  explicit  in  denouncing  the  despotism 
of  Zelaya  in  Nicaragua,  but  has  shown  a  marked  indifference  to 
such  rule  in  other  countries,  as  for  instance,  Guatemala,  where 
Estrada  Cabrera  has  been  reigning  supreme  for  the  last  fourteen 
years,  a  brutal  despot  and  the  scourge  of  his  people,  a  blot  on 
civilization,  who  has  caused  not  only  his  own  country  to  suffer 
under  his  tyrannical  rule,  but  other  Central  American  countries 
as  well.  We  have  made  the  statement  already  that  it  was  Estrada 
Cabrera  who  furnished  the  sinews  of  war  for  the  last  two  revolu- 
tions «in  Honduras,  and  he  did  likewise  for  the  Estrada  revolution 
in  Nicaragua,  and  although  the  State  Department  has  denounced 
Zelaya  as  the  perturber  of  peace  in  Central  America,  and  as  a 
violator  of  the  Washington  Convention,  it  has  never  taken  action 
against  Cabrera,  or  tried  to  check  his  plans,  as  it  was  quick  to  do 
when  Zelava  was  concerned. 


45 

Mr.  Weitzel  expressed  and  repeated  declarations  made  by  the 
State  Department  and  by  the  President,  Mr.  Taft  himself,  to  the 
effect  that  the  United  States  government  would  not  tolerate  a 
restoration  of  the  Zelaya  regime  in  Nicaragua,  which  they  term 
"Zelayism/'  What  does  Mr.  Weitzel,  the  State  Department,  or 
Mr.  Taft  really  mean  ?  Either  one  would  find.it  difficult  to  explain, 
lor  none  of  them  know  the  history  of  Xicaragua,  the  actual  state 
of  affairs  there,  the  character  of  the  masses  and  its  leaders  and 
politicians,  sufficiently  well  to  set  up  $  criterion  and  it  is  this 
ignorance  that  explains  the  many  mistakes  and  abuses  committed 
ly  the  State  Department. 

Zelaya,  like  all  despotic  rulers,  never  succeeded  in  forming  a 
distinctive  political  party.  All  the  employes  of  his  government  were 
subject  to  changes  dictated  solely  by  circumstances  or  by  his  caprice. 
When  Zelaya  abandoned  his  executive  position,  he  would  have  been 
deprived  by  this  act  of  all  prestige  had  not  the  intervention  of 
Ihe  United  States  contributed  to  make  Zelaya  a  martyr  to  the 
autonomy  of  his  country  in  the  eyes  of  some  people,  which  opinion 
would  have  been  far  more  general  had  Zelaya  chosen  to  fall  fighting 
as  a  hero. 

To  stamp  this  last  revolution  in  Xicaragua,  "Zelayism"  shows 
profound  ignorance  and  bad  faith.  This  last  revolution  was  headed 
by  Mena,  one  of  the  conspicuous. leaders  in  the  revolution  against 
Zelaya  and  one  of  the  five  candidates  of  the  Dawson  Treaty,  sup- 
ported by  a  faction  of  the  Conservative  Party.  Without  any  foreign 
(American)  intervention,  it  is  sure  that  the  Liberal  Party  would 
have  remained  passive  in  its  desire  to  see  the  factions  of  the  op- 
posite party  fight  it  out  among  themselves,  and  to  pursue,  when 
the  fight  should  be  ended,  the  most  advantageous  course  for  them- 
selves. But  the  intervention  of  the  United  States  inflamed  the 
masses  among  the  Liberals,  and  without  waiting  for  orders  from 
their  leaders,  they  crushed  the  forces  of  the  Diaz  government. 
This  occurred  principally  in  the  departments  of  Leon  and  Chinan- 
dega,  the  same  having  always  opposed  Zelaya  since  1896.  Where, 
therefore,  is  the  Zelayism  of  this  last  revolution? 

It  is  a  matter  of  surprise  that  a  dignified  government  should 
embody  in  an  official  document  utterances  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
showing  personal  resentment  and  rage  because  of  the  opposition 
shown  toward  his  Dollar  Diplomacy. 


46 

And,  we  ask  again,  after  all  these  abuses,  after  so  many  scandals, 
has  peace  been  assured  Nicaragua?  Any  foreigner  who  goes  to  the 
trouble  of  reading  this  article  can  answer  this  question  just  as  well 
as  Central  Americans  can.  If  such  a  thing  is  possible  as  that  the 
government  of  the  United  States  should  intend  to  persist  in  its 
policy  in  Nicaragua,  it  would  necessarily  have  to  maintain  there  an 
^'army  of  occupation,"  as  is  necessary  in  any  conquered  country, 
•an-cl  which  would  be  the  only  means  of  saving  those  traitors  who 
sold  Nicaragua  from  the  just  punishment,  which  the  people  will, 
no  doubt,  some  day  meet  out  to  them. 

*To  assist  us  in  proving-  our  assertions  Periodical  Publications 
reached  us  from  Nicaragua,  which  bring-  the  following: 

PRECAUTION    BEATS     OSTENTATION. 

Special  to  The  .American: 

Managua,  Nov.  13. — To-day  at  7  a.  m.  the  presidential  train,  com- 
posed of  three  cars,  left  here  for  Corinto.  In  the  centeir  car  rode  Presi- 
dent Adolfo  Diaz,  Gen.  Eimiliano  Chamorro,  Minister  Dieg-o  M.  Chamorro, 
I>r.  Carlos  Cuadra  Pasos  and  other  friends  of  the  administration.  In 
front  and  rear  were  two  cars  carrying  100  Ameirican  marines.  The  band 
was  not  taken,  nor  was  the  Guard  of  Honor,  President  Diaz  being  against 
.amy  ostentation. 


OTJARD    OF    HONOR    ABOLISHED. 

Special  to  The  American: 

Managua,  Nov.  13. — In  accordance  with  the  decree  of  the  9th  instant, 
the  Guard  of  Honor  to  the  President  of  the  Republic  was,  for  the  time 
being-,  abolished. 


ONLY   400   MARINES    REMAIN. 

Special   to  The  American: 

Managua,  Nov.  12. — On  Friday,  the  fifteenth  instant,  Admiral  South- 
erland  will  leave  for  Panama1  with  the  American  forces,  leaving  only 
four  hundred  marines,  300  of  whom  will  be  stationed  at  Campo  de  Marte 
and  100  at  Leon. 

.Nov.   17,  1912. 

'What  a*  sorrowful  cast  for  the  American  Marines!  We  see  them 
converted  into  Body  Guards  of  a  tyrannica1!  usurper,  kept  there  for  the 
purpose  of  insuring  for  this  man  an  immunity  from  the  wrath  and 
justified  indignation  of  the  masses  of  his  country.  Never,  perhaps,  have 
the  taxpayers  of  the  United  States  even  dreamt  of  the  possibility  that 
their  money  should  be  put  to  the  use  of  keeping  this  man  in  power 
.and  to  impose  a  Dictatorship  on  the  people  of  a  free  country  and  to 
oppress  a  now  free  sister  Republic. 

Those  of  the  Nicaraguan  Citizens  who  were  able  to  do  so,  have 
protested  against  the  Coup  d'Etat — against  the  Dictatorship  and  Usurpa- 
tion of  the  Executive  Power  by  a  traitor,  abstaining  from  giving 
their  vote  all  those  who  had  the  valor  to  challenge  the  soldiers  of  the 
Despot,  (converted  into  Electors  and  Agents),  and  who  had  refused  to 
"be  accqmplices  in  an  Electoral  Farce,  which  can  justly  be  termed  a 
Farce,  even  if  there  were  no  more  reasons  than  the  farct  that  the 
People  were  convened  to  cast  their  vote  on  the  18th  of  October,  and  that 
the  real  Election  took  place  on  the  2nd  of  November,  or  a  lapse  of 
time  of  only  a  fortnight,  which  was  insufficient  to  even  carry  the  news 
of  the  Decree  to  some  of  the  Departments  of  the  Republic. 

We  attach  a  fragment  of  the  Protest  which  was  published  in  Blue- 
fields  arnd  another  one  with  the  Decree  of  Dictatorship.  (  Addenda  I.) 


47 

* 

We  believe  that'  a  peaceful  solution  is  possible ,  but  we  do  not 
that  the  moment  and  the  circumstances  are  opportune  for  a 
iiif/fjestion  on  our  part. 

EL  SALVADOR. 

We  do  not  know  whether  any  loan  propositions  were  ever  made 
to  this  country.,  but  most  likely  not  for  the  reason  that  the  foreign 
debt  is  relatively  small  as  compared  with  the  natural  resources  of 
this  country. 

This  foreign  debt,  caused,  the  same  as  the  enormous  internal  debt, 
by  the  corruptness  and  inability  of  previous  presidents,  has  not 
affected  in  any  way  that  could  not  be  remedied  the  country's  sources 
of  wealth,  and,  no  doubt,  Salvador  will  be  able  to  work  out  its  own 
salvation  by  the  means  of  securing  for  itself  a  series  of  honest 
executives.  But  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  Salvador 
would  not  have  to  feel  the  weight  of  Dollar  Diplomacy,  should  this 
come  to  be  the  fixed  system  of  the  United  States  toward  the  Central 
American  countries.  Salvador  would  be  the  last  one  to  suffer  this 
evil,  but  could  not  escape  it,  as  some  pretext,  however  weak,  would 
be  found  for  compelling  the  Salvadorian  government  to  make  the 
sacrifice  of  the  country's  autono'my. 

The  people  of  Salvador  have  realized  the  danger  and  their 
patriotism  found  expression  in  protests  against  the  latest  armed 
intervention  in  Nicaragua.  Salvador's  government,  presided  over 
by  Dr.  Manuel  E.  Araujo,  knew  its  duty,  as  proven  by  documents 
that  we  have  before  us,  seconding  the  public  clamor  of  its  masses. 
We  cannot  resist  the  desire  to  publish  cables  which  were  exchanged 
between  President  Taft  and  President  Araujo,  and  we  attach  same 
hereto.  (Addenda  "H.") 

The  cable  clearly  demonstrates : 

1.  Mr.  Araujo  was  sure  that  peace  could  be  brought  about  if 
President  Diaz,  of  Nicaragua,  would  deposit  the  executive  power 
in  Mr.  Salvador  Caledron,  to  which  proposition  President  Diaz  had 
already  given  his  approval,  but  which,  without  doubt,  President 
Taft  did  not  permit  to  be  consummated,  as  is  to  be  deducted  from 
the  answer  he  sent  Mr.  Araujo. 

2.  Mr.  Arajuo  was  anxious  to  bring  about  peace  in  Nicaragua 
through  the  mediation  of  the  other  Central  American  republics,  it 


48 

being  understood  that  should  this  mediation  prove  fruitless,  an 
armed  intervention  by  these  Central  American  republics  was  to  be 
resorted  to  in  order  to  avoid  such  an  action  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States.  This  would  have  been  to  the  advantage  of  all  the 
Central  American  countries,  because  this  coming  together  for  a 
common  purpose  would  have  offered  opportunity  for  further  steps 
towards  a  union  of  all  the  Central  American  republics  into  one 
"Federation,"  the  best  means  of  protection  against  the  common 
danger. 

Mr.  Taft  objected  to  this  proposition  on  the  ground  that  his  gov- 
ernment, being  neutral,  and,  therefore,  better  fitted,  should  try  to 
bring  about  the  termination  of  the  civil  Avar  in  Nicaragua.  (How 
this  impartiality  or  neutrality  was  afterwards  demonstrated  we 
have  already  related.)  He  supported  this  opinion  of  his  by  call- 
ing attention  to  the  Washington  Convention,  which,  by  the  way, 
prohibits  all  interventions  in  civil  wars,  and  which  Convention 
Taft  said  it  was  his  duty  to  see  respected,  at  thp  same  time,  re- 
serving for  himself  the  right  to  violate  it. 

3.  The  State  Department  had  explained  to  representatives  of 
Salvador  at  Washington  and  Managua  that  the  landing  of  marines 
in  Nicaragua  was  solely  due  to  the  desire  of  the  State  Department 
in  AVashington  to  protect  the  American  Legation,  Consulates  and 
other  American  interests,  but  that  no  intervention  in  the  internal 
strife  was  intended.    These  assurances  were  not  lived  up  to,  as  we 
have   previously  related,  which  caused  Mr.   Araujo  to  formulate 
representations  which,  although  couched  in  very  suave  and  civil 
terms,  might  still  have  prevented  foreign  armed  forces  from  spill- 
ing the  blood  of  Nicaraguans  on  their  own  soil. 

4.  That  Mr.  Taft  still  pretends  to  have  proved  his  impartiality 
is  shown  in  his  opinion  of  the  revolution,  which  he  declared  a 
revolt  without  a  principle  and  comparable  to  Zelaya's  regime,  which 
he  denounced  in  very  bitter  terms,  also  attacking  the  revolution 
most  passionately,  at  the  same  time,  proclaiming  the  legality  of 
the  Diaz  government,  although  this  government  is  a  defacto  gov- 
ernment only,  having  no  more  shadow  of  legality  than  the  Assembly 
appointment,  which  he  received  from  the  very  same  Assembly  that 
declared  Diaz  deposed  from  his  executive  position. 

It  afforded  us  much  pleasure  to  see  an  official  pamphlet  published 


49 

"recently  in  proof  of  the  correct  and  patriotic  stand  taken  by  the 
President  of  El  Salvador,  who,  with  the  President  of  Honduras, 
had  been  accused  of  sending  to  the  Diaz  government  arms  and 
munitions  at  a  time  when  these  were  most  needed,  so  as  to  enable 
the  government  to  offer  some  resistance,  if  feeble,  to  the  formidable 
•onslaught  of  the  revolution,  all  of  which  would  have  resulted  in 
prolonging  the  strife,  and  in  making  Araujo  an  accomplice  in  the 
treachery  to  Central  America. 

These  publications  prove  that  Mr.  Araujo  saw  from  the  very 
beginning  the  perilous  position  :of  Central  America,  and  that  he 
endeavored  to  arrest  the  danger,  which  does  not  coincide  with  the 
grave  accusations  made  against  him;  and  we  shall  be  still  more 
pleased  when  Mr.  Araujo,  as  soon  as  he  is  informed  of  these  ac- 
cusations, shall  offer  direct  and  conclusive  proofs  of  their  fallacy 
in  order  that  nothing  but  the  truth  shall  be  handed  down  in  the 
Tii&tory  of  the  country. 

THE  WASHINGTON  TREATIES  AND  CONVENTIONS. 

The  Central  American  Peace  Conference  took  place  in  Wash- 
ington, November,  1907,  its  objects  being  the  termination  of  dif- 
ferences between  several  of  the  states  of  Central  America,  and  the 
establishment  of  a  firm  basis  for  the  assurance  of  interstate  peace. 
To  obtain  these  noble  ends,  President  Eoosevelt  generously  offered 
the  hospitality  of  his  country,,  and  with  Mexico,  the  good  and  dis- 
interested offices  of  his  government  as  far  as  this  should  be  pos- 
sible. That  this  Conference  did  not  give  any  practical  results  was 
not  the  fault  of  the  mediating  governments,  but  rather  due  to 
the  narrowmindedness  of  the  presidents  there  represented.  The 
delegates  of  Honduras  and  Nicaragua  proposed,  as  a  remedy  for  all 
troubles  in  Central  America,  the  re-establishment  of  the  Union  of 
the  five  nations  in  one,  declaring  at  the  same  time,  that  they  did 
not  have  any  confidence  in  any  other  means  so  far  proposed  or 
that  could  be  thereafter  proposed.  This  proposition  was  rejected 
by  the  majority,  the  other  three  delegations,  as  were  other  pro- 
positions with  a  tendency  to  restrict  the  absolute  power  with  which 
the  Central  American  presidents  have  ruled  their  countries. 

As  some  of  the  articles  agreed  upon  in  the  Washington  Peace 
Conference  are  of  importance  in  reference  to  our  purpose,  we  shall 
<;opy  some  of  these. 


50 


Article  II  of  the  General  Treaty  says : 

"Desiring  to  secure  in  the  Kepublics  of  Central  America  the 
benefits  which  are  derived  from  the  maintenance  of  their  institu- 
tions, and  to  contribute  at  the  same  time  in  strengthening  their 
stability  and  the  prestige  with  which  they  ought  to  be  surrounded, 
it  is  declared  that  every  disposition  or  measure  which  may  tend 
to  alter  the"  constitutional  organzation  in  any  of  them  is  to  be 
deemed  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  said  Republics." 

The  additional  Convention  is  composed  of  three  articles  which 
say : 

Article  I.  "The  Governments  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
shall  not  recognize  any  other  Government  which  may  come  into 
power  in  any  of  the  five  Republics  as  a  consequence  of  a  COUP 
D'ETAT,  or  of  a  revolution  against  the  recognized  Government., 
so  long  as  the  freely  elected  representatives  of  the  people  thereof, 
have  not  constitutionally  reorganized  the  country.'5 

Article  II.  "Xo  Government  of  Central  America  shall,  in  case 
of  civil  war,  intervene  in  favor  of  or  against  the  Government  of 
the  country  where  the  struggle  takes  place." 

Article  III.  "The  Governments  of  Central  America,  in  the  first 
place,  are  recommended  to.  endeavor  to  bring  about,  by  the  means 
at  their  command,  a  constitutional  reform  in  the  sense  of  prohibit- 
ing the  re-election  of  the  President  of  a  Republic,  where  sucti 
prohibition  does  not  exist;  secondly,  to  adopt  all  measures  necessary 
to  effect  a  complete  guarantee  of  the  principles  of  alteration  in 
power." 

In  a  convention  for  the  establishment  of  a  Central  American 
Court  of  Justice  is  contained  an  "Annexed  Article,"  which  says: 

"Annexed  Article.  The  Central  American  Court  of  Justice  shall 
also  have  jurisdiction  over  the  conflicts  which  may  arise  between 
the  Legislative,  Executive  and  Judicial  Powers,  and  when,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  judicial  decisions  and  resolutions  of  the  National 
Congress  are  not  respected." 

Although  we  have  read  and  reread  the  Treaty  and  the  Conven- 
tions referred  to,  we  do  not  find  a  single  article,  a  single  word, 
that  justifies  the  ostentatious  pretensions  of  the  State  Department 
and  of  President  Taft  himself.  (We  refer  to  the  cablegram  ad- 
dressed to  the  President  of  Salvador,  dated  September  5th,  1912.),, 


51 


that  the  United  States  Government  has  the  right,  by  these  same 
Conventions,  to  compel  the  contracting  parties  to  live  up  to  their 
obligations. 

The  preliminary  protocol,  which  was  the  origin  of  the  Confer- 
ence,, contains  Article  II,  which  says : 

"Their  excellencies,  the  Presidents  of  the  Central  American 
Bepublics,  will  invite  their  excellencies,  the  Presidents  of  the 
United  States  of  America,  and  of  the  United  States  of  Mexico, 
if  it  may  please  them,  to  appoint  their  respective  representatives, 
in  order  that  these  representatives,'  in  a  purely  amicable- capacity, 
may  render  their  good  and  impartial  offices  in  furtherance  of  the 
results  aimed  at  by  this  Conference." 

From  what  we  have  related  it  is  clearly  deducted  that  no  right 
to  intervene  was  granted  the  United  States  nor  Mexico  (who,  by 
the  way,  has  never  pretended  to  have  such  right)  but,  quite  to  the 
contrary,  the  General  Treaty  we  have  related  expressly  annuls  all 
previous  Central  American  Conventions,  including  the  one.  which 
took  place  aboard  the  "Marblehead,"  and  which  was  ratified  by  the 
Convention  of  San  Jose,  Costa  Bica,  between  Guatemala,  Salvador 
and  Honduras.  Those  annulled  conventions  gave  the  Presidents 
of  the  United  States  and  Mexico  the  right  to  officiate  as  permanent 
arbitrators  in  all  differences  between  Central  American  countries, 
and  in  those  days  they  could  have  pretended  to  intervene  in  order 
to  prevent  a  resort  to  arms  on  the  ground  that  they  had  a  right 
to  prevent  wars  before  any  harm  could  be  done  that  might  prove 
beyond  reparation. 

Under  the  present  Treaty  all  that  the  mediating  governments 
could  and  ought  to  do  is  to  continue  tendering  their  good  offices 
in  order  that  the-  conventions  providing  for  their  same  good  offices 
and  amicable  assistance  are  obeyed  and  lived  up  to. 

Let  us  examine  whether  the  government  in  Washington  has  in 
one  way  or  another  with  or  without  a  right,  ever  attempted  to 
influence  the  Central  American  presidents  so  that  they  might 
comply  with  the  Treaties,  as  is  claimed  by  the  State  Department. 

Article  III,  preinserted  in  the  Additional  Convention,  declares 
one  of  the  principles  of  International  Law  for  Central  America 
to  be  the  alternability  of  the  executive  power.  This  principle,  al- 
though a  simple  recommendation  resulting  from  this  Conference,. 


accepted  by  the  presidents,  and  ratified  by  the  congresses  of 
all  Central  American  countries.  After  this  Convention  had  been 
made  valid,  Mr.  Estrada  Cabrera  had  himself  re-elected  in  Guate- 
mala, and  we  are  not  aware  that  the  State  Department  has  ever 
even  reminded  Estrada  Cabrera  of  his  obligation  to  deliver  to  a 
successor  who  might  be  elected  in  a  free  election  the  Presidency 
"held  by  him.  On  the  contrary,  Estrada  Cabrera  has  always  en- 
joyed the  favor  of  the  State  Department,  while  Zelaya,  who  was 
re-elected  previous  to  the  Convention,  was  denounced  and  pursued 
in  the  manner  already  related. 

In  some  of  the  Central  American  countries  despotism  and 
tyranny  have  reigned  supreme,  but  never  have  we  heard  that  the 
State  Department  undertook  to  improve  conditions  in  order  to 
prevent  popular  uprisings,  which  invariably  have  had  their  source 
in  the  lack  of  guaranty  of  publict  safety,  or  even  of  those  rights 
necessary  for  the  preservation  of  life.  The  State  Department 
might,  have  intervened  on  the  ground  that  Article  II  of  the  General 
'Treaty,  already  cited  by  us,  gave  it  a  right  to  declare  infringements 
on  the  Constitutional  Laws  a  menace  to  Central  American  peace 
and  well  being.  But  with  the  exception  of  Zelaya,  unquestionably 
the  most  despotic  Presidents  of  Central  America  were  the  ones  to 
enjoy  the  confidence  and  protection  of  the  State  Department. 

The  State  Department  might,  based  upon  Article  II  of  the  Ad- 
ditional Convention  (which  article  we  have  cited  herein  before), 
have  cautioned  the  other  Central  American  governments  not  to 
recognize  the  ISTicaraguan  government  created  by  the  revolution  of 
1910  (which  government  is  in  existence  to-day),  for  the  reason 
that  said  government  had  not  been  reorganized  constitutionally  and 
that  no  elections  had  taken  place  (until  the  one  which  was  effected 
November  2nd,  and  which  we  have  demonstrated  already  did  not 
merit  the  title  of  an  election.)  But  far  from  doing  so,  the  S'tate 
Department  hastened  to  recognize  this  illegal  government  and  to 
give  it  the  support  of  the  "United  States  government  to  the  extent 
of  protecting  it  by  armed  forces  against  an  uprising  of  its  own 
masses ;  while  it  refused  to  recognize  the  government  of  Dr.  Madriz, 
"which  was  .legally  constituted,  influencing  Guatemala  and  Salvador 
to  refuse  their  recognition  also. 

All  the  efforts  of  the  Central  American  Court  of  Justice  during 


53 


the  last  two  revolutions  in  Nicaragua  to  re-establish  peace  by  means 
of  mediation  were  unsuccessful,  principally  because  one  of  the- 
factions  was  assured  of  the  support  of  the  State  Department  car- 
ried to  the  extremes  we  have  already  criticised. 

Had  it  been  the  desire  of  the  State  Department  to  preserve  the 
dignity  of  this  Court,  instead  of  being  the  direct  cause  of  its 
complete  failure,  it  would  have  assisted  this  Court  in  its  efforts  to- 
bring  .about  peace;  the  more  so  because  an  annexed  article  of  the- 
Convention,  which  provides  for  the  establishment  of  this  Court, 
gives  this  Court  the  right  to  intervene  in  differences  arising  among 
the  High  Departments  of  the  government,  and  the  American  gov- 
ernment might  have  used  its  good  offices  in  having  the  election  of' 
Mena,  since  this  election  was  considered  illegal,  or  the  dismissal 
of  President  Diaz  by  the  same  Assembly  that  elected  Mena,  sub- 
mitted to  this  Court,  thereby  terminating  all  civil  strife  in  Nicara- 
gua at  once. 

Although  Article  II  of  the  Additional  Convention  prohibits  the 
Central  American  governments  from » intervening  for  or  against 
any  Central  American  government  in  case  of  a  revolution  or  civil 
war,  the  American  Government  has  placidly  allowed,  if  it  did  not 
instigate,  the  government  of  Guatemala  to  take  side  with  and 
assist  the  revolutions  in  Honduras  and  Nicaragua.  The  State- 
Department  has  done  even  worse  than  this.  Claiming  for  itself  a 
right  that  was  denied  all  contracting  parties  in  the  Washington 
Conventions,  the  right  to  intervene  directly  or  indirectly,  for  or 
against,  in  revolutions  in  Central  America,  the  State  Department 
went  so  far  as  to  use  armed  force  in  putting  down  the  last  revolu- 
tion and  used  these  armed  forces,  not  only  against  combatants, 
but  even  against  unarmed  citizens,  all  of  which  was  committed' 
with  the  Washington  Treaties  as  a  pretext,  in  scandalous  violation 
of  these  very  same  treaties  which  the  State  Department  has  claimed' 
to  be  defending. 

We  consider  it  very  opportune  to  publish  a  communication  sent 
by  President  Araujo  to  the  Central  American  Court  of  Justice- 
relative  to  the  last  revolution  in  Nicaragua  and  his  true  inter- 
pretation of  the  Washington  Conventions,  which  opinion  is  all 
the  more  interesting,  because  it  voices  the  authorized  idea  of  an 
Executive  of  one  of  the  Central  American  republics.  His  com- 
munication reads  as  follows : 


54 


"Five  independent  nations,  none  having  relinquished  their  rights 
to  an  autonomous  government,  convened  upon  treaties  which  tend 
to  promote  effective  relations  of  peace,  commerce  and  good  will,  and 
the  governments  of  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  having  been  rep- 
resented at  this  Conference  through  notable  representatives,  were 
parties  to  the  deliberations  which  preceded  the  final  conclusions 
arrived  at  in  these  Intrenational  treaties  ratified  at  Washington, 
thanks  to  a  generous  and  disinterested  offer  of  hospitality  of  the 
Ex-President  of  the  United  States.  However,  it  is  noteworthy  that 
neither  in  the  text:of  these  documents,  the  preliminary  Protocol,  nor 
in  the  records  of  the  Conference,  are  these  great  governments  of  the 
United  "States  of  America,  and  Mexico^  conceded  any  rights  or 
obligations  that  could  be  traced  to  these  Treaties  convened  upon  by 
the  Central  American  contracting  parties.  There  is  nothing  in 
either  the  spirit  nor  the  wording  of  these  treaties  that  could  be 
construed  into  a  restriction  of  their  rights  of  sovereignty,  when 
these  contain  nothing  but  expressions  of  mutual  admiration,  respect 
and  good  will,  obligating  the  contracting  countries  to  submit  their 
differences  to  the  verdict  of  the  Central  American  Court  of  Justice, 
which  is  purely  Central  American,  and  of  which  esteemed  institu- 
tion your  Honor  is  the  meritorious  representative." 

And  now  we  shall  conclude.  We  hope  we  have  succeeded  in 
demonstrating  that  "Dollar  Diplomacy"  is  a  great  injustice  and 
is  the  ruin  of  those  countries  in  which  it  is  pursued,  at  the  same 
time  endangering  the  prestige  of  the  United  States  in  the  eyes 
of  all  Latin-America  to  the  benefit  of  only  a  few  privileged 
citizens  of  the  United  States.  We  Central  Americans  lack  the 
means  to  relieve  the  situation  and  to  resent  this  injustice,  and  for 
the  moment  we  have  to  trust  to  the  straightforwardness  and  honesty 
of  the  American  people,  and  the  people's  worthy  representatives  in 
Congress,  and  especially  in  the  Senate,  which  is  investigating  this 
matter.  We  admire  this  great  country,  and  we  are  far  from 
believing  that  the  people  are  responsible  for  the  errors  of  a  few  of 
its  public  men  in  leading  positions.  We  hope  for  justice  to  be  done 
us,  fand  for  a  revival  of  the  Pan- American  Fraternity,  which  will 
give  peace,  progress  and  liberty  to  all  the  nations  of  this  continent/ 

JUAN  LEETS. 
New  Orleans,  November,  1912. 


ADDENDA 


f?  ;  55 

ADDEXDA  A 

MEMORANDUM  OF  MINISTER  BROWN. 

Under  instructions  from  my  government,  which  I  have  just 
received  by  telegraph,  I  have  the  honor  and  the  pleasure  to  inform 
the  Government  of  Honduras  that  the  firm  of  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co. 
has  informed  my  government  that  they  are  prepared  to  agree  in 
the  arrangement  of  the  foreign  debt  of  Honduras,  the  delivery  of 
the  railway  wharf  of  Puerto  Cortes,  and  the  advancement  of  a  sub- 
stantial amount  for*internal  improvements  which  may  be  necessary, 
acquiring  new  bonds  which  must  be  duly  secured. 

Messrs.  Morgan  &  Co.  have  notified  my  government  that  the. 
Council  of  Foreign  Bonholders  had  accepted  the  proposal  of  Morgan 
&  Co.,  who  now  have  control  of  the  British  and  American  securities, 
including  the  railway  and  wharf,  and  that  the  Council  of  Foreign 
Bondholders,  acting  in  behalf  of  the  holders  of  bonds,  have  in- 
formed the  British  Secretary  of  S'tate  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
foregoing,  and  that  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 
having  cordially  approved  the  new  project,  has,  by  request  of  the 
Council  of  Bondholders,  given  notice  to  Minister  Garden  gf  the 
change  in  the  situation. 

I  have  instructions  to  manifest  that  if  the  Government  of  Hon- 
duras would  send  a  special  agent  to  the  United  States  with  full 
powers  to  negotiate  with  Morgan  &  Co.,  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  would  extend  to  him  all  facilities. 

I  beg  to  add  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  feels  itself 
happy  to  see,  in  the  said  proposals,  the  prospect  of  a  good  result 
and  for  a  settlement  upon  a  favorable  basis  for  the  amortization  of 
the  national  debt,  which  would  be  for  the  prosperity,  tranquility 
and  national  strength  of  Honduras. 

(Signed)     PHILIP  BROWN, 
American  Minister  to  Honduras. 

Tegucigalpa,  July  17,  1909. 


ADDENDA     B 

CABLEGRAMS. 

TEGUCIGALPA,  Dec.  10,  1910. 
Paredes,  Honduras  Consulate,  New  York: 

Accept  agreement;  sign  agreement  and  return. 

(Signed)     DAVILA. 


56 


NEW  YORK,  Dec.  11,  1910. 
President  Davila,  Tegucigalpa,  Honduras: 

Consult  situation  prominent  people  to  decide  destinies  Kepublic.. 

(Signed)     PAREDES. 

CABLEGRAMS. 

NEW  YORK,  Dec.  24,  1910. 
President  Davila,  Tegucigalpa,  Honduras: 

I  have  refused  to  sign  convention — American  Protectorate — 
S'anto  Domingo  plan.  Complied  with  my  duty.  Present  you  my 
resignation.  (Signed)  PAREDES. 

TEGUCIGALPA,  Dec.  29,  1910. 
Paredes,  New  York: 

Country  is  on  the  verge  of  a  disastrous  civil  war.  Only  the  loan 
can  save  it.  Think  patriotically.  Must  make  efforts  to  gain  time. 
Loan  will  be  made  in  spite  of  us.  At  least,  we  must  try  to  avoid" 
bloodshed  to  the  Eepublic.  I  await  details. 

(Signed)     DAVILA. 

TEGUCIGALPA,  Jan.  20,  1911.. 
Paredes,  Honduras  Consulate,  New  YoiTc: 

Your  resignation  not  accepted.  Sign  loan  without  delay.  Gov- 
ernment assumes  all  responsibility.  Civil  war  appears  to  be  formid- 
able. Loan  may  avoid  bloodshed  and  prepare  beneficial  evolution, 
preventing  Bonilla  coming  to  power.  Subscribe  contract  this  week. 
Answer.  (Signed)  DAVILA. 

»  » 

LETTER  OF  PRESIDENT  DAVILLA  TO  MINISTER  PAREDES. 

TEGUCIGALPA,  Jan.  12,  1911. 

Minister  of  Honduras,   General  Juan  E.  Paredes,  Comulado   de- 
Honduras,  66  Beaver  Street,  New  York: 

My  Esteemed  Friend — I  am  in  receipt  of  yours  of  Nov.  28th  and 
Dec.  5th. 

Estrada  Cabrera,  who  is  the  promoter  of  this  war  and  that  of 
August  last  year,  has  displayed  a  prodigious  activity  to  produce  the 
revolution,  and  all  elements  are  conjoined  against  the  Government, 
unjustly.  To  get  out  of  these  difficulties  we  take  to  fight  hard. 

The  Government  of  Honduras  was  notified  officially  that  if  the 


57 


loan  was  not  signed,  it  would  be  carried  through  at  all  hazards,  in1, 
worse  conditions  for  the  Eepublic.  Nevertheless,,  we  said  nothing, 
did  not  give  any  promises  until  we  could  receive  your  indications. 
The  last  proposition  made  .by  the  bankers,  which  you'  transmitted 
by  cable,  we  consider  it  as  decisive,  and  for  that  reason  we  ordered 
you  to  sign  and  return. 

The  American  Minister  asked  me  for  a  copy  of  that  cable,  and  I 
gave  it  to  him.  When  you  refused  to  sign  the  treaty  at  Washington, 
the  disgust  of  the  State  Department  raised  to  indignation. 

(Signed)     DAVILA. 

TEGUCIGALPA,  Jan.  27,  1911.. 
Paredes,  Honduras  Consulate,  New  York: 

Ceiba  has  fallen.  S'an  Marcos,  Colon,  has  also  been  taken  by  in- 
vasion from  Nicaragua.  The  war,  according  to  official  declarations, 
took  place  on  account  of  delay  in  signing  the  loan,  notwithstanding 
promises  made  since  Dec.  10th.  War  between  factions  which  de- 
vastates the  country,  atid  the  loan  will  be  made  by  any  means.  Let 
us  put  one  side  our  "amour  propre"  in  order  to  avoid  the  ruin  of 
Honduras.  If  you  cannot  sign,  help  Lazo.  Let  us  work  together 
in  behalf  of  peace.  (Signed)  DAVILA.. 


ADDENDA     C 

Aid  for  Nicaragua  Asked  by  Estrada — She  will  Never  Thrive- 
Without  Our  Effective  Intervention,  Says  Ex-President — 
Urges  a  Protectorate — President  Diaz  Hopes  for.  Our  Help,. 
He  Declares — Blames  Americans  for  Revolutions. 


[New  York  Times,  Sept.  10,  1912.] 

In  the  course  of  an  interview  with  a  Tim&s  reporter  yesterday, 
Ex-President  Estrada,  of  Nicaragua,  who  is  stopping  at  the  Hotel 
St.  George,  Brooklyn,  said  that  without  the  effective  intervention 
of  the  United  States  warfare  in  Nicaragua  would  continue- 
in  definitely,  cuining  the  Central  American  country,  and  sooner  or 
later  involving  the  United  States  in  trouble  with  England  or  Ger- 
many. Mr.  Estrada,  who  declares  that  the  presidency  rightfully 
belongs  to  him,  also  brought  grave  charges  against  a  number  of 
Americans  in  Nicaragua,  blaming  them  for  present  conditions  there;. 


58 


Mr.  Estrada  and  his  faithful  henchman,,  General  Moncada,  are 
starting  for  Nicaragua  early  this  week  to  support  the  government 
of  President  Diaz,  in  whose  favor  Mr.  Estrada  handed  over  the 
reins  of  the  Chief  Magistracy  in  1911,  in  order  to  avert,  so  he  says, 
war  with  the  Conservative  faction. 

"I  would  like  you,  through  the  New  York  Times,  to  convey  a  few 
words  to  the  American  people,"  said  Mr.  Estrada.  "It  is  succinctly 
this:  Without  the  active  help  of  the  United  States  Government, 
Nicaragua  will  never  thrive.  She  will  be  always  the  same." 

"You  mean  a  sort  of  American  protectorate  ?"  he  was  asked. 

ARBITER  FOR  NICARAGUA. 

"Yes,"  he  answered  without  hesitation.  "A  protectorate  along 
the  lines  exercised  in  Cuba  and  Panama,  without,  of  course,  impair- 
ing our  sovereignty.  We  want  the  United  States  Government, 
whether  it  be  Eepublican  or  Democrat,  to  keep  an  eye  upon  us, 
supervise  our  elections,  and,  in  a  word,  become  the  arbiter  and  judge 
of  our  destinies.  I  speak  in  my  name  and  in  the  name  of  President 
Diaz.  My  ideas  are  his,  as  well  as  those  of  the  majority  of  the' 
people  of  Nicaragua.  It's  the  only  way  in  which  we  can  hope  for 
peace  and  progress.  I  am  still  titular  head  of  Nicaragua.  I  did 
not  resign,  as  has  been  stated,  but  merely  handed  the  government 
over  to  the  Yice-President  during  my  absence. 

"For  the  last  twenty  years  Nicaragua  has  been  in  the  hands  of 
a  savage  system  of  militarism.  There  are  no  real  elections,  every- 
thing is  a  farce,  and  everybody  wants  to  be  President  and  rule. 
The  result  is  that  the  country  has  been  and  still  is  a  seething  pot 
of  anarchy,  which  is  gaining  proportions  every  day. 

"But  it  is  not  alone  our  people  who  brew  all  this  trouble.  They 
are  the  least  responsible.  I  charge  thatjjje  majority,  if  not  all,  of 
the  revolutions  in  NicaraguaTin  recentyears  have  been  engineered 
and  openly  financed  by  American  companies  anxious  to  get  conces- 
sions and  monopolies  from  the  government. 

"Take  the  case'  of  the  Bluefields  Steamship  Company.  Zelaya 
gave  these  people  the  exclusive  monopoly  for  the  navigation  of  the 
River  Escondido  and  its  affluents.  When  I  reached  fhe  presidency 
I  also  found  that  exclusive  concessions  for  the  exploitation  of  the 
mining,  liquor,  tobacco,  cattle,  fishing  and  other  national  industries 
were  in  the  hands  of  a  few  Americans  and  Germans. 


59 


CONSPIRACIES  ON  ALL  SIDES. 

"What  was  the  result  ?  I  found  conspiracies  were  being  hatched 
on  all  sides.  Mena,  my  War  Minister,  was  planning  a  revolution. 
The  United  Fruit  Company,,  which  was  after  a  similar  concession, 
a  railroad,  was  pushing  him  all  the  time.  I  had  positive  proofs 
that  he  was  going  to  start  a  revolution  on  May  14,  1911,  so  I 
arrested  him  on  May  9.  The  Conservatives  clamored  for  his  release, 
and  I  handed  over  the  presidency  to  Diaz  to  avert  war,  although  I 
might  have  carried  it  on  successfully,  because  I  had  the  backing  of 
600  Liberals,  who  rallied  around  me  at  the  time." 

Continuing,  Mr.  Estrada  said  that  Mena's  revolution  was  being 
backed  by  the  United  Fruit  Company  and  the  partisans  of  Zelaya. 

Mr.  Estrada  was  frank  enough  to  admit  that  the  revolution 
lieaded  by  him  which  overthrew  Zelaya  had  received  financial  aid 
from  certain  American  companies  established  on  the  Atlantic  coast 
of  Nicaragua.  He  said  these  companies  had  contributed,  off  and  on, 
something  close  to  $1,000,000.  The  house  of  Joseph  W.  Beers  was 
in  for  $200,000,  and  that  of  Samuel  Weil  for  about  $150,000. 


ADDENDA  D 

THE  SECRETARY  OF  STATE  TO  THE  NICARAGUAN  CHARGE. 

DEPARTMENT  OF  STATE, 

December  1,  1909. 

SIR — Since  the  Washington  Convention  of  1907  it  is  notorious 
that  President  Zelaya  has  almost  continuously  kept  Central  America 
in  tension  or  turmoil,  that  he  has  repeatedly  and  flagrantly  violated 
the  provisions  of  the  conventions,  and  by  a  baleful  influence  upon 
Honduras,  whose  neutrality  the  conventions  were  to  assure,  has 
sought  to  discredit  those  sacred  international  obligations  to  the 
great  detriment  of  Costa  Eica,  El  Salvador  and  Guatemala,  whose 
governments  meanwhile  appear  to  have  been  able  patiently  to  strive 
for  the  loyal  support  of  the  engagements  so  solemnly  undertaken  at 
Washington  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  States  and  of  Mexico. 

It  is  equally  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that,  under  the 
regime  of  President  Zelaya,  republican  institutions  have  ceased  in 
Nicaragua  to  exist,  except  in  name;  that  public  opinion  and  the 


60 

press  have  been  throttled;  and  that  prison  has  been  the  reward  of 
any  tendency  to  real  patriotism.  My  consideration  for  you  personally 
impels  me  to  abstain  from  unnecessary  discussion  of  the  painful 
details  of  a  regime  which  unfortunately  has  been  a  blot  upon  the 
history  of  Nicaragua  and  a  discourageemnt  to  a  group  of  Republics 
whose  aspirations  need  only  the  opportunity  of  free  and  honest 
government. 

In  view  of  the  interests  of  the  United  States  and  of  its  relation 
to  the  Washington  Convention,  appeal  against  this  situation  has 
long  since  been  made  to  this  government  by  a  majority  of  the  Cen- 
tral American  Eepublics.  There  is  now  added  to  the  appeal,  through 
the  revolution,  a  great  body  of  the  Mcaraguan  people.  Two 
Americans  who,  this  government  is  now  convinced,  were  officers 
connected  with  the  revolutionary  forces,  and  therefore  entitled  to 
be  dealt  with  according  to  the  enlightened  practice  of  civilized 
nations,  have  been  killed  by  direct  order  of  'President  Zelaya.  Their 
execution  is  said  to  have  been  preceded  by  barbarous  cruelties.  The 
Consulate  at  Managua  is  now  officially  reported  to  have  been 
menaced.  There  is  thus  a  sinister  culmination  of  an  administration 
also  characterized  by  a  cruelty  to  its  own  citizens  which  has,  until 
the  recent  outrage,  found  vent  in  the  case  of  this  country  in  a 
succession  of  petty  annoyances  and  indignities  which  many  months 
ago  made  it  impossible  to  ask  an  American  Minister .  longer  to 
reside  in  Managua.  From  every  point  of  view  it  has  evidently 
become  difficult  for  the  United  States  further  to  delay  more  active 
response  to  the  appeals  so  long  made  to  its  duty,  to  its  citizens,  to 
its  dignity,  to  Central  America  and  to  civilization. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  convinced  that  the  revo- 
lution represents  the  ideals  and  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the 
NIcaraguan  people  more  faithfully  than  does  the  Government  of 
President  Zelaya,  and  that  its  peaceable  control  is  well-nigh  as 
extensive  as  that  hitherto  so  sternly  attempted  by  the  Government 
of  Managua. 

There  is  now  added  the  fact,  as  officially  reported  from  more  than 
one  quarter,  that  there  are  already  indications  of  a  rising  in  the 
Western  provinces  in  favor  of  a  presidential  candidate  intimately 
associated  with  the  old  regime.  In  this  it  is  easy  to  see  new  elements 
tending  toward  a  condition  of  anarchy  which  leaves,  at  a  given 
time,-  no  definite  responsible  source  to  which  the  Government  of 


61 


the  United  States  could  look  for  reparation  for  the  killing  of 
Messrs.  Cannon  and  Groce,  or,  indeed,  for  the  protection  which 
must  be  assured  American  citizens  and  American  interests  in 
Nicaragua. 

In  these  circumstances  the  President  no  longer  feels  for  the 
Government  of  President  Zelaya  that  respect  and  confidence  which 
would  make  it  appropriate  hereafter  to  maintain  with  it  regular 
diplomatic  relations,  implying  the  will  an'd  the  ability  to  respect 
and  assure  what  is  due  from  one  State  t'o  another.  <. 

The  Government  of  Nicaragua  which  you  have  hitherto  repre- 
sented is  hereby  notified,  as  will  be  also  the  leaders  of  the  revolu- 
tion, that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  will  hold  strictly 
accountable  for  the  protection  of  American  life  and  property  the 
factions  de  facto  in  control  of  the  Eastern  and  WESTERN  portions 
of  the  Republic  of  Nicaragua. 

As  for  the  reparation  found  due,  after  careful  consideration,  for 
the  killing  of  Messrs.  Groce  and  Cannon,  the  Government  of  the 
tFnited  States  would  be  loath  to  impose  upon  the  innocent  people 
of  Nicaragua  a  too  heavy  burden  of  expiating  the  acts  of  a  regime 
forced  upon  them  or  to  exact  from  a  succeeding  government,  if  it 
have  quite  different  policies,  the  imposition  of  such  a  burden.  Into 
the  question  of  ultimate  reparation  there  must  enter  the  question 
of  the  existence  at  Managua  of  a  government  capable  of  respond-" 
ing  to  demands.  There  must  enter  also  the  question  of  how  far 
it  is  possible  to  reach  those  actually  responsible  and  those  who 
perpetrated  the  tortures  reported  to  have  preceded  the  execution, 
if  these  be  verified ;  and  the  question  whether  the  government  be  one 
entirely  disassociated  from  the  present  intolerable  conditions  and 
worthy  to  be  trusted  to  make  impossible  a  recurrence  of  such  acts, 
in  which  case  the  President,  as  a  friend  of  your  country,  as  he  is 
also  of  the  other  Republics  of  Central  America,  might  be  disposed 
to  have  indemnity  confined  to  what  was  reasonably  due  the  relatives 
of  the  deceased,  and  punitive  only  in  so  far  as  the  punishment  might 
fall  where  really  due. 

In  pursuance  of  this  policy,  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
will  temporarily  withhold  its  demand  for  reparation,  in  the  mean- 
while taking  such  steps  as  it  deems  wise  and  proper  to  protect 
American  interests. 


To  insure  the  future  protection  of  legitimate  American  interests, 
in  consideration  of  the  interests  of  the  majority  of  the  Central 
American  Republics,  and  in  the  hope  of  making  more  effective  the 
friendly  offices  exerted  under  the  Washington  Conventions,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  reserves  for  further  consideration 
at  the  proper  time  the  question  of  stipulating  also  that  the  Con- 
stitutional Government  of  Nicaragua  obligate  itself  by  convention, 
for  the  benefit  of  all  the  governments  concerned,  as  a  guarantee  for 
its  future  loyal  support  of  the  Washington  Conventions  and  their 
peaceful  and  progressive  aims. 

From  the  foregoing  it  will  be  apparent  to  you  that  your  office 
of  Charge  d' Affaires  is  at  an  end.  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  your 
passport,  for  use  in  case  you  desire  to  leave  this  country.  I  would 
add  at  the  same  time  that,  although  your  diplomatic  quality  is 
terminated,  I  shall  be  happy  to  receive  you,  as  I  shall 'be  happy 
to  receive  the  representative  of  the  revolution,  eacn  as  the  unofficial 
channel  of  communication  between  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  and  the  de  facto  authorities  to  whom  I  look  for  the  protection 
of  American  interests  pending  the  establishment  in  Nicaragua  of 
a  government  with  which  the  United  States  can  maintain  diplo- 
matic relations. 

Accept,  sir,  etc., 

(Signed)     P.  C.  KNOX. 


ADDENDA  E. 

MESSAGE  OF  PRESIDENT  MADRIZ  TO  PRESIDENT  TAFT,  REGARDING' 

THE  LANDING  OF  MARINES  FROM  THE  AMERICAN 

WARSHIPS  IN  BLUEFIELDS. 

CAMPO  DE  MARTE,  June  15,  1910. 

His  Excellency,  President  W.  H.  Toft,  Washington: 

Your  Excellency  will  permit  me  to  refer  to  certain  acts  relating 
to  our  civil  war. 

On  the  27th  of  May  last  the  forces  of  my  government  took  the 
Bluff  by  assault,  same  being  a  strong  position  which  defended  Blue- 
fields.  The  commander  of  our  forces  was  instructed  to  proceed 
immediately  and  take  the  city,  which  had  been  evacuated,  and 


G3 


which  would  have  terminated  the  campaign.  This  was  frustrated 
by  the  attitude  of  the  commander  of  the  cruiser  Paducah,  who  in- 
timated to  the  commander  of  our  forces  that  he  would  use  his  force 
to  oppose  the  taking  of  the  city,  and  actually  landed  his'  marines 
and  occupied  the  city.  This  action  assured  the  revolution  a  base 
for  its  operations,  and  enabled  it  to  withdraw  all  of  its  forces  from 
the  city  to  oppose  our  single  column,  and  thus  was  able  to  frustrate 
a  combination  which  had  been  carefully  prepared  and  whose  success 
was  assured. 

This  government  purchased  in  New  Orleans  the  British  steam- 
ship Venus,  to-day  called  "Maximo  Jerez,"  which  sailed  for  San 
Juan  del  Xorte  with  clearance  from  the  American  authorities  after 
exhibiting  bona  fide  all  of  the  elements  of  war  which  she.  had 
aboard,  and  which  were  considered  articles  of  free  commerce.  In 
San  Juan  del  Norte  her  nationality  was  changed  to  that  of  Nica- 
ragua, and  she  was  armed  for  war  and  dispatched  to  blockade  Blue- 
fields.  The  blockade  had  for  its  object  the  prevention  of  the  revo- 
lution from  receiving,  as  it  had  done  before,,  arms,  and  provisions 
from  Xew  Orleans. 

The  government  of  your  Excellency  has  denied  the  right  of  our 
vessels  to  blockade  the  port  and  prevent  American  vessels  entering, 
and  thus  has  kept  open  to  the  revolution  its  source  of  supply — Xew 
Orleans. 

The  taking  of  the  Bluff  gave  my  government  possession  of  the 
Bluefields  Customhouse,  and  we  expected  to  deprive  the  revolution 
of  the  revenues  which  this  customhouse  produces;  but  the  govern- 
ment of  your  Excellency  has  declared  that  the  revenues  of  this 
customhouse  should  be  paid  to  the  revolution,  and  this  has,  in  a 
great  measure,  annulled  the  victory  attained  by  our  forces  at  the 
Bluff. 

The  government  of  your  Excellency  has  denied  our  right  to  pre- 
vent American  vessels  from  passing  in  front  of  the  Bluff  on  their 
way  to  the  customhouse  established  by  the  revolution  at  Schooner 
Key,  on  the  Escondido  River,  notwithstanding  the  decree  of  my 
government  closing  the  Port  of  Bluefields  and  prohibiting  this 
traffic,  as  a  necessary  measure  of  defense  and  pacification. 

The  commander  of  the  Paducah  threatened  the  commander  of 
the  Maximo  Jerez,  stating  that  he  would  fire  on  his  vessel  and  sink 
her  if  our  forces  attempted  to  attack  Bluefields. 


64 


The  chief  of  our  forces  at  the  Bluff  having  noticed  that  certain 
boats  in  the  service  of  the  revolution  were  using  the  American  flag 
to  pass  in  front  of  our  forts  without  detention,  notified  the  com- 
mander of  the  Paducah  of  his  intention  to  stop  this  free  traffic  of 
these  boats  in  front  of  his  lines.  The  commanders  of  the  Paducah 
and  Dubuque  replied  that  they  would  use  their  cannon  on  him  to 
•enforce  respect  due  American  commerce,  even  if  it  consisted  of 
arms  and  ammunition  for  the  revolution,  and  that  one  shot  fired  on 
such  boats  would  be  considered  a  declaration  of  war  against  the 
United  States. 

Lastly,  I  know  that  in  Bluefields,  although  under  protection  of 
American  marines,  an  attack  is  being  prepared  against  our  position 
at  the  Bluff  and  Pearl  Lagoon.  The  intentions  of  the  commander 
of  the  Paducah  prevent  us  anticipating  the  enemy's  actions,  which 
-we  have  a  right  to  do  as  a  legitimate  defense. 

It  is  my  duty  to  state  to  your  Excellency,  frankly,  that  I  cannot 
iind  any  way  to  reconcile  the  action  herein  enumerated  with  the 
principles  of  neutrality  proclaimed  by  the  law  of  nations;  and 
Tiaving  full  confidence  in  the  high  character  of  the  Government  of 
ihe  United  States,  I  have  no  hesitancy  in  respectfully  asking  your 
Excellency  to  rectify  the  orders  given  to  your  naval  authorities  in 
Bluefields. 

Thus  can  this  government  easily  terminate  a  bloody  and  isolated 
revolt,  which  in  itself  is  without  life,  but  which  is  working  towards 
'.the  ruin  of  Nicaragua. 

JOSE  MADRIZ, 
President. 


ADDENDA  E 

(Copy.) 

WASHINGTON,  June  19,  1910. 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs: 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  remains  as  set  forth  in  the  Secre- 
tary of  State's  letter  of  December  first,  1909,  to  Minister  Eodriguez, 
then  Charge  d' Affaires,  whereby  relations  with  the  Zelaya  Govern- 
ment were  broken  off.  That  letter  and  statements  of  the  consistent 
applications  of  the  same  policy  to  conditions  as  they  arose  were 
•duly  published. 


65 

As  to  the  statements  made  in  the  telegram  of  Doctor  Madriz  to 
the  President,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  took  only  the 
•customary  step  of  prohibiting  bombardment  or  fighting  by  either 
faction  within  the  unfortified  and  ungarrisoned  commercial  city  of 
Bluefields,  thus  protecting  the  preponderating  American  and  other 
foreign  interests,  just  as  the  British  commander  had  done  in  case 
-of  Greytown,  where  there  were  British  interests.  The  Government 
'of  the  United  States  has  acknowledged  the  right  of  each  faction  to 
maintain  a  blockade,  but  has  refused  to  permit  vessels,  illegally  and 
clandestinely  fitted  out  in  American  waters,  to  interfere  with  Amer- 
ican commerce. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  simply  insists  that  each 
faction  shall  collect  duties  only  for  the  territory  under  its  de  facto 
control,  and  refuses  to  permit  the  collection  of  double  duties.  . 

If  any  violation  of  neutrality  has  occurred  it  was  in  connection 
with  the  sailing  of  the  Venus  from  New  Orleans  as  an  expedition 
-of  the  Madriz  faction.  (Signed)     KNOX. 


ADDENDA  E. 

MANAGUA,  June  23,  1910. 
To  Ministro  de  Nicaragua,  Washington,  D.  C.,  1912: 

According  to  the  rights  of  the  people,  no  neutral  government  can 
prevent  or  disturb  the  military  operations  in  time  of  war,  which  is 
legally  executed  by  belligerants.  Foreigners  are  subject  to  all  con- 
tingencies of  these  operations,  the  same  as  natives.  In  consequence, 
I  cannot  consider  the  acts  of  the  American  marines  in  having  pre- 
vented the  operations  of  our  armies  at  Bluefields  as  legal. 

Regarding  the  sailing  of  the  Venus  from  New  Orleans,  I  am  con- 
vinced that  she  has  not  violated  any  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 
Furthermore,  the  clearance  given  by  the  authorities  at  New  Orleans 
•only  obligated  the  vessel  to.  maintain  neutrality  during  her  voyage, 
which  she  actually  did.  Once  her  voyage,  for  which  she  had  been 
given  clearance,  terminated,,  she  entered  other  waters  and  changed 
her  nationality  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  Nicaragua;  and  the 
laws  and  authority  of  the  United  States  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  ultimate  destination  of  the  vessel,  which  has  had,  and  has,  the 
right  to  execute  warlike  operations,  amongst  which  figures  the 
blockade. 


6G 


I  omit  at  present  to  refer  to  other  details  of  Mr.  Knox's  note ;  but 
I  want  made  known  the  certainty  that,  but  for  the  interference  of 
the  naval  authorities  of  the  United  States,  in  the  manner  explained 
in  my  cablegram  to  President  Taft,  Bluefields  would  have  been 
taken,  the  revolution  defeated  and  Nicaragua  in  peace. 

MADRIZ. 


EXHIBIT  E 

[TELEGRAM.] 

"BLUFF,  5  p.  MV  July  23d,  1910. 
"To  the  Supreme  Command  of  All  Arms,  Managua: 

"The  Executive  Delegate  sent  me  from  San  Juan  del  Norte  the 
telegram  you  addressed  to  him,  which  contains  a  copy  of  a  cable- 
you  received  from  the  Norwegian  Consul  General  at  Havana,  and 
also  a  copy  of  a  telegram  sent  you  by  the  Executive  Delegate  at 
San  Juan  del  Norte  relative  to  the'  steamers  'Hiram'  and  'Utstein/ 
at  the  same  time  giving  me  instructions  of  what  I  should  do  upon 
the  arrival  of  these  steamers  here. 

"As  some  steamers  had  been  sighted,  I  thought  one  might  be 
the  'Hiram,"  and  I  sent  out  two  despatches,  one  addressed  to  the> 
Captain  of  the  'Hiram'  and  the  other  addressed  to  the  Commander 
of  the  American  Squadron  arrchored  opposite  this  Fort,  which 
despatches  said:  Bluff,  July  21st,  1910— To  the  Captain  of  the 
Steamer  'Hiram,'  opposite  the  Bluff :  Please  take  note  [here  I  gave 
him  copy  of  the  telegram  I  received  from  the  Executive  Delegate, 
and  also  a  copy  of  the  cable  that  had  been  received  from  the  Consul 
General  of^  Norway  at  Havana]  I  have  reliable  information  that 
you  have  war  contraband  aboard  intended  for  the  revolution  headed 
by  General  Juan  J.  Estrada,  and  in  consequence  of  and  in  con- 
formity with  the  information  given  me  in  the  telegram  and  cable, 
of  which  I  give  you  a  copy  herewith,  I  herewith  order  you  to  de- 
liver to  this  authority  whatever  war  supplies  you  may  have  aboard, 
and  I  warn  you  that,  should  you  refuse  to  do  so,  I  shall  confiscate 
your  vessel  in  conformity  with  the  laws  of  my  country.  I  also 
inform  you  that  you  will  be  held  responsible  for  your  action  in  this 
incident,  and  that  I  shall  advise  my  Government  of  whatever  action 
you  will  take,  and  that  my  Government  may  report  your  conduct 
to  the  Norwegian  Government. 


67 


"I  do  not  doubt  that  you,  seeing  that  justice  and  right  is  with 
us,  will  facilitate  the  delivery  of  this  war  contraband.  I  send  you 
this  communication  in  duplicate,  so  you  may  confirm  receipt  of 
this  dispatch  at  the  foot  of  one  of  them.  Yours  truly  [signed] 
F.  M.  Eivas,  Inspector  General  of  the  Atlantic  Coast. 

"The  second  despatch  reads  as  follows:  Bluff,  July  21st,  1910— 
Sir :  I  herewith  acquaint  you  with  a  communication  I  received 
the  16th  inst.  from  the  Executive  Delegate:  S'an  Juan  del  Norte, 
July  16th,  1910.— General  Fernando  M.  Eivas,  the  Bluff:  Under 
date  the  12th  inst.  I  was  advised  over  the  wire  by  the  President 
that  the  Minister  General,  Mr.  Baca,  received  a  cable  from  the 
Consul  General  of  Norway  in  Havana,  which  reads  as  follows: 
[Here  follows  the  cable.]  This  authority  has  trustworthy  informa- 
tion that  the  steamer  'Hiram'  brings  war  supplies  for  the  revolu- 
tion under  the  leadership  of  General  Juan  J.  Estrada.  I  am 
despatching  a  communication  to  the  Captain  of  said  vessel  in 
which  I  demand  the  surrender  of  all  war  material  to  this  command, 
and  I  am  basing  my  demand  on  the  information  contained  in  said 
cable  received  from  the  Norwegian  Consul  General.  I  trust  that, 
once  you  are  aware  of  the  information  given  us  in  this  cable,  you 
will  see  that  justice  and  the 'right  are  with  us  and  that  you  will 
not  oppose  in  any  way  that  my  demand  to  the  Captain  of  'the 
'Hiram'  is  not  complied  with,  and  that,  should  you  object,  you  will 
notify  me  in  writing*  before  you  will  permit  the  'Hiram7  to  enter 
and  to  proceed  to  Bluefields,  which  I  doubt  very  much  you  will 
permit,  knowing,  as  I  do,  that  your  Government  has  declared  its 
neutrality,  and  having  satisfied  myself  that  you  know  how  to  in- 
terpret this  neutrality.  Your  attentive  and  never-failing  servant, 
[signed]  F.  M.  Eivas,  Inspector  General  of  the  Atlantic  Coast  to 
the  Comamnder  of  the  Naval  Forces  of  the  United  States  as- 
sembled opposite  the  Bluff. 

His  answer  was  the  following: 

"No.  B,  6110,  U.  S.  A.  'Dubuque/  3d  Class,  in  the  Eoad  to  Blue- 
fields,  Nicaragua,  Central  America,  July  22nd,  1910. 

"Sir — I  have  the  honour  to  confirm  receipt  of  your  communica- 
tion of  the  21st  of  July,  1910.  I  shall  cause  the  steamers  to  anchor 
near  my  vessel  while  the  nature  of  their  cargo  i?  determined,  and 
thereafter  I  shall  act  according  to  demands  of  circumstances  and 
in  accordance  with  instructions  from  mv  Government  relative  to» 


the  protection  of  American  commerce  and  the  maintenance  of 
^neutrality.  Respectfully  [signed]  H.  R.  Rines,  Naval  Commander 
-of  the  United  States,  in  Comamnd  of  the  Marines  at  Present  on  the 
Oriental  Coast  of  Nicaragua,  to  General  F.  M.  Rivas,  Commander 
at  the  Bluff,  Nicaragua,  Central  America." 

'Last  night  the  steamer  'Utstein'  arrived  and  immediately  I  sent 
a  despatch  aboard  identical  to  the  one  sent  to  the  Captain  of  the 
'Hiram/  but  the  Captain  of  the  'Utstein'  refused  to  receive  the 
despatch,  saying  that  if  anything  was  wanted  of  him  an  under- 
standing should  be  had  with  the  Commander  of  the  'Dubuque.' 

"The  communication  was  delivered  to  the  Commander,  who  de- 
-clared  that  he  was  not  responsible  for  the  Captain  of  the  'Utstein' 
accepting  or  refusing  to  accept  despatches,  and  that  much  less 
•would  he  sign  the  duplicate  of  the  despatch  which  I  had  sent  along 
in  order  to  have  a  proof  that  said  despatch  had  been  delivered  to 
him.  Furthermore,  the  Commander  of  the  'Dubuque'  declared 
to  General  Francisco  Altschul  and  Mr.  Ofilio  Arguello,  the  latter 
being  my  interpreter,  that  HE  WAS  A  PARTISAN  OF  THE 
REVOLUTION,  and  that  he  had  told  the  Captain  of  the  'Utstein* 
that,  if  he  did  not  care  to,  not  to  communicate  with  us,  and  that 
he  would  give  the  Captain  of  the  'Utstein'  his  unconditional  sup- 
port, and  shortly  afterwards  he  sent  marines  aboard  that  vessel 
and  ordered  the  vessel  to  proceed  to  Bluefields,  which  took  place 
to-day.  I  have  sent  a  despatch  to  the  Representative  of  the  Nor- 
wegian Consul  in  Bluefields,  protesting  against  the  actions  of  the 
Captain  of  the  HJtstien/  heading  this  protest  with  a  copy  of  the 
cable  received  by  the  Consul  General  of  Norway  in  Havana.  This 
communication  to  the  Norwegian  Vice  Consul  in  Bluefields  is  to  be 
delivered  through  the  Commander  of  the  'Dubuque/  supposing 
that  he  cares  to  do  so,  but,  taking  into  consideration  the  hostility 
ihis  official  has  shown  us,  it  is  doubtful  that  this  communication 
will  ever  reach  its  destination. 

"So  long  as  there  is  no  warship  here  of  another  nation,  and  in 
command  of  an  officer  who  is  really  neutral,  the  interest  of  your 
Government  will  be  at  the  mercy  of  the  officers  of  the  United  States 
Navy,  who  are  inspired  and  counseled  by  the  American  Consul  in 
Bluefields,  who  is  a  more  revolutionary  rebel  than  Estrada  and 
"Chamorro. 

Your  subaltern,  (Signed)     F.  M.  RIVAS/' 


69 

ADDENDA  E 

"NEW  ORLEANS,  7  P.  M.,  Novbr.  9th. 
"President,  Managua: 

"Guatemala  advises  Bluefields  cargo  has  not  been  for  yet.  Last 
of  October  shall  send  to  Bocas  large  quantity  of  shells,  also  men. 
From  Bluefields  Diaz  answered:  Shall  try  and  sustain  ourselves 
until  arrival  of  steamer."  ALTSCHUL. 


ORLEANS,  7  :40  P.  M.,  17th  Novbr. 
"President,  Managua  : 

"War  elements  have  arrived  in  Bluefields  it  seems  are  the  same 
advised  by  cable  last  week  —  hailing  from  Bocas  —  Steamer  Utstein 
leaves  now  for  Port  Barrios  with  war  supplies.  ALTSCHUL/' 


ORLEANS,  8  :38,  18th  of  Novbr. 
"President,  Managua: 

"Utstein  will  arrive  Barrios  Sunday,  to  transfer  4^  cases  rifles 
and  114,000  shells  to  a  gasoline  schooner  bound  for  Bluefields.. 
Guatamala  uses  Barrios  as  a  base  for  the  revolution.  ALTSCHUL/' 

"BLUKFIELDS,  15th  November. 
"President,  Guatem  a  la  : 

"If  war  supplies  are  not  received  before  the  20th,  revolution  will 
have  to  be  abandoned.  Diaz.  Cabrera  answered.  Ulstein,  with 
war  supplies  aboard,  will  arrive  in  a  few  days/' 

"NEW  ORLEANS,  11  A.  M.,  Novbr.  24th. 
"President,  Managua: 

"Ulstein  left  for  Bermuda  Monday,  from  Port  Barrios;  will 
arrive  Bluefields  to-morrow."  ALTSCHUL. 

"WASHINGTON,  Jany.  13. 
"Estrada,  Bluefields: 

"THEY  ADVISE  YOU  NOT  TO  PAY  ATTENTION  T0"> 
KIMBALL.  CASTRILLO/' 

"WASHINGTON,  Jany.  14. 
"Estrada,  Bluefields: 

"State  Department  does  not  support  KImball.        CASTRILLO."" 


70 

"WASHINGTON,  Jany.  14. 
"Estrada,  Blue  fields: 

"STATE  DEPARTMENT  INFORMS'  ME  THAT  MADRIZ 
IS  VERY  WEAK.  CASTRILLO." 

"WASHINGTON,  Feb.  12/10. 
"Estrada,*Blucfields: 

"State  Department  will  proceed  energetically  in  our  favor. 

"CASTRILLO/' 

"BLUEFIELDS,  Feb.  11/10. 
"Castrillo,  Washington  : 

"We  know  positively  that  Madriz  has  no  elements  of  war  and  is 
trying  to  obtain  them,  in  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras.  Our  operations 
continue  with  vigor.  Chamorro  army  every  day  stronger.  Corea 
animates  Madriz.  Continue  pretending  moral  support  of  Ameri- 
can Xavv  at  Corinto,  and  try  and  have  Washington  Cabinet  influ- 
ence Mexico.  ESTRADA/' 

"BLUEFIELDS,  Feb.  9/10. 
"Chamorro,  Panama  : 

"Want  to  know  how  many  Americans  you  can  enlist  im- 
mediately. I  can  send  steamer  'Senator/  This  depends  on  your 
answer.  DIAZ/' 

"COLON,  Feb.  14/10. 
"Diaz,  Blue  fields: 

"Can  enlist  not  less  than  25  Americans.  If  you  can  send  steamer, 
be  sure  to  tell  me  what  date  it  will  arrive  at  port  of  embarca- 
tion.  CHAMORRO/' 

"President,  Managua: 

"NEW  YORK,  1 :15  P.  M.,  7th  of  December. 

"The  revolution  and  this  Government  will  never  accept  Irias. 
Deposit  in  Dolores  Estrada  will  impede  further  sacrifice  of  lives, 
and  the  disembarking  of  Americans.  Read  note  of  Knox  to 
Rodriguez.  Bolanos." 

"NEW  YORK,  6  :40  p.  M.,  17th  Decbr. 
" President,  Managua : 

"Appointment  of  Madriz  considered  an  error.  Will  not  be 
recognized  by  this  Government  nor  by  those  of  Central  America, 
and  revolution  will  not  cease.  Bolaiios." 


71 

ORLEANS,  3  P.  M.,  Novbr.  6th. 
**Pres  ifJt.'-n  t,  Managua : 

"Adolfo  Diaz  cabled  via  Guatemala  asking  for  1,000  rifles  and 
"300,000  shells.  ALTSCHUL." 

"BLUEFIELDS,  Nov.  8. 
'"Arambui'ft,  Xcic  York: 

"A>k  O'astrillo  what  is  the  opinion  of  Washington  with  reference 
to  oew  Republic.  Has  steamer  sailed?  If  not,  what  is  the  cause? 
When  will  she  sail?  Answer  immediately  by  Western  Union  Code. 

.         "DlAZ." 

"BLUEFIEDS,  Feb.  4/10. 
'"Rita,  Guatemala  (Estrada'  Cabrera) : 

"Latest  news  is  Chamorro,  Camoapa,  Mena,  Santo  Tomas  now 
on  the  way  to  combine  with  Chamorro.  I  am  anxiously  awaiting 
<arte.?  (?)  "  DIAZ." 

"BLUEFIELDS,  Feb.  5/10. 
"Saenz,  Guatemala  (Estrada  Cabrera) : 

"We  require  urgently  200,000  cartridges,  Remington,  43  y  50,000 
cartridges.  ( ?)  May  you  instruct  (  ?)  prompt  dispatch?  Ofrezco  mi 
garantia.  I  offer  my  guaranty.  ADOLFO  DIAZ/' 

"BLUEFIELDS,  March  7/10. 
*' Saenz,  Guatemala: 

"Present  state  of  affairs,  peace  is  entirely  in  your  hands.  Wash- 
ington Tanzimat  without  consulting  you  in  the  matter." 


ADDENDA  F 

EXCERPT     FROM     A    MESSAGE     WHICH     PRESIDENT 
MADRIZ,  OF  NICARAGUA,  WROTE  WITH  HIS  OWN 
HAND,  AND  WHICH  WAS  TO  BE  SENT  TO  THE 
NATIONAL  CONGRESS,  BUT  WHICH,  ON  ACCOUNT 
OF  LACK  OF  TIME,  WAS  NEVER  SENT : 
Notwithstanding  I  cannot  help  but  refer  to  the  principal  of  them, 
because  it  explains, the  political  transition  which  I  have  just  com- 
municated to  you ;  I  refer  to  the  intervention  of  the  United  States 
in  our  domestic  fights. 


72 


This  intervention  is  made  known  to  you  through  a  cable  message- 
which  I  have  addressed  to  President  Taft  in  regard  to  it.  I  will 
give  you  a  concise  idea  of  same : 

As  the  peace  overtures  which  were  offered  during  the  middle  of 
last  March  between  this  Government  and  the  faction  in  .Bluefields 
were  frustrated,  on  account  of  the  pretentions  of  General  Estrada, 
who  desired  to  establish  conditions  which  I  did  not  consider  com- 
patible with  the  dignity  of  the  Eepublic,  it  was  necessary,  in  order 
to  determine  the  situation,  to  continue  our  military  operations 
against  the  enemy.  To  do  so,  we  sent  our  armies  by  land,  one 
against  Bluefields  under  command  of  General  Paulino  Godoy,  and' 
another  against  Rama  under  command  of  General  Benito  Chavarria, 
By  sea,  we  sent  from  San  Juan  del  Norte  our  boats  armed  for  war, 
the  steamship  Maximo  Jerez  (formerly  the  Venus)  and  the  steam- 
ship San  Jac'into,  under  command  of  the  Executive  Delegate,  Dr. 
Julian  Irias,  and  the  Chief  of  the  Expedition,  General  Fernando* 
M.  Rivas.  The  ships  carried  sufficient  landing  forces  to  assault 
the  Bluff,  and  attack  Bluefields,  so  that  the  column  of  General 
Godoy  could  attack  the  revolutionary  forces  which  they  found 
entrenched  outside  of  the  city.  The  ships  were  to  establish  a 
blockade  of  Bluefields  and  close  the  port  completely  to  foreign  com- 
merce, in  order  to  deprive  the  revolutionists  of  re-enforcements  and" 
help  which  would  arrive  from  New  Orleans.  The  combined  oper- 
ations would  have  resulted  in  the  fall  of  Bluefields,  which  had 
remained  defended,  and  the  defeat  and  submission  of  the  revolu- 
tion, which,  deprived  of  all  co-operation  from  the  outside  by  the 
blockade,  could  not  long  resist. 

In  the  brilliant  attack  of  June  27th,  the  troops  from  the  steam- 
ship Maximo  Jerez  assaulted  and  took  the  Bluff,  which  had  been 
thought  impregnable.  Its  possession  on  our  part  placed  Bluefields 
in  our  hands.  The  forces  of  General  Godoy  attacked  the  enemy's 
formidable  positions,  and,  after  a  bloody  fight,  would  have  crowned 
its  efforts  with  victory,  if  the  forces  at  the  Bluff  would  have  been 
able  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  its  base  of  operation  and  attack  it 
from  its  rear.  The  column  under  General  Chavarria  defeated  the 
revolutionists  in  El  Toyal,  near  Rama,  and  if  our  forces  had  won 
in  Bluefields,  Rama  would  necessarily  have  fallen. 

But  the  decisive  moment,  when  the  whole  country  saw  with  satis- 
faction the  advent  of  peace,  the  power  of  the  United  States  crossed' 


73 

our  path,  prevented  our  victory,  and  once  more  brought  the  clouds 
of  blood  and  death,  which  we,  with  pain,  still  see  floating  upon  the; 
horizon  of  our  country. 

The  Commander  of  the  American  cruiser  Paducah,  anchored  in 
the  waters  of  Bluefields,  for  reasons  inconsistent  in  the  light  of 
Eight,  intervened  directly  in  the  fight,  protecting  the  rebels,  cutting 
off  the  further  attack  by  our  forces  and  frustrating  the  result  of 
our  sacrifices  and  our  victory  at  the  Bluff.  In  fact,  he  landed 
marines  to  protect  Bluefields,  and  to  prevent  the  attack  by  our. 
forces  on  that  rebellious  city ;  and  according  to  statements  of  im" 
partial  Americans,  whose  reports  were  published  in  the  American 
press,  the  American  marines  reinforced  the  positions  of  Estrada's 
army,  thereby  conducting  themselves  as  revolutionists.  This  con- 
duct cannot  be  justified  as  a  protection  of  foreigners,  and  especially 
of  Americans  living  in  Bluefields. 

International  law  does  not  authorize  this  exception  to  the  un- 
deniable right  of  sovereignty  and  of  belligerency.  As  sovereigns, 
we  can  impose  our  authority  in  any  Nicaraguan  city;  as  belliger- 
ents, we  can  attack  and  destroy,  the  enemy  in  any  place,  if  same  is 
not  within  the  territory  of  another.  Bluefields  was  the  cradle  and 
seat  of  the  revolution.  Its  government  was  located  there.  To  take 
it,  or  force  its  surrender,  was  to  destroy  the  base  of  the  revolution. 

In  regard  to  the  danger  to  American  interests,  international  law 
establishes  that  foreign  residents  in  a  place  where  a  state  of  war 
exists  are  subject  to  all  contingencies  of  the  operations  executed 
legally  by  the  belligerents.  This  undeniable  principle  was  sustained 
by  the  American  government  during  the  bombardment  of  San  Juan 
del  Norte,  an  open  city,  unfortified,  unarmed,  a  purely  commercial 
locality,  by  the  ship  Cyane,  of  the  American  Navy,  in  the  year  1852. 

Furthermore,  this  government  purchased  in  New  Orleans  the- 
steamship  Venus,  an  English  merchantman.  Before  she  left  New 
Orleans  destined  for  San  Juan  del  Norte,  the  revolutionary  agents 
endeavored  to  prevent  her  leaving,  -alleging  to  the  government' 
authorities  in  New  Orleans  that  she  sought  to  violate  the  law  of  the- 
United  States.  The  authorities  carefully  examined  the  matter, — 
inspected  the  ship,  heard  all  the  proofs  adduced  on  both  sides, 
consulted  the  Departments  of  Commerce  and  of  Justice  of  the- 
American  Government, — and  resolved  that,  according  to  the  laws 
of  the  United  States,  the  voyage  of  this  ship  could"  not  be  prevented.. 


L 


"The  Venus  brought  arms  destined  for  the  Government  of  Nicaragua 
at  San  Juan  del  Norte.  In  the  United  States,  the  traffic  in  arms  is 
free,  except  the  right  of  belligerents  to  seize  same  as  contraband 
of  war. 

The  Venus  left  New  Orleans,  carrying  regular  clearance  papers 
issued  ~by  the  port  authorities.  The  papers  given  her  were  signed 
under  the  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  vessel  to  maintain  neutrality 
during  her  voyage.  The  Venus  complied  with  her  obligations  of 
neutrality  during  her  voyage  and  entry  at  her  destination,  where 
she  arrived,  unarmed,  at  San  Juan  del  Norte.  She  could  do  no 
'more,  and,  above  all,  was  not  under  the  American  flag.  At  this 
'port,  before  the  British  Consul,  she  changed  her  register  under  the 
English  flag  for  that  of  Nicaragua,  after  which  she  armed  for  war 
and  was  sent  to  operate  against  the  rebels  of  Bluefields.  In  all  this 
'there  was  no  infraction  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  nor  inter- 
national law.  With  all  the  Government  of  the  United  States  has 
declared  that  the  Venus  cannot  operate  against  American  commerce 
by  using  the  right  of  search  on  the  high  sea,  nor  that  of  blockade, 
tbecause  of  the  pretext  that  this  vessel  left  New  Orleans  through 
^subterfuge  and  deceived  the  authorities  of  the  United  States.  On 
•this  account,  the  avenues  of  help  from  the  outside  remained  open 
to  the  revolution,  and  especially  from  New  Orleans,  where,  lately, 
large  shipments  of  war  material  have  been  made,  destined  for  the 
•revolution.  This  explains  clearly  why  measures  were  taken  to 
prevent  the  blockade. 

The  principal  customhouse  of  the  coast  is  at  the  Bluff,  and  this 
was  established  by  law  before  the  revolution.  The  possession  of 
'this  post  gave  us  authority  over  the  customhouse  and  the  right  to 
'the  revenues  produced  by  same.  The  American  Government  de- 
•  clared  that  these  revenues  belong  to  the  Estrada  faction,  and  ordered 
'that  the  American  commerce  pay  same  to  the  revolution  in  a  new 
customhouse  established  in  Schooner  Key,  in  the  River  Escondido. 

As  we  were  in  possession  of  the  Bluff,  we  could  still  have  pre- 
Tented  any  boats  from  entering  the  river  and  going  to  the  custom- 
house established  by  the  revolution,  but  the  commanders  of  the 
American  gunboats  Paducah  and  Dubuque  threatened  to  fire  on  us 
with  their  guns  if  our  forces  at  the  Bluff  interfered  with  American 
commerce.  "One  shot,"  they  said,  "fired  on  a  vessel  carrying  the 
American  flag  would  be  considered  a  declaration  of  war  against  the 
^United  States." 


75 


In  order  to  insure  the  free  movement  of  vessels  past  the  Bluff,  the 
commanders  of  the  American  vessels  stated  they  would  place  at  all 
"times  a  guard  of  American  marines  on  the  vessels,  which  they  have 
invariably  done. 

To-day,  on  account  of  this  action,  vessels  are  passing  the  Bluff 
carrying  the  American  flag — these  include  all  kinds  of  vessels, 
among  which,  schooners  from  San  Andres  and  Providence  are 
loaded  with  provisions  for  Bluefields.  Furthermore,  a  tug  employed 
by  the  enemy  in  its  hostile  operations,  which  fired  on  a  lighter 
bearing  our  men,  passed  the  Bluff  under  protection  of  the  Ameri- 
can flag. 

When  our  forces  occupied  the  entire  coast  from  San  Juan  del 
Norte  to  Cape  Gracias  the  Executive  power  ordered  to  establish  a 
customhouse  at  Pearl  Lagoon  to  collect  duties  on  exports  and  im- 
ports from  those  districts  under  our  authority,  but  when  we  notified 
the  commander  of  the  Dubuque  of  our  action  in  the  premise  he 
replied  to  us,  imposing  restrictions  which,  in  effect,  practically  gave 
the  revenues  of  the  coast  to  the  Estrada  faction.  Finally,  notwith- 
standing the  occupation  of  Bluefields  by  the  American  marines, 
and  the  sham  neutrality  which  they  pretended  to  maintain,  an  attack 
^as  prepared  on  Pearl  Lagoon  position  without  our  being  able  to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  carrying  out  its  intentions. 

As  some  of  the  vessels  which  ran  between  the  United  States  and 
Bluefields  are  of  Norwegian  nationality,  this  government  made 
-overtures  to  Norway,  to  the  end  that  these  vessels  respect  the  closing 
of  the  port  of  Bluefields.  That  government,  recognizing  the  legality 
-of  our  act,  thought  that  it  was  duty-bound  to  accede  to  our  petition, 
and  to  this  effect  notified  its  Legations  in  Washington,  Havana  and 
the  Norwegian  Vice  Consul  in  Bluefields.  The  American  Govern- 
ment officiously  intervened,  and  in  a  communication  addressed  to 
'the  Norwegian  Minister  in  Washington,  objected  to  the  order  of  the 
Norwegian  Government,  under  the  pretext  that  the  blockade  was 
ineffective  and  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  American  commerce. 

The  Norwegian  steamship  Utstein  having  arrived  at  Bluefields, 
and  as  we  had  advices  that  she  carried  elements  of  war  for  the 
revolution,  our  commander  at  the  Bluff  addressed  a  communication 
to  her  prohibiting  the  delivery  of  this  contraband  of  war  which  she 
liad  on  board.  The  captain  of  the  Utstein  declined  to  receive  the 
•communication,  and,  violating  our  orders  and  those  of  his  own 


76 


government,  entered  the  port  under  protection  of  the  marines  from 
the  U.  S.  S.  Dubuque.  • 

On  account  of  the  commander  of  the  Bluff  answering  the  fire  of 
the  revolutionary  artillery  stationed  on  Halfway  Key,  one  of  our 
projectiles  fell  near  Bluefields.,  and  the  commander  of  the  Dubuque 
gave  notice  that  a  repetition  of  this  would  be  considered  a  bombard- 
ment of  Bluefields.  MADRIZ." 


ADDENDA  G. 

MANAGUA,  September  14th,  1912. 
Jefes  Politicos,  Governor-Intendant  and  Commandants: 

I  transmit  to  you  the  following  communication,  dated  the  13th 
inst,  directed  to  this  office  by  his  Excellency,  George  F.  Weitzel, 
Minister  'Plenipotentiary  and  Envoy  Extraordinary  of  the  United 
States  at  this  capital,  so  that  you  may  give  it  due  publicity : 

"LEGATION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  OP  AMERICA, 

MANAGUA,  September  13,  1912. 

Excellency :  I  have  the  honor  of  informing  your  Excellency  that 
the  Department  of  State  has  given  me  instructions  by  cable  to 
transmit  to  the  Government  of  your  Excellency,  and  unofficially  to 
the  leaders  of  the  rebel  forces,  and  to  make  public  the  following 
authorized  declaration  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  during  the 
present  disturbances. 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  during  the  present  disturbances 
in  Nicaragua  is  to  take  the  necessary  measures  to  adequately  pro. 
tect  the  Legation  in  Managua,  to  maintain  open  the  ways  of  com- 
munication, to  protect  the  life  and  property  of  Americans.  Upon 
repudiating  Zelaya,  whose  regime  of  barbarism  and  corruption 
was  ended  by  the  Nicaraguan  nation  after  a  bloody  war,  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  condemned  not  only  the  individual, 
but  the  system.  Consequently  this  government  could  not  tolerate 
any  movement  to  re-establish  the  same  destructive  regime. 

The  Government  of  the  United  States  therefore  will  oppose  any 
attempt  to  restore  Zelayism  and  will  lend  its  moral  and  efficient 
support  to  the  cause  of  good  government  legally  constituted  for  the 
benefit  of  the  people  of  Nicaragua,  who,  for  a  long  time,  it  has 
endeavored  to  assist  in  their  just  aspirations  towards  peace  and 
prosperity  under  a  constitutional  and  orderly  government. 


A  group  of  about  125  American  planters  residing  in  a  region  of 
Nicaragua  have  asked  for  protection;  about  two  dozen  American 
houses  doing  business  in  that  country  have  asked  for  protection; 
the  American  banks,  which  have  invested  funds  in  railways  and 
steamships  in  Nicaragua,  as  part  of  a  plan  to  relieve  the  deplorable 
financial  situation,  have  asked  for  protection.  The  American 
citizens  who  are  actually  in  the  employ  of  the  Government  of  Nica- 
ragua, and  even  the  Legation,  have  seen  themselves  exposed  to 'im- 
mediate peril  during  the  bombardment.  Two  American  citizens, 
the  reports  state,  have  been  barbarously  assassinated;  besides  the 
Emery  claim  due  to  American  citizens,  and  the  indemnity  for  the 
killing  of  Cannon  and  Groce  during  the  war  with  Zelaya,  there  are 
various  other  claims  of  Americans  and  interests  originated  by  con- 
cessions, in  Washington. 

The  United  States  is  under  the  obligation  of  exercising  its 
influence  for  the  maintenance  of  general  peace  which  is  seriously 
menaced  by  the  present  uprising ;  and  in  this  manner  to  exact  strict 
compliance  with  the  convention  of  Washington  and  lend  due  sup- 
port to  its  designs  and  terms. 

All  the  Republics  of  Central  America  can  depend  upon  powerful 
mediums  of  co-operation. 

These  are  the  important  moral  and  political  interests  which 
require  protection.  When  the  American  Minister .  asked  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Nicaragua  to  protect  the  lives  and  property  of  Ameri- 
cans, the  Minister  of  Foreign  Eelations  answered  that  the  troops  of 
the  government  were  occupied  in  putting  down  the  rebellion. 

Consequently  my  Government  desires  that  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  guarantee  with  its  own  forces  the  security  and 
property  of  American  citizens  in  Nicaragua,  and  to  extend  this  sam^e 
protection  to  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  Republic. 

Under  these  conditions,  the  policy  of  the  United  States  shall  be 
to  protect  the  life  and  property  of  its  citizens  in  the  manner  indi- 
cated, and  at  the  same  time  employ  its  influence  by  adequate  means 
to  protect  the  legal  and  organized  government,  so  that  Nicaragua 
may  continue  its  program  of  reform,  free  from  the  obstacle  put  in 
its  way  by  the  vicious  elements  who  wished  to  restore  the  methods 
of  Zelaya  in  citing  General  Mena  to  rebellion  in  flagrant  violation 
of  his  promises  given  to  his  Government,  the  American  Minister 
and  the  Dawson  Convention,  by  the  terms  of  which  he  was  solemnly 


78 


obligated,  and  his  attempt  to  overthrow  the  government  of  his 
country,  moved  exclusively  by  selfish  motives  and  without  even  pre- 
tending to  fight  for  a  principle,  makes  the  present  rebellion,  from 
its  beginning,  the  most  inexcusable  one  in  the  annals  of  Central 
America.  The  character  of  the  actual  disturbance  and  the  proceed- 
ings employed  impress  them  with  the  stamp  of  anarchy  rather  than 
that  of  an  ordinary  revolution. 

The  moral  condition  of  those  who  immediately  made  common 
cause  with  Mena,  as  well  as  their  uncivilized  and  savage  conduct  in 
breaking  an  armistice,  mistreating  women,  violating  their  word  of 
honor,  torturing  peaceful  citizens,  exacting  contribution,  and,  above 
all,  the  barbarous  bombardment  of  the  city  of  Managua,  the  deliber- 
ate destroying  of  the  lives  of  innocent  persons  and  their  property, 
the  killing  of  women,  children  and  the  sick  in  the  hospitals,  the 
cruel  and  barbarous  assassination  of  hundreds  said  to  have  been 
perpetrated  in  Leon,  identify  Mena's  rebellion  with  the  abhorred 
and  intolerable  regime  of  Zelaya. 

I  beg  your  Excellency  to  accept  the  reiterated  expressions  of  my 
esteem  and  most  distinguished  consideration. 

GEORGE  F.  WEITZEL, 

American  Minister. 
To  His  Excellency, 

DON  DIEGO  M.  CHAMORRO, 

Minister  of  Foreign  Relations." 

Your  attentive  servant, 

DIEGO  M.  CHAMORRO, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Relations.. 


ADDENDA  H. 

DECREE  BY  THE  DICTATOR  DIAZ. 

The  President  of  the  Republic: 

Whereas,  the  Constitutive  National  Assembly,  convened  by  De- 
cree of  April  the  5th,  1911,  overreached  the  limit  of  its  powers, 
the  President,  in  Ministerial  Council,  decrees: 

ARTICLE  1.  Meanwhile  the  Constitutive  National  Assembly,, 
which  is  to  be  convened  immediately,  does  not  dispose  otherwise,, 
the  present  Constitution  shall  be  valid  only  as  far  as  the  Executive- 


and  Judicial  Powers  are  concerned.  THE  EXECUTIVE  SHALE  ASSUME 
LEGISLATIVE  POWER. 

ART.  2.  The  functions  of  the  Constitutive  National  Assembly, 
convened  by.  Decree  of  April  5th,  1911,  are  hereby  declared  termi- 
ated*. 

ART.  3.  The  people  are  to'  be  convened  for  the  election  of  Depu- 
ties to  a  Constitutional  Assembly  which  shall  reform  definitely  the 
Constitution  and  Constitutive  Laws,  at  the  same  time  exercising 
the  Powers  of  Legislation. 

Given  at  Managua,  in  the  Presidential  Palace,  the  18th  day  of 
October,  1912. 

Adolfo  Diaz. 

The  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Miguel  Cardenas. 

The  Minister  of  Agriculture  and  Finance,  Pedro  Rafael  Cuadra. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Eelations  and  Education,  Diego  M.. 
Chamorro. 

The  Sub-Secretary  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  Benjamin  Cuadra. 

The  Minister  df  Improvements  and  Public  Works,  Elsias  Pallais. 


ADDENDA  H. 

PROTEST  PROCLAIMED  ix  BLUEFIELDS,   OCTOBER,   1912. 
(FINAL  PART.) 

We,  the  undersigned  Nicaraguan  citizens,  who  love  the  Sov- 
ereignty and  the  dignity  of  our  Republic,  and  pronounced  enemies- 
of  all  foreign  intervention  on  our  soil,  and  without  any  previous 
understanding  with  the  people  in  the  interior,  whose  attitude  we 
do  not  know  even  now,  due  to  lack  of  communication  with  the  in- 
terior, have  unanimously  resolved : 

1.  To  abtstain  from  any  participation  whatever  in  the  elections 
just  decreed. 

2.  To  protest  most  vigorously  and  with  all  our  heart  against 
the  infamous  aggressive  stand  taken  by  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  against  our  beloved  country,  Nicaragua;  and, 

3.  To  condemn  the  shameful  conduct  of  those  Nicaraguans  who 
are  traitors  to  our  country  and  who  are  besmirching  the  honour  of 
the  Indo-Spanish  race. 


80 


BLUEFIELDS,  C.  A.,  October,  1912. 

Rosendo  Arguello,  Jacob  Jaen,  Manuel  H.  Giron,  Jose  M. 
Zacarias  G.,  Juan  Ignacio  Rivas,  J.  Ramon  Cisneros,  Ciriaco 
Pineda  G.,  Salvador  Lejarza,  A.  Hunter,  Pio  E.  Guzman,  Juan 
Davila  R.,  J.  P.  Chevez,  J.  P.  Delgadillo,  Guillermo  Childres 
Raudales,  Gustavo  Cortes,  Samuel  Gutirrez,  M.  Ig.  Argiillo,  F.  R. 
Baldovinos,  Carlos  A.  Espinosa  R.,  E.  Castrillo  £.,  Eduardo  Del- 
gadillo,  J.  M.  Araica,  Carlos  Alberto  Castro,  Jesus  Sierra  P., 
INTarciso  Bermudez,  Ygnacio  Dinarte,  Patricio  Soils,  B.  Herrera, 
Narciso  Bermudez,  Ignacio  Dinarte,  ^Patricio  Soils,  B.  Herrera, 
Franco  Aviles. 


ADDENDA  I. 

SAN  SALVADOR,  August  26th,  1912. 
'To  President  Taft,  Washington  : 

The  Nicaraguan  situation  is  being  aggravated  more  and  more 
•every  day,  and  I  fear  serious  complications  if  American  troops  in- 
Tade  ISTicaraguan  territory.  In  Leon  the  masses  revolted  upon  the 
arrival  of  the  marines,  and  had  it  not  been  for  the  intervention  of 
the  Salvadoran  Minister  we  would  now  have  to  lament  grave  con- 
sequences. I  respectfully  request  you  to  suggest  to  President  Diaz 
>to  enter  into  some  arrangement  whereby  peace  can  be  secured, 
accepting  a  third  party  in  whom  the  Executive  power  is  to  be  de- 
posited. 

"I  am  prompted  to  address  this  communication  to  you  by  my 
ardent  desire  for  peace  in  Central  America  and  my  sincere  friend- 
ship for  the  Government  and  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

"PRESIDENTS  ARAUJO/' 


ADDENDA  I. 

(Translated  from  Spanish.) 

WASHINGTON,  Septbr.  5th,  1912. 
To  the  American  Legation  in  San  Salvador: 

The  President  desires  that  you  solicit  an  audience  with  President 
Araujo  and  that  you  place  in  his  hands  the  following  communica- 
tion, word  for  word,  which  is  an  answer:  "His  Excellency,  the 


81 

President  of  the  United  States,  estimates  very  highly  the  assurances 
of  your  ardent  desire  for  peace  in  Central  America  and  the  assur- 
ances of  your  friendship.  These  motives  will  no  doubt  guaranty  a 
strict  adherence  and  an  enforced  obedience  to  the  stipulations  of  the 
Washington  Convention,  in  that  part  that  may  concern  the  Sal- 
vadoran  Government,  and  will  no  doubt  be  a  guaranty  that  the 
Salvadoran  Government  will  carry  out  the  dispositions  made  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  to  create  confidence  in  the  peace 
of  Central  America,  carried  out  by  this  government,  which  is  the 
government  best  fitted  to  do  so,  and  because  it  is  justified  in  doing 
so  by  the  stipulations  of  the  Washington  Convention,  and  because 
it  is  completely  neutral  in  all  local  issues  which  might  frustrate 
the  intentions  of  any  one  of  the  Governments  of  Central  America. 

"I  am,  with-you,  of  the  opinion  that  the  political  situation  in 
Nicaragua  is  very  grave.  The  Government  of  the  United  States 
has  never  intended  to  leave  its  Legation  and  the  lives  and  interests 
of  its  citizens  in  Nicaragua  to  the  mercy  of  a  rebellion  that  had 
no  justification  and  which,  by  its  acts,  recalls  the  epoch  of  Zelaya, 
committing  the  most  flagrant  outrages  against  all  principles  of 
honour,  humanity,  law  and  order  and  civilization,  as  indicated  by 
Your  Excellency.  I  do  not  think  it  just  to  suggest  to  the  legitimate 
Government  of  Nicaragua  that  it  should  deal  with  persons  who 
have  demonstrated  that  they  will  not  respect  agreements  made  with 
local  authorities,  legal  representatives  and  within  their  right. 

"In  consequence  of  all  this,  and  in  order  to  expedite  the  carrying 
out  of  its  obligations,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  pro- 
poses, in  conformity  with  a  solicitation  made  by  the  Nicaraguan 
Government,  to  take  such  steps  as  are  most  convenient  to  protect 
its  interests  and  to  insure  peace,  taking  in  consideration  that  every 
one  of  the  Central  American  Republics  has  solemnly  compromised 
itself  with  this  government  to  maintain  the  Washington  Conven- 
tion. 

"It  has  pained  me  to  learn,  although  I  may  say  that  I  have  not 
given  any  credit  to  the  rumor,  that  the  present  revolution  in  Nica- 
ragua is  being  supported  from  Salvadoran  territory. 

"I  deem  it  hardly  necessary  to  say  to  Your  Excellency  that  Sal- 
vador will  have  a  chance  to  vindicate  its  policy  in  conformity  with 
the  Washington  Convention.  WILLIAM  H.  TAFT." 


82 
ADDENDA  I. 


"SAN  SALVADOR,  Sept.  23,  1912. 
"Legation  of  El  Salvador,  Washington,  D.  C.: 

"Please  place  before  Mr.  Under-Secretary  Wilson,  in  a  verbal 
conference,  the  exact  copy  of  th'is  dispatch,  begging  him  to  bring 
it  to  the  attention  of  His  Excellency,  president  Taft,  for  whose 
consideration  it  is  forwarded.  The  dispatch  is  as  follows : 

"  clt  is  understood  here  that  the  naval  forces  occupying  Nica- 
raguan  territory  have  engaged  in  military  operations  against  the 
revolutionists  at  Granada.  So  grave  an  event  seriously  compromises 
the  other  Central  American  governments.  In  order  to  safeguard 
my  own,  and  fulfilling  lofty  duties  to  humanity,  which  I  feel  sure 
will  find  a  generous  echo  in  the  President,  please  suggest  to  him 
the  proposition  that  in  order  to  avoid  greater  bloodshed  in  our 
brother  nation  a  propitious  opportunity  is  presented  to  the  Ameri- 
can government  to  lend  its  high  offices  to  humanity  by  aiding  my 
government,  either  by  joint  or  separate  action,  in  placing  Don 
Salvador  Calderon  in  charge  (provisionally)  of  the  supreme  power 
in  Nicaragua,  while  constitutional  order  is  being  re-established  by 
pacific  and  legal  means.  Sr.  Calderon  is  a  person  of  blameless  ante- 
cedents, illustrious  and  honorable,  a  person  likewise  acceptable  -to 
the  American  government  and  a  friend  of  President  Diaz,  who  has 
indicated  to  my  government  that  he  would  accept  him  in  such,  a 
capacity.  My  government  promises  to  exert  moral  pressure  upon 
the  rebellious  chiefs  for  the  acceptance  of  Sr.  Calderon  in  agree- 
ment with  that  government,  which  would  thus  lend  a  service,  un- 
forgetable  in  the  memory  of  the  Central  American  people,  avoiding 
the  profound  upheaval  which  the  gravity  of  the  events  has  caused 
in  this  country,  which  likewise  would  deeply  reverberate  in  the 
moral  opinion  of  the  whole  continent.  Explain  to  the  President  my 
good  intentions  in  this  grave  emergency,  which  I  was  not  expecting, 
because  the .  Department  of  State  had  indicated  to  you  that  Ameri- 
can naval  action  would  be  limited  to  guaranteeing  foreign  lives  and 
property  and  safeguarding  the  American  Legation  and  Consulate  in 
that  country — a  manifestation  which  we  received  with  complacency, 
the  more  so  as  it  was  confirmed  by  Minister  Weitzel  to'  our  Minister 
in  Nicaragua. 

The  unavoidable  consequences  which  the  continuation  of  this 
useless  conflict  in  the  form  and  character  in  which  it  to-day  presents 


83 

itself  would  bring  to  Central  America  cannot  escape  the  exalted  t 
penetration  of  the  President,  and  you  will  make  one  more  effort  in 
the  mode  proposed  by  interesting  deeply  the  humanitarian  senti- 
ments of  the  head  of  that  government. 

"I  see  with  regret  that  the  agreements  entered  'into  in  Washing- 
ton by  the  Central  American  delegates,  under  the  mere  attitude 
of  .ii'nod  offices  and  generous  hospitality  which  Ex- President  "Uoose- 
velt  lent  them,  appear  to  be  invoked  in  favor  of  the  position  lately 
assumed.  El  Salvador  being  a  contracting  party,  judges  it  as  its 
undeniable  duty — a  duty  which  becomes  a  right  when  it  deals  with 
the  interpretation  of  the  facts  which  directly  affect  it — to  declare 
to  President  Taft,  in  the  frankest  and  most  respectful  manner, 
that  the  good  offices  which  the  United  States  and  Mexico  lent  to 
the  Central  American  Plenipotentiaries  are  ever  remembered  with 
pleasure,  hut  that  they  ought  to  be  limited  to  what  they  intentionally 
signify.  The  firm  relations  of  cordial  friendship  which  bind  El 
Salvador  to  the  American  government  authorize  me  to  exercise  this 
right  in  the  most  courteous  and  well-intentioned  way/ 

"You  can  add  pertinent  explanations  concerning  the  contents  of 
these  instructions  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  appeal  ing-  to  Irs  friendly 
courtesy  to  convey  them  to  the  high  functionary  for  whom  they 
arc  designed. 

(Signed)     "M.Y\ria  E.  ARAUJO." 


84 


DR.  JOSE  MADRIZ,  ' 
Former  President  of  Nicaragua. 


JOSE  MADRIZ. 

Jose  Madriz  was  born  in  the  City  of  Leon,  Nicaragua,  C.  A., 
February  21,  1866. 

His  parents  were  poor  and  honorable.  Tn  spite  of  their  poverty, 
they  resolved  to  give  their  sen  a  literary  education  and  Jose  re- 
ceived his  elementary,-  high  school  and  professional  training  in 
the  city  of  his  birth.  The  deficiency  in  his  school  training,  due  to 
the  adequate  educational  facilities,  was  more  than  counterbalanced 
by  his  mental  talents  and  a  close  application  to  his  studies. 


85 

He  was  fortunate  in  that  his  intellectual  training  came  at  a 
period  in  the  country's  history  when  the  illuminating  ideas  of  the 
great  patriot,  Maximo  Jerez,  a  noted  jurist  -and  philosopher,  were 
in  the  ascendancy. 

His  vocation  as  a  lawyer  was  crowned  with  marked  success,  and 
in  1893,  when  only  27  years  of  age,  he  was  summoned  by  President 
Zelaya  to  the  exalted  position  of  Secretary  of  State,  a  position 
which  he  administered  with  brilliancy  for  several  years. 

During  this  incumbency  he  was  sent  to  the  Atlantic  coast  of 
Nicaragua  in  the  capacity  of  Executive  Delegate,  charged  with  an 
important  political  mission.  Difficulties  had  arisen  in  that  terri- 
tory, known  as  the  "Mosquito  Eeserve,"  as  a  result  of  the  stablish- 
ment  of  a  protectorate  over  it  by  His  British  Majesty.  As  a  re- 
sult, '  largelv.  of  his  intelligent  labors,  all  of  that  coast  was  re- 
incorporated  as  a  part  of  the  Nicaraguan  Republic,  and  an  era 
.of  development  in  that  secticn  was  immediately  begun  and  has 
•  continued  since  in  an  astounding  manner.  For  this  reason  Dr. 
Madriz,  perhaps  more  than  anyone  else,- deprecated  the  proposal 
of  the  revolutionists  of '1909  to  declare  the  Atlantic  coast  an  in- 
dependent rermblic,  or,  rather,  ostensiblv-  independent,  for  the 
truth  is  that,  if  such  severance  had  occurred, 'it  would  have  been 
cpbicoted  to  a  protectorate  bv  a  foreign  powei  ' 

On  account  of  internal  political  dissensions  Dr."  Madriz  had  to 
resieri  'his  position  as  Secretary  of  State  in  1895.  However,  he  was 
later  restored  to  bis 'elevated  position  in  fulfillment  of  conditions 
imposed  upon  President  Zelaya  at  a  conference  between  the  execu- 
tive and  the  Liberals,  of  Leon,  as  a  means  of  averting  civil  strife. 
This,  unfortunately.  rHd  riot  havp  fh'p  'desired  r"p«n'lt,  and  Zelaya 
faced  a  revolution. 

During-  the  several  years  that  Dr.  Madriz  served  Zelaya  he  could 
and  did  do  so  conscientonsly,  for  Zelaya  then  was  regarded  as  one 
of  the  best  presidents  in  La  tin- America,  honest,  a  respector  of  the 
laws  of  the  country,  and,  indeed,  practically  a  liberal  ruler. 

When  the  revolution  referred  to  broke  out,  Madriz  was  in  its 
ranks.  The  revolution  was  unsuccessful  and  Madriz  emigrated 
to  Salvador,  where  he  resided  until  1907.  There  he  married  Miss 
Hortensia  Cobos.  Four  children  resulted  from  this  union,  two 
sons,  Ricardo  and  Jose",  and  two  daughters,  Hortensia  and  Mercedes. 


86 

Although  he  did  not  accumulate  a  fortune  in  his  law  practice  in 
Salvador,  his  family  lived  in  comfort  and  always  moved  in  the  best 
social  circles. 

In  Salvador,  and  in  Honduras  and  Guatemala  (in  which  latter 
two  republics  he  lived  for  a  short  while),  Dr.  Madriz's  eminent 
culture,  intellectual  achievements,  and  courteous  manners  attracted 
to  him  the  friendship  and  esteem  of  all  those  who  had  the  good 
fortune  of  his  acquaintance.  His  brilliant  eloquency  made  it  a 
rare  pleasure,  indeed,  to  hear  Dr.  Madriz  speak. 

In  1907,  notwithstanding  his  political  animosity  toward  Zelaya, 
the  hostility  shown  by  other  Central  American  Presidents  to  the 
Liberal  Party  in  Nicaragua  prompted  Madriz  to  return  to  Nicara- 
gua and  lend  his  earnest  co-operation  to  the  efforts  to  avoid  an 
invasion,  which  then  appeared  to  be  and,  in  fact  proved,  inevitable. 
Dr.  Madriz,  like  other  adversaries  of  Zelaya,  was  prompted  by 
high  motives  and  a  patriotic  desire  to  assist  Zelaya.  The  diffi- 
culties confronting  the  adjoining  republics  made  Dr.  Madriz  and 
others  of  the  patriotic  who  were  strong  believers  in  the  necessity  for 
a  union  of  the  Central  American  republics,  to  think,  in  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  union  at  least,  of  the  three  republics  which  had  made 
the  last  effort  to  effect  it.  Madriz  was  disillusioned,  however,  when 
Zelaya  sank  far  below  his  estimations  by  abandoning  the  cherished 
hope  of  the  union,  and  preferring  to  content  himself  with  a  change 
in  the  executive  power  of  Honduras.  This  change  of  president  in 
the  neighboring  republic,  however,  resulted  in  no  benefit  to  either 
Honduras  or  Nicaragua,  due  to  grave  mistakes  made  by  Zelaya  as 
a  result  of  his  narrow-mindedness  in  those  circumstances. 

Thus,  disillusioned  and  disappointed,  Madriz  again  left  Nicara- 
gua, this  time,  however,  without  having  had  any  political  rupture 
with  Zelaya.  He  went  to  Honduras  with  the  intention  of  making 
this  country  his  permanent  home.  Circumstances  unforeseen,  how- 
ever, compelled  a  change  of  his  plans  later. 

The  governments  of  Latin- American  accepted  the  proposal  of 
a  Central  American  peace  conference  in  Washington  and  Madriz 
was  appointed  head  of  the  Niraraguan  delegation.  In  this  confer- 
ence, in  accord  with  the  Honduran  delegates,  he  advocated  the 
restoration  of  his  old  country,  or  nation,  in  the  union  of  the  five 
republics,  which  had  been  his  constant  dream.  These  efforts  were 
again  in  vain  and  the  conference  bgre  no  practical  results, 


87 

Although  representing  <  Zelaya's  government,  Madriz  without 
exception,  made;  proposals,  and  accepted  such,  which  had  for  their 
object  the  enforcement  and  observance  of  law  in  all  Central  Amer- 
ican countries,  and,  in  truth,  it  must  be  admitted  that  Zelaya 
never  failed  to  support  the  acts  of  Madriz  even  if  his  suggestions 
and  advice  frequently  were  inimical  to  the  personal  interests  of  the 
rulers,  who  were  wont  to  consider  their  word  as  the  law.  Un- 
iortunately,  most  of  the  tentative  steps  taken  in  line  with  these 
suggestions  were  eventually  rejected  by  the  conference. 

One  of  the  results  of  this  Washington  conference  was  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  Central  American  Court  of  Justice  at  Cartago, 
Costa  Eica.  Dr.  Madriz  was  appointed  a  judge  of  this  court  by 
the  Nicaraguan  Congress.  Upon  his  return  from  Washington  Dr. 
Madriz  remained  in  Costa  Eica,  attending  to  his  duties  in  connec- 
tion with  this  Court  until  December,  1909,  when  he  was  summoned 
by  the  Nicaraguan  Congress  to  take  the  presidency  of  the  country, 
Zelaya  having  decided  to  tender  his  resignation. 

We  were  justified  in  expecting  an  era  of  peace  in  Nicaragua, 
under  the  administration  of  President  Madriz,  because  he  had 
the  confidence  of  the  Zelaya  faction  in  Nicaragua,  and  should  have 
had  the  confidence  and  support  of  the  revolutionists,  like  many 
of  whom  he  had  been  for  several  years  an  exile  from  the  country 
and  a  pronounced  adversary  of  the  Zelaya  administration.  But, 
local  jealousies  and  other  causes,  which  do  not  properly  belong 
here,  were  responsible  for  a  continuance  of  the  most  disastrous  civil 
war  the  country  ever  witnessed. 

Those  of  us  who  had  an  intimate  acquaintance  with  Madriz, 
.and  who  realized  that  peace  could  not  be  soon  effected,  were  loath 
to  see  him  accept  the  presidency,  knowing  that,  because  of  his 
pacific  nature,  he  was  unfitted  for  the  difficult  task  which  was 
then  present.  Madriz,  in  time  of  peace,  undoubtedly  would  have 
proved  one  of  the  best  presidents  Latin-American  ever  knew.  His 
character  and  training,  however,  did  not  fit  him  for  an  epoch  of 
war.  A  man  of  profound  feelings  of  amity  and  peace,  he  was  not 
capable  of  exercising  strong  tactics  against  his  enemies,  notwith- 
standing he  knew  they  were  conspiring  against  him.  This  gave 
courage  to  his  adversaries.  In  fact,  he  was  a  president  of  whom 
they  were  unafraid.  He  was  not  a  man  willing  to  order  the  spilling 
of  the  blood  of  his  brothers  to  maintain  himself  in  power. 


88 

In  tliis  connection,  we  do  not  wish  it  to  appear  that  we  would 
censure  hm.  He  did  right,  as  his  desire  was  to  leave  to  his  chil- 
dren a  name  un  besmirched  with  sanguinary  acts.  However,  for 
the  sake  of  his  country,  it  would  have  been  better  if  he  had  spared 
himself  for  other  and  better  opportunities. 

The  Madriz  government,  weighted  down  by  the  heavy  hand  oi  a 
foreign  government,  foresaw  that  a  continuation  of  the  civil  strife 
inherited  from  the  Zelaya  regime,  would  not  result  beneficially 
to  his  native  land,  and  with  a  firm  belief  that  he  had  done  all  .pos- 
sible in  defense  of  the  national  honor,  Dr.  Madriz  left  the  country 
and  went  to  Mexico,  where  he  had  many  sincere  friends,  acquired 
during  his  visit  to  that  republic  as  a  delegate  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence in  Washington,  to  thank  President  Porfirio  Diaz  for  the  em- 
ployment of  his  good  offices  in  the  interest  of  Central  American 
peace. 

It  was  the  purpose  of  Dr.  Madriz  to  establish  himself  in  Mexico 
City  in  the  practice  of  law,  hoping  to  find  there  the  peace  of 
mind  which  was  denied  him  in  Central  America,  but  death  put  an 
end  to  his  plans  for  the  future.  An  unconquerable,  but  sudden 
disease  prostrated  him  for  a  few  days,  and  on  the  14th  of  May, 
1911,  he  died;  yet  in  the  memory  of  all  good,  patriotic  Central 
Americans  he  lives. 

In  Nicaragua  his  demise  was  lamented  in  almost  every  home  and 
even  his  political  enemies,  who,  during  his  life,  had  not  hesitated 
to  defame  him,  bowed  in  grief  before  the  altar  of  his  memory. 
The  National  Assembly  of  Nicaragua  honored  Madriz's  memory  by 
giving  his  name  a  place  in  the  "Hall  of  Fame"  of  that  country 
This  honor  conferred  upon  him  is  proof  that  Madriz  embodied  the 
national  cause. 

May  this  posthumous  honor  result,  at  least,  in  consolation  for 
the  family  of  the  departed  and  for  those  of  us  who  had  the  honor 
and  distinction  of  his  friendship.  We  trust  it  will  encourage  tho 
Central  American  youth  to  live  up  to  the  lofty  example  set  by  this 
great  patriot. 

P.   BONILLA. 

New  Orleans,  October,  1912. 


ESTADOS  UNlDOS 


Y  LA 


AMERICA  LATINA 


DIPLOMACIA  DEL  DOLLAR' 


NUEVA  ORLEANS,  DIC1EMBRE  DE  1912 


JUAN    LEETS 


NEW  ORLEANS,  LA. 

THE  L.  GRAHAM  Co..  PRINTERS. 

1912. 


PROLOGO. 


Al  Pueblo  Americano: 

Al  Senado  de  Estados  Unidos: 
A  los  Miembros  de  la  Camara  de  Eepresentantes: 

Inspirado  por  el  profundo  sentimiento  de  justicia  de  que  estan 
penetrados  los  ciudadanos  de  la  gran  Eepiiblica  Americana  desde 
su  fundacion,  y  con  absoluta  confianza  en  la  integridad  de  los 
Eepresentantes  del  pueblo  en  el  Congreso  de  Estados  Unidos, 
presento  este  humilde  momorial  en  nombre  de  los  ciudadanos  de  las 
Eepublicas  de  Centro  America,  que  han  sufrido  las  consecuencias  de 
la  violenta  e  inicua  politica  del  Departamento  de  Estado,  bajo  la 
direceion  de  Philander  C.  Knox. 

La  publicacion  de  este  memorial  tiene  dos  fines: 

1°. — Poner  en  conocimiento  del  pueblo  americano  y  de  los  miem- 
bros  del  Senado  y  Camara  de  Eepresentantes  algunos  detalles  de 
la  llamada  "DOLLAE  DIPLOMACY"  de  Mr.  Knox,  tal  como  ha 
Mo  aplicada  a  las  Eepublicas  de  la  America  Central. 

2°. — Aprovechar  toda  la  influencia  que  en  si  mismos  tienen  los 
hechos  que  presentamos  en  favor  de  la  restauracion.de  los  vinculos 
de  verdadera  amistad  entre  los  pueblos  de  la  America  Latina  y 
Estados  Unidos,  que  la  ruinosa  y  egoista  politica  de  Mr.  Knox 
ha  destrozado 

En  esta  labor  he  sido  ayudado  por  algunos  de  los  mas  notables 
hombres  de  Estado  de  Centro  America,  trabajando  todos  al  impulso 
del  patriotismo  y  con  un  profundo  y  sincero  deseo  de  estableccr 
la  justicia  en  donde  la  iniquidad,  con  futiles  pretextos,  ha  produci- 
do  no  mas  que  la  ruina  y  devastacion,  el  desconcierto,  la  discordia 
y  el  rencor.  lln  este  memorial,  lo  mismo  que  en  la  declaracion 
que  personalmente  di  ante  el  Comite  del  Senado  que  practica  1/t 
investigacion  de  los  asuntos  relatives  a  la  revolucion  de  Nicaragua,, 
he  procurado  comprobar  con  documentos  todos  mis  cargos;  y,  en 
ningun  caso,  he  hecho  una  afirmacion  que  no  encierre  en  mi  con- 
cepto  la  mas  absoluta  verdad. 

Aunque  los  hechos  que  presento  demuestran  que  los  grandes  7 


fundamentals  principles  de  libertad  y  justicia  de  la  madre  de 
]as  Republicas,  han  sido  desconocidos  o  enredados  en  las  mallas 
'de  las  falsas  doctrinas  proclamadas  por  el  Departamento  de  Estado, 
los  ciudadanos  de  las  pequenas  Republicans  del  Sur,  tienen  todavia 
'completa  confianza  en  el  pueblo  de  este  gran  pals,  y  hacen  esta 
formal  apelacion  ante  sus  Representantes,  en  la  esperanza  de  que, 
despertando  interes  en  conocer  a  fondo  la  conducta  de  Mr.  Knox, 
resultara  una  escrupulosa  investigation.,  y  en  consecuencia  la 
justicia. 

Aunque  el  resultado  de  la  reciente  election  de  Presidente  y 
Representantes  al  Congreso  asegura  un  proximo  cambio  en  el  per- 
sonal del  Departamento  de  Estado,  trayendo  consigo  un  marcado 
cambio  en  la  politica  que  este  Gobierno  seguira  en  sus  relaciones 
exteriores,  la  injusticia  hecha  a  Centre  America  por  medio  de  la 
perniciosa  Dollar  Diplomacy,  ha  sido  demasiado  grande  para  que 
pueda  quedar  desconocida  por  quienes  sientan  patrioticos  impulses. 
Por  esta  razon  nosotros  no  queremos  olvidar  lo  pasado  y  dejar  al 
pueblo  de  los  Estados  Unidos  en  la  ignorancia  de  los  nocivos  planes 
y  erroneos  actos  que  han  sido.  realizados  bajo  el  manto  de  la  diplo- 
ma acia. 

En  este  memorial  he  procurado  en  detalle  una  verdadera  descrip- 
cion  de  la  intervencion  del  Departamento  de  Estado  en  los  ne- 
gocios  de  Centro  America  y  los  resultados  de  la  politica  Knox. 
En  breve  resumen.,  nos  proponemos  demostrar : 

1. — Bajo  pretexto  de  dar  auxilio  a  las  pequenas  Republicas  de 
Centro  America,  el  Departamento  de  Estado  ha  usado  lo  que  se  ha 
complacido  en  llamar  "Dollar  Diploma^,"  para  forzar  sobre  aque- 
llos  paises  contratos  de  emprestito  que  darian  a  un  grupo  de  ban- 
queros  de  Wall  Street,  no  solo  millones  de  dollars  adquiridos  ile- 
gitimamente,  sino  tambien  oportunidades  para  inmensas  y  perni- 
-ciosas  especulaciones  y  absoluta  libertad  para  explotar  los  vastos 
recursos  de  aquellas  tierras,  y  hasta  para  controlar  la.Admistracion 
piiblica. 

2. — Los  terminos  de  los  contratos  de  emprestito  que  el  Secretario 
Knox  se  ha  empenado  tan  asiduamente  en  imponer  sobre  Nicaragua 
y  Honduras,  son  vicioso&;  y  cuando  sean  revelados  en  sus  detalles 
al  pueblo  americano,  provocaran  indignacion  y  energicas  protestas. 

3.— <La  politica  de  Knox  al  tratar  con  Centro  America  ha  pro- 
Tocado  un  manifiesto  sentimiento  antiamericanista  en  donde  antes 


DO  habia  mas  que  sentimientos  de  amistad  hacia  el  pueblo  de  esta,> 
gran  Kepublica.  Disturbios,  revolucion  y  pobreza  lian  sido  los 
perniciosos  resultados. 

4. — En  Tina  ocasion  Mr.  Knox  ha  dado  apoyo  a  una  revolucion 
en  Nicaragua,  en  otra  ha  adversado  la  revolucion  y  sacrificado  la? 
vidas  de  soldados  americanos  para  conservar  en  el  poder  a  un 
usurpador  y  traidor,  que  es  un  pobre  instrumento  del  Secretario  para 
la  realizacion  de  su  plan  de  entregar  a  Centro  America  a  los  banque- 
ros  de  New  York. 

5. — Mr.  Knox  condeno  a  Zelaya,  un  dictador  en  Nicaragua,  y  lo 
derroco  del  poder,  colocando  en  el  un  Gobierno  que  ha  traido  la 
pobreza  en  vez  de  la  prosperidad,  la  discordia  en  vez  de  la  armonia, 
el  despotismo  en  vez  de  la  libertad;  y  por  otro  lado,  ha  apoyado 
constantemente  al  peor  tirano  y  dictador  que  la  America  Latina 
haya  conocido,  al  Presidente  de  Guatemala,  Manuel  Estrada  Ca- 
brera. 

6. — Con  pleno  conocimiento  del  Departamento  de  Estado  se  han 
permitido  expediciones  filibusteras  que  han  salido  para  Centro 
America  de  los  puertos  del  Golfo,  y  en  una  ocasion,  el  conocimiento 
de  la  proxima  salida  de  una  de  esas  expediciones  fue  usado  para 
hacer  presion  sobre'  el  Presidente  de  Honduras  con  el  fin  de  ha- 
cerle  aceptar  el  emprestito  Morgan,  que,  es  bien  sabido,  era  resist]  do 
por  dicho  Presidente,  y  fue  rechazado  por  el  Congreso  y  el  pueblo 
de  Honduras. 

7. — Por  sus  personales  designios  los  nnancieros  americanos  desea- 
ron  la  intervencion  en  la  reciente  guerra  civil  de  Nicaragua,  y 
por  otro  lado  han  querido  para  el  Gobierno  de  Estados  Unidos  la 
politica  de  no  intervencion  en  Mexico.  En  Nicaragua  solo  han  sido 
matados  dos  americanos  en  combate  al  servicio  del  Gobierno,  sin 
oue  en  ningun  otro  caso  hayan  sufrido  dano  en  sus  personas  o 
propiedades,  ni  siquiera  estuviesen  en  peligro.  En  Mexico  gran 
numero  de  americanos  han  sido  intencdonalmente  matados,  muchos 
mas  han  sido  heridos,  otros  han  sido  secuestrados  para  pedir  rescato 
por  ellos,  y  millones  de  dollars  de  propiedades  americanas  han  sido 
destruidos.  En  Nicaragua  Mr.  Knox  intervino :  en  Mexico  profesa 
Jr.  politica  de  no  intervencion.  Estos  son  hechos,  de  que  se  deduce 
algo  que  perjudica  el  buen  nombre  de  Estados  Unidos. 

8. — 'Los  hechos  referentes  a  la  intervencion  del  Departamento  de- 
Estado  en  Centro  America  han  sido  cuidadosamente  ocultados  al1 


pueblo  americano,  o  ban  sido  falseados  o  exagerados.  Algunas 
veces  se  han  dado  en  Washington  semioficialmente  a  la  prensa  in- 
formaciones  exclusivamente  para  el  uso  del  piiblico  americano,  en 
las  cuales  se  ha  variado  en  absoluto  la  verdad  de  los  hechos,  general  - 
mente  con  el  proposito  de  preparar  la  opinion  piiblica  en  favor  de 
la  actitud  de  Mr.  Knox  y  de  sus  eolaboradores,  por  medio  de  tales 
falsedades. 

Entre  los  documentos  que  ahora  presento,  que  son  parte  de  los 
que  puse  a  disposicion  del  Comite  del  Senado,  algunos  de  los  ma£ 
importantes  fueron  depositados  en  mis  manos  por  Dona  Hortensia 
C.  de  Madriz,  viuda  del  Ex-Presidente  de  Nicaragua,  Dr.  Don. 
Jose  Madriz.  El.  Dr.  Madriz,  al  ocurrir  su  prematura  muerte  en 
Mayo  de  1911,  estaba  empenado  en  la  preparacion  de  una  historia 
de  las  relaciones  del  Departamento  de  Estado  con  la  revolucion  de 
Nicaragua  en  1909 ;  y  la  senora  de  Madriz,  deseosa  de  que  los  hechos 
y  documentos  coleccionados  por  el  no  quedasen  iniitiles,  resolvio 
entregarmelos  para  hacerlos  conocer  del  pueblo  y  Congreso  ameri- 
canos,  no  solo  para  la  vindicacion  de  la  memoria  de  aquel  gran  hom- 
bre  de  Estado,  sino  por  el  beneficio  que  el  pueblo  americano  reportara 
del  conocimiento  de  los  actos  perniciosos  cometidos  por  ciertos 
funcionarios  del  Gobierno  de  Estados  Unidos.  • 

Al  dar  mi  testimonio  en  el  mes  de  Octubre  ante  el  Sub- Comite 
presidido  en  El  Paso  por  el  Honorable  Senador  Fall,  encontre  al 
Comite  ansioso  por  hacer  luz  en  la  cionducta  del  senor  Knox  y  sus 
agentes  hacia  las  Eepublicas  de  Centro  America.  Coloque  en. 
manos  del  Senador  Fall  muchos  de  los  mas  importantes  documentos 
que  traje  a  este  pais,  y  quede  satisfecho  de  que  la  causa  de  una 
debil  nacion,  mi  pais  adoptive,  estaba  en  buenos  manos. — En  mi 
viaje  a  El  Paso  me  acompano  como  consejero  legal  el  notable 
jurisconsulto  hondureno,  Doctor  Don  Angel  Ugarte. 

Aunque  nacido  en  Rusia,  soy  centroamericano  de  corazon.  En 
mi  patria  adoptiva  he  sido  -honrado  con  importantes  posiciones 
gubernamentales.  Es  la  cuna  de  mi  esposa  e  hijos;  y  por  ello  es 
mi  mas  vivo  deseo  hacer  cuanto  este  a  mi  alcance  por  asegurar  su 
prosperidad  y  el  imperio  en  ella  de  la  libertad  y  de  todos  los  bene- 
ficios  de  las  instituciones  republicanas.  He  dedicado  a  esta  causa 
todos  mis  esfuerzos,  y  siempre  la  considerare  como  sagrada. 

New  Orleans,  Diciembre  de  1912. 

-     '  JUAN  LEETS. 


LA  DIPLOMACIA  DEL  DOLLAK. 

La  politica  que  el  Secretario  de  Estado,  Mr.  Philander  C.  Kaox, 
ha  aplicado  a  la  America  Latina,  durante  la  Presidencia  de  Mr. 
Taft,  ha  sido  denominada  por  sus  mantenedores  "Dollar  Diplo- 
macy." En  este  escrito  nos  proponemos  estudiar  ese  bistema  de 
politica  y  sus  funestas  consecuencias  para  los  paises  interesados. 

Antes  queremos  echar  una  ojea'da  sobre  la  politica  que  anterior- 
mente  habia  puesto  en  practica  el  Gobierno  Americano  en  relation 
con  las  demas  Republicas  del  continente. 

Durante  la  mayor  parte  de  la  vida  de  esta  gran  nation,  ha  pre- 
valecido  en  el  animb  de  sus  h'ombres  de  Estado,  y  en  la  opinion 
general  del  pueblo,  el  sistema  de  no  intervention  en  los,  asuntos  de 
los  demas  paises.  Por  esta  razon  han  podido  los  EE.  UU.  crecer  y 
desarrollarse  de  manera  tan  asombrosa,  siendo  su  Gobierno  durante 
mas  de  un  siglo  el  mas  barato  entre  todos  los  del  mundo.  Al  pro- 
ceder  asi  se  han  conformado  con  los  preceptos  del  padre  de  la 
patria,  de  George  Washington,  quien,  con  su  clarividencia,  percibio 
la  grandeza  que  habia  de  alcanzar  su  pais,  pero  haciendola  depender 
del  complimiento  de  tan  sabio  consejo  que  dio  a  sus  contemporaneos 
y  a  las  futuras  generaciones. 

DOCTRINA  MONROE. 

James  Monroe,  otro  de  los  grandes  hombres  de  Estado  america- 
nos,  conformandose  con  aquei  Salvador  principle,  comprendio  que, 
para  poder  mantenerlo  en  practica,  era  necesario  impedir  que  las 
naciones  europeas  fundasen  en  America  grandes  imperios.  A  raiz 
de  la  independencia  de  las  naciones  latino  americanas,  se  organize 
la  Santa  Alianza,  en  virtud  de  la  cual  los  monarcas  absolutos  euro- 
peos  se  comprometieron  a  enviar  sus  ejercitos  a  reconquistar  para 
Espana  las  que  acababan  de  ser  sus  colonias.  El  restabletimiento 
del  regimen  monarquico  en  America,  bajo  la  proteecion  de  los 
grandes  Poderes,  habria  sido  una  constante  amenaza  para  EE.  UU., 
habria  hecho  a  la  larga  imposible  su  vida  republicana,  y,  sobre  todo, 
habria  h'echo  imposible  la  politica  aconsejada  por  Washington,  y 
obligado  al  pais  a  mantener  un  gran  ejercito  permanente  de  mar 
y  tierra,  que  es  el  cancer  de  la  vieja  Europa,  Monroe,  gran  estadista 


8 

y  gran  patriota,  lo  eomprendio  bien,  y  notifico  al  mundo  su  famosa 
doctrina  "America  para  las  Americanos"  que  entonces  fue  nitiy 
claramente  entendida,  por  mas  que  despues  haya  sido  tan  tergi- 
versada,  y  por  lo  tanto  tan  discutida.  Entonces  no  cupo  duda  de 
que  Monroe  se  propuso  asegurar  la  independencia  y  la  tranquilidad 
de  su  propio  pais  y  de  todas  las  republicas  del  continente;  pero  a 
nadie  se  le  ocurrio,  y  menos  a  su  generoso  autor,  que  algun 
dia  podria  ser  empleada  como  una  amenaza  para  la  autonomia  de  las 
naciones  latino  americanas  que  el  se  propuso  proteger;  que  es  lo 
que  despues  ha  sucedido  y  nos  proponemos  demostra.r  en  el  curso 
de  este  estudio. 

PANAMERICANISMO. 

• 
Como  un  desarrollo  de  la  doctrina  de  Monroe,,  y  para  facilitar 

su  cumplimiento,  Mr.  James  G.  Elaine,  Secretario  de  Estado  bajo 
la  Administracion  Harrison,  inicio  la  idea  del  panamericanismo,  y 
propuso  a  las  demas  naciones  del  continente  la  reunion  de  la 
prim  era  oonferencia  de  Delegados  de  todas  ellas,  que  &e  reunio  en 
Washington  en  1889.  De  esta  primera  conferencia  surgio  la  Oficina 
Internacional  de  las  Eepublicas  americanas,  encargada  de  organizar 
las  futuras  conferencias,  que  periodicamente  han  venido  verifican- 
dose,  con  el  fin  de  lograr  el  acercamiento  de  las  dos  razas,  y  en 
consecuencia,  el  de  las  naciones  que  las  representan. 

Otro  grande  hombre  de  Estado,  Mr.  Elihu  Root,  al  llegar  a  la 
Secretaria  de  Estado  bajo  la  Administracion  Eoosevelt,  se  apodero 
de  esa  idea  y  se  convirtio  en  su  mas  entusiasta  -propagandista. 
Concurrio  personalmente  a  la  Conferencia  celebrada  en  Rio  de 
Janeiro  en  1906,  visitando  la  Republica  Argentina,  Chile  y  otros 
paises,  y  mas  tarde,  en  1907,  Meixco,  en  donde  pronuncio  famosisi- 
mos  discursos,  que  hicieron  en  los  pueblos  latino  americanos  la  mas 
grata  impresion,  creando  en  ellos  grarides  simpatias  hacia  Estados 
TJnidos.  El  seiior  Root,  en  su  propio  nombre  y  como  Secretario 
de  Estado,  garantizo  que  la  politica  de  su  Gobierno  era  de  fraterni- 
dad  hacia  los  pueblos  y  Gobiernos  de  la  America  Latina,  y  que  la 
nacion  mas  pequefia  de  ellas  como  la  mas  grande,  tendrian  asegu- 
radas  su  independencia  y  su  autonomia,  a  la  vez  que  la  integridad 


de  su  territorio.  Iguales  declaraciones  ratifico  ante  la  Conferencia 
Centroamericana  de  paz  celebrada  en  Washington  en  fines  de  1907.* 
Si  esa  pojitica  que  el  Secretario  Root  mantuvo  firmemente  hacia 
aquellos  paises  se  hubiese  sostenido,  el  credito  del  Gobierno  ameri- 
cano  ante  ellos  hubiera  ido  en  aumento,  y  no  seria,  como  es  hoy, 
objeto  de  la  mayor  desconfianza  y  causa  de  constante  alarma, 
hasta  el  nunto  de  estar  convirtiendo  en  mas  de  alguno  en  odio  el 
carino  que  antes  se  tenia  por  el  nombre  de  anglo  americano;  por 
mas  que  nosotros  reconocemos  que  no  es  la  cnlpa  de  este  pueblo 
sino  de  su  Gobierno.  En  vez  de  seguir  aquella  politica  tan  sana, 
de  la  cual  con  razon  podria  esperarse  la  armonia,  la  prosperidad  y 
el  bienestar  de  todo  el  continente,  se  introdujo  una  de  doblez  y  de 
falsia  y  de  proteccion  a  especulaciones  financieras.  Mexico,  Santo 
Domingo  y  Centro  America  son  en  la  actualidad  las  victimas  del 
nuevo  rumbo  que  ha  seguido  el  Departamento  de  Estado  de  EE. 
UU.  Aunque  nuestro  principal  objeto  es  hacer  luz  en  la  cuestion 
de  Centro  America,  y  especialmente  de  Nicaragua,  por  considerarlo 
todo  intimamente  ligado,  haremos  una  breve  resena  de  lo  referente 
a  los  otros  paises  mencionados. 

*  Ya  escrito  lo  que  dice  el  texto,  han  llegado  a  nuestras  manos 
peri6dicos  de  Centro  America  en  que  esta  reproducido  en  espanol  un 
discurso  pronunciado  en  Estados  Unidos  por  el  senor  Root,  que,  por 
sus  terminos,  nos  inclinamos  a  oreer  que  es  ap6crifo.  Bn  €1  declara  que 
Estados  Unidos  eon  la  Roma  Moderna,  "colocada  por  Dios  para  actuar 
de  ARBITRO  no  s61o  en  los  destines  de  toda  la  America,  sino  en  Europa 
y  en  Asia."  Declara  que  su  pats  tiene  el  destino  rnanifiesto  de  controlar 
toda  la  America,  faltando  s61o  determinar  los  rnedios  para  realizarlo. 
Declara  como  frontera  natural  del  territorio  de  esta  Republican  ei 
Canal  de  Panama,  y  que  en  la  segunda  mitad  del  siglo  XX  causara 
extraneza  que  no  se  haya  redondeado  su  ma*pa  comprendiendo  Mexico, 
Centro  America  y  todas  las  Antillas,  siendo  s61o  cuesti6n  de  tiempo  el 
ver  flotar  en  esos  territories  la  bandera  norteamericana;  pero  al  mismo 
tiempo  declara  a  los  latino  americanos  ineptos  para  la  vida  republicacna, 
indig-nos  de  la  ciudadania  yankee,  destinandolos  asi,  a  desempenar  en 
manos  de  sus  compatriotas  el  papel  de  ilotas,  porque  las  dos  razas  son 
antitStioa-s,  inamalg-amables,  separadas  por  un  abismo.  Dice  que  para  hacer 
la  anexion  tienen  poder  bastante,  faltando  s61o  una  i;esoluci6n  conjunta 
del  Congreso;  y  pronostica  que  eso  se  hara,  sea  de  cualquiera  de  los 
tres  partidos  contendientes  el  nuevo  Presidente, 

Repetimos  que  n.o  concebimos  que  quien  se  ha  captado  las  simpatlas 
del  continente  americano  por  su  levantado  panamericanismo,  sea  autor 
de  los  conceptos  anotados;  y  menos  que  el  grande  hombre  de  Estado 
lanzase  tan  imprudente  reto,  no  s61o  a  la  America,  sino  a  todars  las 
naciones  del  mundo.  amenazando  a  muchas  con  arrebatarles  sus  pose- 
siones  en  el  mar  Caribe. 

Tenemos  confia-nza  en  que  al  leer  el  senor  Root  estas  Ifneas,  escritas 
por  quien  ha  sentido  por  el  la  mas  profunda  admiraci6n,  se  apresurara 
a  tranquilizar  a  la  America  Latina,  principalmente,  protestando  contra: 
la  arutenticidad  del  discurso  que  su  prensa  le  atribuye;  o  dara  la  versi6n 
autentica  del  mismo,  si  hubiese  sido  alterado. 

El  no  haber  visto  en  la  prensa  de  este  pafs  publicado  ni  comentado 
tan  importante  como  trascendental  documento.  nos  inclina  a  creer  que 
no  estamos  equivocados  al  considerarlo  ap6crifo. 


10 


EEVOLUCIONES  EN  MEXICO. 

Ese  pais,  bajo  la  dilatada  Administracion  del  General  Don  Por- 
firio  Diaz,  habia  alcanzado  un  alto  grado  de  progreso  y  de  prosperi- 
c!  ad,  al  amparo  de  la  paz,  que  duro  mas  de  treinta  aiios.  No  ado 
lanto,  es  cierto,  en  materia  de  educacion  politica  del  pueblo,  y  de 
practica  de  publicas  libertades,  siendo  esto  el  justo  cargo  que  puede 
liacerse  al  senor  Diaz,  porque  no  prepare  a  los  mexicanos  para 
apreciar  y  sostener  su  fructuosa  labor,  que  se  h'a  desmoronado  al 
empuje  del  primer  huracan  revolucionario,  que  aiin  esta  destrozando 
-aquella  nacion. 

Hasta  1909  la  Administracion  en  EE.  UU.  batia  palmas  al  senor 
Presidente  Diaz  por  su  modo  de  gobernar,  presentandolo  como  mo- 
delo  a  las'  demas  Kepublicas  del  Sur;  por  lo  cual,  el  haber  caido 
en  desgracia  ante  el  Departamento  de  Estad6,  no  debe  atribuirse 
a  su  celo  en  favor  de  la  practica  de  las  instituciones  democraticas. 
No  conocemos  a  fondo  la  causa  del  cambio,  pero  podemos  conje- 
turarla.  En  fines  de  1909  estallo  en  Nicaragua  una  revolucion 
contra  el  Presidente  J.  Santos  Zelaya,  por  quien  el  Secretario  Knox 
tenia  gran  aversion,  al  punto  de  forzarle  a  resignar  el  Poder  y  a 
salir  de  su  pais,  circunstancia"s  en  las  cuales  el  Presidente  Diaz 
mostro  a  Zelaya  sus  simpatias,  hasta  brindarle  urio  de  sus  vapores 
de  guerra  para  trasladarse  a  Mexico.  Esto  llego  a  provocar  un 
incidente  'diplomatico,  que  aunque  parecio  satisfactoriamente  termi- 
nado,  debe  creerse  que  dejo  profundo  resentimiento  en  el  senor 
Knox,  a  juzgar  por  los  sucesos  posteriores. 

En  1910  estallo  en  Mexico  un  movimiento  revolucionario,  loca- 
lizado  al  principio,  pero  que  fue  extendiendose  rapidamente  por 
todo  el  pais.  Ese  movimiento  conto  con  capital  y  elementos  de 
guerra  suficientes,  porque  la  frontera  de  EE.  UU.  estaba  practica- 
mente  abierta  para  introducir  estos,  y  el  dinero  americano  abundo 
tn  favor  de  la  revolucion.  Entonces  el  Gobierno  americano  llevo 
a  la  frontera  millares  de  soldados,  y  movilizo  una  poderosa  escuadra 
con  objeto  declarado  de*  llevarla  a  los  puertos  de  Mexico;  y  todo 
dejaba  entender  que  se  pensaba  en  una  intervencion  armada,  funda- 
.da  en  los  daiios  que  la  guerra  causaba  a  las  personas  y  bienes  de 
los  ciudadanos  americanos,  y  que,  para  mantener  el  pretexto,  se 
trataba  con  tanta  benevolencia  a  los  revolucionarios.  Mas,  ya  sea 
por  la  accion  en  contrario  del  Congreso  americano,  ya  sea  por  el 


11 

-convencimiento  de  que  la  invasion  seria  la  senal  para  la  conclusion 
de  la  guerra  civil,  provocando  la  union  de  todos  los  mexicanos  en 
xlefensa  de  su  patria,  es  el  hecho  que  no  hubo  tal  intervencion.  El 
gobierno  del  senor  Diaz  cayo;  pero  desgraciadamente  no  termino 
con  eso  el  estado  revolucionario.  De  entre  las  mismas  filas  de  los 
vencedores  resultaron  descontentos,  que  continuaron  la  lucha,  la 
cual,  con  alternativas  de  buena  o  mala  suerte,  se  sostiene  todavia 
para  desgracia  de  aquella  tierra.  En  esta  segunda  epoca  revolu- 
cionaria  la  conducta  del  Departamento  (de  Estado  ha  sido  entera- 
mente  contraria  a  la  anterior.  Hoy  tiene  en  la  frontera  solo  unos 
centenares  de  soldados;  y  sin  embargo  han  sido  bastantes  para 
hacer  efectiva  la  neutralidad  del  territorio  americano.  La  revolu- 
cion  esta  hoy  positivamjente  privada  de  elementos  de  guerra  y  de 
toda  clase  de  recursos  que  de  tierra  americana  pudiera  sacar,  porque 
•se  persigue  y  castiga  con  severidad  a  todo  violador  de  neutralidad, 
dandose  fiel  cumplimiento  a  una  proclamacion  del  Presidente  Taft 
tendente  a  prevenir  tales  violaciones.  Y  hasta  se  ha  concedido  el 
paso  por  territorio  americano  a  f uerzas  del  Gobierno  me^icano,  para 
ir  a  combatir  a  los  rebeldes. 

Este  contraste  que  hacemos  notar  entre  las  dos  epocas  revolu- 
cionarias,  ha  dado  lugar  a  creer  que  la  Administracion  en  este 
pais  no  ha  tenido  simpatias  por  determinado  partido  o  persona  en 
el  vecino,  sino  empeno  en  prolongar  la  lucha  para  fines  ulteriores, 
que  felizmente  no  se  realizaran,  porque  hay  razon  para  esperar  un 
e,ambio  radical  en  la  politica  hacia  la  America  latina  en  el  nuevo 
periodo  presidencial. 

Por  nuestra  parte,  al  hacer  esta  ref erencia  a  la  situacion  de 
Mexico,  no  tenemos  el  proposito  de  pronunciarnos  en  favor  de  uno 
11  otro  bando  de  los  contendientes,  sino  hacer  notar  la  inconsecuencia 
de  la  A'dministracion  americana,  y  la  doblez  con  que  ha  procedido, 
que  quedara  como  punto  de  referenda  al  tratar  de  su  proceder 
en  Centro  America. 

DOCTRINA  KNOX. 

La  doctrina  Monroe,  como  antes  hemos  indicado,  fue  en  su  origeu 
bien  acogida  por  los  pueblos  latino  americanos;  pero,  cuando  mas 
tarde  se  ha  querido  ampliar  en  el  sentido  de  significar  el1  derecho 
de  tutela  de  los  Esta  dos  Unidos  sobre  las  demas  republicas  del 


12 

Hemisferio,  ha  sido  rechazada  unanimemente  por  ellas  su  arbitraria 
y  perniciosa  interpretacion.  Es  unisona  la  voz  de  aquellos  pueblos 
en  decir:  "Lo  que  nosotros  veiamos  de-bueno  en  esa  doctrina,  era 
la  garantia  de  nuestro  derecho  a  la  vida;  pero  si  hubiera  de  signi- 
fi car  que  nos  protege  contra  las  naciones  de  Europa,  para  que  los 
EE.  ITU.  nos  dominen  a  su  sabor,  no  encontramos  en  ella  ningiin 
beneficio.  Xo  hay  ninguna  ventaja  en  ser  salvados  de  las  fauces 
del  tigre  para  ser  destrozados  por  las  garras  del  leon." 

Y  ultimamente,  bajo  la  Administraeion  Taft,  el  Secretario  dc 
Estado,  Mr.  Knox,  ha  agregado  al  derecho  de  tutela  o  de  policia, 
sobre  las  naciones  del  continente,  el  derecho  al  protectorado  finan- 
ciero,  tomando  a  su  cargo  la  administracion  de  sus  rentas,  especial- 
mente  en  Centre  America,  segiin  lo  explicaremos  en  seguida. 

En  su  primer  ano,  el  seiior  Knox,  parece  que  tuvo  la  vision  clara 
de  lo  que  podria  salvar  a  aquellos  paises,  asegurando  en  ellos  la 
paz?  y.  con  ella  el  progreso.  Parece  que  tuvo  el  proposito  de 
esforzarse  en  conseguir  el  reaparecimiento  de  la  antigua  nacion, 
Centro  America,  f  ormada  por  los  Estados  de  Guatemala,  Honduras, 
El  Salvador,  Nicaragua  y  Costarrica,  como  el  mejor  medio,  quizas 
el  unico,  para  lograr  aquel  fin.  Pero,  si  penso  en  eso  como  estadista, 
resurgio  en  el  el  hombre  de  negocios,  y  resolvio  encomendar  la 
pretendida  tutela  sobre  aquellos  paises  a  sindicados  que  se  organi- 
zarian  en  Wall  Street,  para  proceder  a  la  explotacion  de  aquellas 
tierras,  no  en  beneficio  siquiera  del  pueblo  norteamericano,  sino 
en  el  del  grupo  de  banqueros  privilegiados,  a  quienes  se  entregarian. 
El  examen  de  los  negocios  propuestos,  siguiendo  esa  politica,  bauti- 
zada  con  el  npmbre  de  "Dollar  Diplomacy,"  justifica  nuestros 
asertos;  y  vamos  a  hecer  ese  examen,  aunque  brevemente,  como 
causa  de  las  revoluciones  en  varios  de  los  pai&es-  donde  se  ha  querido 
introducir  o  se  ha  ensayado,  que  son  en  general  las  republicas  que 
bana  el  mar  Caribe. 

Yamos  a  exponer  la  Doctrina  Knox,  tal  como  sus  autores  y  man- 
tenedores  la  presentan  y  defienden.  El  Presidente  Taft  en  sus 
mensages,  y  el  mismo  y  el  Secretario  Knox  en  discursos  ante  las 
Universidades  y  ante  los  electores,  han  declarado  enfaticamente  que 
su  politica  tiende  a  asegurar  la  paz  y  el  progreso  de  las  republicas 
latino  americanas,  sustituyendo  los  dollars  a  las  balasj:  que,  to- 
mando los  agentes  del  Gobierno  americano  a  su  cargo  la  adminis- 


13 

tracion  de  las  aduanas,  se  quitaria  el  principal  aliciente  para  las 
revoluciones,  suponiendo  que  estas  obedecen  solo  al  deseo  de  apo- 
derarse  de  las  rentas  publicas  para  enriquecerse  sus  autores;  que 
su  sistema  ha  sido  ensayado  con  el  mejor  exito  en  Santo  Domingo, 
en  donde  hace  algunos  anos  que  esta  funcionando  satisfactoria- 
mente :  que  los  proyectos  de  emprestito  estan  concebidos  en  terminos 
los  mas  favorables  para  los  paises  que  se  trata  de  proteger;  y,  en  lo 
general,  han  endosado  de  manera  absoluta  los  planes  de  explotacion 
de  aquellas  tierras  concebidos  por  los  banqueros  favorites  del  De- 
partamento  de  Estado. 

SANTO  DOMINGO. 

Como  la  Administration  americana  abona  su  politica  con  la  ex- 
periencia  hecha  en  Santo  Domingo,  queremos  examinar,  aunque  sea 
a  la  ligera,  la  situacion  de  ese  pais  despues  de  que  ha  caido  bajo  el 
protectorado  financiero  del  Gobierno  americano.  Desde  hace  mas 
de  quince  anos  un  grupo  de  especuladores  americanos  celebro  un 
contrato  para  el  arreglo  de  la  deuda  externa  de  dicha  nacion, 
teniendo  por  base  el  mane  jo  de  las  aduanas  por  medio  de  los  agentes 
del  sindicado  que  se  organize  al  efecto.  El  negocio  habria  sido  un 
complete  fracaso  para  los  especuladores,  sino  hubiesen  logrado  mas 
tarde  interesar  el  Gobierno  americano,  imponiendo  al  efeeto  al  Go- 
bierno de  la  isla  un  tratado  en  virtud  del  cual  haria  el  Presidente 
de  EE.  UU.  el  nombramiento  de  los  colectores  de  las  aduanas,  para 
manej arias  a  su  discrecion,  quedando  a  cargo  del  Colector  General  el 
servicio  de  la  deuda  extrangera.  Los  especuladores  quedaron  a 
cubierto  de  todo  riesgo,  porque  desde  aquel  memento  el  cumpli- 
miento  del  convenie  quedaba  en  verdad  garantizado  per  el  poder  de 
EE.  UU. 

Si  el  plan  hubiese  dado  buen  resultado,  podria  haber  tenido 
alguna  excusa  en  la  circunstancia  de  que  con  el  se  detuvo  la  accion 
de  varias  naciones  europeas  que  enviaron  buques  de  guerra  para 
colectar  por  la  fuerza  los  creditos  de  sus  nacionales ;  si  bien  para 
detener  esa  accion  habria  bastado  la  aplicacion  de  la  doctrina  Mon- 
roe, tal  como  la  han  entendido  notables  publicistas  sudamericanos, 
a  la  cabeza  de  los  cuales  aparece  el  muy  notable  seiior  Luis  M.  Drago 
que  ha  dado  su  nombre  a  una  nueva  doctrina.  Pero  el  plan  fue  un 
fracaso,  al  menos  en  relacion  con  el  fin  que  ostentaron  sus  autores. 


14 

Es  cierto  que,  por  haber  introducido  mayor  orden  en  la  adminis- 
tration, el  producto  de  la  renta  aumento  considerablemente  en  los 
primeros  anos,  si  bien  en  los  pcsteriores  ha  seguido  su  curso  regular. 
En  cuanto  a  honradez,  la  prensa  americana  ha  dado  cuenta  de  un 
gran  escandalo  relacionado  con  el  Colector  General.  Y  los  otros- 
lines  que  se  perseguian,  el  buen  servicio  de  la  deuda  extrangera  y 
el  mantenimiento  de  la  paz,  tampoco  se  han  conseguido.  Eespecto 
a  lo  primero,  por  ser  mas  autorizada,  dejaremos  la  voz  al  Consejo  de 
Tenedores  de  Bonos  Extranjeros  en  Londres,  que  en  su  report 
correspondiente  al  ano  de  1910,  dice :  "El  Consejo  tiene  que  declarar 
que  ningunos  pasos  se  han  dado  todavia  para  reparar  la  injusticia 
hecha  a  los  tenedores  de  bonos  ingleses  de  la  deuda  de  Santo  Do- 
mingo bajo  el  arreglo  de  1908.  Al  tiemjpo  de  presentar  las  pro- 
puestas  referentes  a  la  deuda  de  Honduras  en  1909,  se  dio  a 
entender  al  Consejo  que  la  materia  tendria  pronta  atencionj 
pero  fuera  'de  vagas  indicaciones  de  que  el  asunto  no  se  habia  perdi- 
do  de  vista,  ostensiblemente  nada  se  ha  hecho;  y  por  consiguiente., 
el  credito  exterior  'de  Santo  Domingo  nada  h'a  ganado,  y  se  halla  en 
peor  situacion  que  antes,  porque  ya  no  esta  en  manos  de  su  propio 
Gobierno  remediar  el  mal. 

Eespecto  al  manteninmiento  de  la  paz,  el  fracaso  ha  sido  mas 
completo.  En  el  trascurso  de  los  mencionados  quince  anos  ha 
habido  dos  Presidentes  asesinados  y  una  serie  de  revoluciones,  de- 
bidas  al  descontento  popular  contra  sus  gobernantes,  por  ser  instru- 
mento  de  un  Poder  extranjero.  En  los  ultimos  dos  anos  sobre  todo, 
puede  asegurarse  que  no  ha  gozado  aquel  infortunado  pals  de  un 
momento  de  perfecta  tranquilidad,  no  obstante  que,  o  mas  bien  por 
eso  mismo,  los  movimientos  han  sido  sofocados  por  la  presion  de 
los  buques  americanos;  y  en  los  momentos  actuales,  esa  presion 
no  ha  bastado,  y  ha  sido  despachada  una  verdadera  expedicion,  que 
todavia  no  se  sabe  si  va  a  proteger  al  Gobierno  o  a  los  revoluciona- 
rios.* 

£  Porque  entonces  el  Presidente  Taf  t  y  el  Secretario  Knox  siguen 

*La  revoluci6n  de  Santo  Domingo  ha  terminado,  con  intervenci6n 
del  Grobierno  americano,  cuyo  Delegudo  se  declar6  en  favor  de  ella, 
dando  por  resultado  la  calda  del  Presidente  Victoria,  y  la?  elevaci6n  a 
la  Presidencia  del  Arzobisps  cat6lics.  Es  curioso  que  la  diplomacla 
de  un  pals  en  su  maryorfa  protestante,  haya  apoyado  en  aquel  lugar  la 
entrega  del  poder  al  jefe  de  la  iglesia  cat61ica.  la  mas  intolerante  de 
todas  las  sectas,  que  privara  de  la?  libertad  religiosa,  tan  sagrada  en 
Estados  Unidos,  no  s61o  a  los  natives,  sino  tambien  a  los  extranjeros. 
Este  es  uno  de  los  llamados  beneficios  de  la  Dollar  Diplomacy. 


entonando  canticos  en  favor  de  su  interveneion  en  Santo  Domingo, 
y  siguen  presentandola  como  modelo  para  ejercer  igual  accion  en 
los  demas  paises?  No  pueden  creer  de  buena  fe  lo  que  anrman, 
porque  los  hechos,  a  la  vista  del  mundo,  estan  desmintiendo  sus 
palabras. 


Ahora  examinemos  los  resultados  de  la  benevola  y  fraternal  in- 
fluencia  de  esa  politica  en  los  paises  de  Centro  America  donde  se 
ha  intentado  o  logrado'introducir. 

COSTARRICA. 

Hace  unos  cuatro  anos  que  se  celebro  un  contrato  entre  el  Go- 
bierno  costarricence  y  Tin  sindicado  de  banqueros  de  New  York 
Fobre  arreglo  de  la  deuda  extrangera  y  emision  de  un  emprestito, 
con  la  consabida  base  de  la  entrega  de  las  aduanas  al  Colector  o 
colectores  que  nombrase  el  Presidente  de  EE.  TJTL,  todo  en  forma 
muy  semejante  al  plan  de  Santo  Domingo.,  si  bien  no  figuraba  como 
parte  contratante  el  Gobierno  americano.  El  Congreso  costarricence 
rechazo  aquel  contrato  como  atentatorio  a  la  soberania  nacional. 
Despues  se  celebro  con  Mr.  Minor  C.  Kieth,  uno  sustancialmente 
igual  en  la  parte  financiera,  pero  sin  mencionarse  interveneion  de 
Gobierno  extranjero.  Este  fue  aprobado  por  el  Congreso.  y  esta  en 
practica.  No  es  nuestro  proposito  abonar  este  convenio,  que  quizas 
pudo  haberse  celebrado  en  mepores  condiciones;  pero  si  podemos 
declarar  que,  por  no  contener  ninguna  estipulacion  atentatoria  a 
la  soberania  de  Costarrica  no  ha  producido  irritacion  en  la  opinion 
publica,  que  aun  en  aquel  pais  esencialmente  pacifico  se  hubiera 
tra'ducido  en  trastornos. 

GUATEMALA. 

Por  el  mismo  tiempo  recibio  el  Gobierno  de  Guatemala  propuestas 
de  contrato  de  emprestito  semejantes  al  rechazado  por  el  Congreso 
de  Costarrica.,  recomendadas  por  el  Departamento  de  Estado,  al 
menos  en  terminos  generales.  El  Poder  Ejecutivo  no  quiso  asumir 
la  responsabilidad  de  resolverlas  y  las  paso  al  Congreso,  el  cual  las 
devolvio  sin  discutirlas,  encargando  al  Ejecutivo  estudiarlas  con 
el  debido  detenimiento  y  celebrar  la  que  mejor  le  pareciese.  Conocido 
el  sistema  despotico  de  gobierno  en  Guatemala,  debemos  hacer  justi- 


16 

cia  a  su  Presidente,  reconociendo  que  con  eso  demostro  no  querer 
entrar  en  ese  arreglo,  aunque  buscando  la  manera  de  demorarlo  sin 
ponerse  mal  con  el  Departamento,  sistema  de  moratorias  que  ha 
eontinuado  hasta  el  momento  presente;  lo  cual,  si  no  le  abona  por 
su  entereza  de  caracter,  demuestra  su  prudencia  y  su  deseo  de 
conservar  el  poder.  Al  mismo  tiempo  ha  logrado  tener  satisfecho 
al  Departamento,  secundando  todos  sus  planes  en  las  d^emas  sec- 
ciones  de  Centre  America,  como  lo  haremos  ver  adelante. 

HONDURAS. 

Casi  simultaneamente  con  las  propo&iciones  de  emprestitos  hechas 
a  los  dos  paises  mencionados,  el  Departamento  de  Estado,  por 
medio  de  su  Ministro  en  Tegucigalpa,  insinuo  al  Gobierno  de 
Honduras  la  conveniencia  de  mandar  representantes  a  Washington, 
con  el  fin  de  aprovechar  la  buena  disposicion  de  un  sindicado  de 
banqueros  de  Wall  Street  para  encargarse  del  arreglo  de  su  deuda 
extranjera,  suministrar  fondos  para  obras  de  progreso  y  redimir 
la  deuda  interior ;  asegurando  que  esas  condiciones  serian  mas  venta- 
josas  para  el  pais  que  las  convenidas  entre  dicho  Gobierno  y  el 
Ministro  ingles,  representante  de  los  tenedores  de  bonos.  Vease  el 
anexo  A. 

Antes,  el  Departamento  de  Estado  habia  logrado  ejercer  su  in- 
fluencia  cerca  del  Foreign  Office  de  Londres,  para  que  anulara, 
como  anulo,  el  arreglo  antedicho. 

El  Gobierno  de  Honduras  mando  comisionados  a  Washington  y 
New  York,  quienes  recibieron  las  proposiciones  de  los  banqueros, 
basadas  en  en  una  convencion  previa  con  el  Gobierno  americano,  el 
cual  asumiria  la  administracion  de  las  aduanas  hondurenas  por 
medio  de  empleados  que  practicamente  serian  de  nombramiento  y 
remocion  del  Presidente  de  EE.  TJU.,  y  que  en  el  hecho  resultaban 
irresponsables. 

El  emprestito  seria  de  diez  millones  de  dollars,  al  tipo  de  emision 
de  88%,  con  interes  de  5%  y  1%  de  amortizacion.  De  estos  millone? 
no  habria  de  llegar  a  Honduras  ni  el  10%,  inclusive  lo  que  iria 
invertido  en  maquinaria,  utiles  y  materiales  de  f errocarril,  que  repre- 
sentaria  la  mayor  parte  de  ese  10%.  Por  las  demas  condiciones  del 
negocio,  en  realidad  significaba  que  Honduras  haria  no  solo  el 
sacrificio  de  su  soberania,  sino  tambien  el  de  sus  rentas  en  beneficio 


17 

del  grupo  de  banqueros,  quedando  aquel  pais  sujeto  a  vivir  de  la 
caridad  de  sus  llamados  protectores.  Reducido  a  numeros  el 
proyecto  significaba  para  Honduras  el  pago  en  40  anos  de  mas  de 
26  millones  de  dollars,  en  vez  de  ocho  que  habria  debido  pagar, 
segiin  el  arreglo  con  el  Ministro  ingles,  sin  tener  este  peligros  ni 
condiciones  vergonzosas.  Y,  sin  embargo,  tanto  el  Presidente  Taft 
como  el  Secretario  Knox  han  proclamado  que  estaban  tendiendo  su 
mano  generosa  a  aquellos  paises  para  librarlos  de  una  enorme  deuda 
extrangera,  cuando  en  realidad  su  accion  significa  el  plan  de  colocar 
a  aquellos  pueblos  en  la  imposibilidad  de  vivir  con  gobierno  propio, 
para  que  se  vean  forzados  a  pedir  como  gracia  la  anexion  o  el  pro- 
tectorado  absoluto.  Y  significa  ademas  que  el  Poder  Ejectivo  ameri- 
cano  gobernaria  en  el  hecho  en  aquellos  paises,  sin  responsabilidad 
nlguna  ante  su  propio  pueblo,  pues  llegado  el  caso  la  declinaria  en 
el  grupo  de  financieros  sus  aliados,  contra  quienes  las  leyes  de  EE. 
UTJ.  nada  podrian,  y  contra  quienes  las  leyes  de  los  paises  oprimidos 
tampoco  podrian  nada,  porque  serian  aplicadas  bajo  la  influencia  y 
poder  efectivo  de  los  mismos  culpables  de'cualquier  abuso  cometido. 
Tal  proyecto  se  mantuvo  isecreto  tanto  aqui  como  en  Honduras, 
pues  el  Presidente  de  aquel  pais  no  dio  cuenta  de  las  proposiciones 
ni  al  mayor  numero  de  sus  propios  Ministros,  por  exigencia  del 
Departamento  y  de  los  banqueros.  El  representante  de  Honduras 
estuvo  resistiendo  la  firma  del  tratado  y  contrato  propuestos,  con 
instrucciones  de  su  Gobierno,  hasta  que  en  el  mes  de  Julio  de  1910 
sobrevino  una  tentativa  revolucionaria,  por  medio  de  una  expedi- 
cion  maritima  en  el  Atlantico :  y,  no  obstante  el  celo  que  en  otras 
ocasiones  ha  demonstrado  la  marina  americana  en  tales  casos,  en 
esta  sus  buques  brillaron  por  su  ausencia.  La  revolucion  fracaso 
en  su  principio;  pero  el  Departamento  la  aprovecho  para  -hacer 
comprender  al  gobernante  de  Honduras,  ya  por  medio  de  sus  Repre- 
sentantes  en  Washington,  ya  por  medio  del  Ministro  americano  en 
Tegucigalpa,  que  solo  aceptando  el  arreglo  financiero*  propuesto,  se 
libraria  de  la  repeticion  de  la  tentativa,  porque  el  Departamento  se 
encargaria  de  impedirla  o  ahogarla.  El  Presidente  de  Honduras, 
General  Miguel  R.  Davila.  que  a  toda  costa  queria  conservar  el 
Poder,  comenzo  a  variar  sus  instrucciones  a  su  Agente  fmanciero 
en  Xew  York,  a  la  vez  Enviado  especial  en  Washington,  General 
Don  Juan  E.  Paredes,  pero  resistiendo  toda  via  al  compromiso  de 


18 

la  soberania.  Fue  precise  para  que  cediese  que  la  prensa  de  este 
pais  se  encargara  de  hacer  publico  que  si  el  Presidente  Davila  no 
aceptaba  la  negociacion,  esta  se  haria  de  todos  modos,  porque  la 
revolueion  seria  inevitable  y  su  jefe  estaba  comprometido  a 
.aceptarla. 

Cuando  el  Presidente  Davila  pedia  que  se  impidiese  en  EE.  UU. 
la  salida  de  la  anunciada  expedicion,  quejandose  a  la  vez  de  que 
el  Presidente  de  Guatemala  estaba  auxiliandola,  se  le  contestaba 
indefectiblemente  "Firme  el  arreglo  financiero"  Por  ultimo  dio 
la  orden  de  firmar  la  convencion  y  contrato  de  emprestito,  orden 
que  al  principio  resistio  en  absoluto  el  representante,  pero  que  al  fin 
cumplio,  previa  protesta,  firmando  la  conveneion  el  10  de  Enero, 
cuando  ya  habia  estallado  el  anunciado  movimiento  revolucionario 
y  sido  tornados  dos  puertos,  pero  negandose  a  firmar  el  contrato  con 
los  banqueros.  Esta  materia  h'a  sido  completamente  puesta  en 
claro  por  el  senor  Paredes  en  varios  folletos  que  aqui  ha  publicado, 
y  de  los  cuales  reproducimos  bajo  el  anexo  B  algunos  documentos 
important  es. 

Cuando  la  expedicion  que  salio  de  la  costa  americana  llego  a 
la  de  Honduras,  despues  de  haber  trasbordado  cerca  de  la  de  Guate- 
mala los  elementos  de  guerra  que  el  Presidente  de  aquel  pals  h'abia 
ofrecido,  habia  buques  de  guerra  americanos  en  aquellas  aguas,  y 
no  ejercieron  ninguna  accion  par  detener  el  movimiento.  El 
orucero  americano  Tacoma  abordo  al  buque  revolucionario  Hornet, 
que  era  el  principal  de  la  expedicion,  para  averiguar  si  habia  viola  do 
la  neutralidad ;  pero  su  capitan  declaro  que  nada  iregular  encontro 
en  el.  Cuando  la  conveneion  fue  firmada  el  Hornet  fue  capturado 
por  el  mismo  crucero,  pero  despues  que  habia  desembarcado  todos 
los  elementos  de  guerra. 

La  conveneion  de  emprestito  fue  improbada  el  ultimo  de  Enero 
casi  por  unanimidad  por  el  Oongreso  hondureiio,  a  pesar  de  lo  cual 
siguio  exigiendo  el  Departamento  la  firma  del  contrato  con  los 
banqueros,  el  cual  fue  firmado  en  Febreero,  no  por  el  Senor  Paredes, 
que  fue  removido,  sino  por  el  Plenipotenciario  hondureiio  perma- 
nente.  Mas  al  ser  improbada  dicha  conveneion,  volvio  a  ser  mani- 
fiestamente  parcial  en  favor  de  la  revolucion  la  conducta  de  la 
rnarina  americana.  o  mejor  dicho,  del  Departamento  de  Estado. 

Cuando  el  Departamento  ejercio  su  mediacion  para  llegar  a  la 


19 

paz,  en  nota  que  comunico  a  los  contendientes,  a  su  Ministro  en 
Tegucigalpa  y  al  jefe  de  la  Escuadrilla,  conteniendo  las  bases  de 
su  intervencion,  declare  que  Puerto  Cortes  debia  ser  Zona  neutral; 
y  en  consecuencia  el  Capitan  del  Tacoma  exigio  que  las  fuerzas  del 
Gobierno  constituido  desocuparan  el  puerto,  y  asi  lo  hicieron, 
quedando  bajo  la  proteccion  de  los  Consules  extrangeros  y  de  los 
buques  de  guerra,  pero  principalmente,  bajo  la  fe  de  la  declaracion 
de  neiitralidad  hecha  por  el  Secretario  de  Estado.  For  eso  con  harta 
sorpresa  escucho  el  Presidente  Davila  de  boca  del  Ministro  ameri- 
cgno,  en  nombre  del  Capitan  del  Tacoma,  la  exigencia  de  que  diese 
su  autorizacion  para  ehtregar  el  puerto  a  los  revolucionarios.  Davila 
se  nego,  alegando  las  razones  expresadas,  pero  el  Ministro  insistio 
al  dia  siguiente;  y  despues  de  varias  horas  de  discusion,  sin  duda 
aburrido,  dijo  a  Davila :  "Es  inutil  que  sigamos  perdiendo  tiempo : 
el  puerto  esta  entregado  a  la  revolucion  desde  aver;  si  quiere  II. 
que  haya  conferencia  de  paz  con  la  mediae-ion  americana,  acepte 
el  hecho  consumado."  Y  en  efecto  el  puerto  habia  sido  entregado 
a  los  revolucionarios  desde  antes  de  solicitar  la  autorizacion  del 
Presidente  Davila. 

El  serior  Knox  en  sus  mencionadas  instrucciones  habia  declaradn 
como  base  esencial  para  la  transaccion  que  se  buscaba,  que  el  tercero 
en  quien  el  Presidente  Davila  depositaria  el  Poder  con  el  fin  de 
poner  termino  a  la  contienda,  debia  ser  persona  enteramente 
imparr-ial,  que  diese  garantias  iguales  a  todos  los  hondurenos  sin 
clistincion  de  partidos;  y  sin  embargo,,  con  instrucciones  suyas,  su 
omiisionado  Sr.  Dawson,  en  quien  los  Delegados  a  la  conferencia  de 
paz  de  Puerto  Cortez  declinaron  la  designacion  del  tercero,  escogio 
al  Dr.  Francisco  Bertran,  hombre  cuyos  meritos  personales  no 
discutimos,  pero  que  estaba  al  servicio  de  la  revolucion.,  militando 
e-n  sus  filas  activamente,  y  era  reconocido  como  uno  de  los  mejores 
nmigos  personales  del  jefe  de  ella.  Por  tal  motive  no  se  logro  la 
concordia  de  los  hondurenos  que  se  buscaba,  pues  siendo  el  Presi- 
dente de  hecho  el  Jefe  vencedor,  fueron  ilusorias  las  garantias 
prometidas  y  estipuladas  en  el  convenio  de  paz  en  favor  de  los 
contraries. 

De  esta  conducta  doble  del  Departamento  resulto  un  beneficio. 
El  favorer-ido  por  el  Departamento  tampoco  quedo  satisfecho;  y, 
como  la  opinion  publica  en  Honduras  estaba  tan  claramente  mani- 


festada  en  contra  de  la  propuesta  negociacion  de  emprestito,  hasta-. 
este  dia  el  nuevo  Presidente,  burlando  las  esperanzas  que  en  el 
tenian  los  especuladores,  no  ha  firmado  el  contrato,  a  pesar  de  quo 
se  le  ban  ^ropuesto  modificaciones  ventajosas  para  el  pals.  Le  ha 
favorecido  para  su  resistencia  la  actitud  adversa  a  esas  negociaciones 
de  parte  del  Senado  americano;  actitud  que  ha  merceido  tantos 
aplausos  en  los  pueblos  latino  americanos.  La  actitud  del  Senado 
fue  en  gran  manera  debida  a  los  trabajos  que,  por  inicdativa  propia 
y  sin  ayuda  de  ningun  Gobierno,  hicieron  unos  pocos  centro  ameri- 
canos,, especialmente  el  patriota  Dr.  Don  Policarpo  Bonilla; 
que  dio  por  resultado  hacer  luz  en  un  asunto  que  se  habia  conservado 
en  el  misterio.  Si  el  Senado  hubiese  ratificado  la  convencion,  el 
Departamento  de  Estado  se  habria  atrevido  a  ejercer  energica  pre- 
sion  sobre  el  Presidents  de  Honduras ;  y  este,  sabedor  por  experien- 
cia  propia  de  lo  que  era  capaz  de  hacer  para  lograr  su  objeto,  por 
conseryar  el  poder,  es  probable  que  habria  imitado  a  su  antecesor. 
Creemos  dejar  demostrado  que  los  dos  ultimos  movimientos  re- 
volucionarios  ocurridos  en  Honduras  han  sido  la  obra  del  Departa-- 
mento  de  Estado  americano,  o  por  lo  menos  conocidos  y  tolerados 
por  el,  como  consecuencia  de  la  famosa  Dollar  Diplomacy;  y  va- 
mos  a  procurar  en  seguida  demostrar  la  culpabilidad  del  mifemo 
Departamento  respecto  a  las  dos  ultimas  revoluciones  en  Nicaragua, 
para  sacar  las  conclusiones  finales,  de  que  resultara  la  absoluta 
condenacion  de  la  politica  Knox  en  Centro  America,  y  en  general 
en  la  America  Latina. 

NICARAGUA. 

Por  la  misma  ep:oca  en  que  se  hicieron  propuestas  de  emprestito 
a  las  otras  Eepublicas,  se  hicieron  tambien  a  Nicaragua,  siendo 
Presidente  el  General  Don  J.  Santos  Zelaya,  quien  no  les  dio 
entrada,  siquiera  para  discutirlas ;  y  mas  bien  arreglo  un  emprestito 
en  Europa,  en  el  que  entraba  como  base  principal  la  cancelacion 
de  la  deuda  americana.  Dado  el  entpeno  que  despues  ha  mostrado 
el  Sefior  Knox  por  esas  negociaciones,  hasta  convertirlo  en  una 
cuestion  de  amor  propio,  se  comprende  facilmente  que  desde  aquel 
momento  quedase  condenado  a  muerte  el  gobierno  de  Zelaya.  Se 
le  promovieron  enormes  reclamaciones  y  se  renovaron  con  desusada 
dureza  muchas  otras,  algunas  de  ellas  monstruosas ;  pero  no  dieron 


21 

lugar  a  un  rompimiento,  porque  el  gobiemo  de  Zelaya  propuso 
arreglos  tan  ventajosos  para  los  reclamantes,  que  ni  estos  ni  el 
Departamento  tuvieron  pretexto  para  rechazarlos. 

Pero  el  ST.  Knox  tenia  que  castigar,  como  el  diria,  a  Zelaya  por 
su  resistencia.  Y  la  revolucion  no  se  hizo  esperar.  El  Jefe  de 
la  Costa  Atlantica,  Juan  J.  Estrada,  formado  a  las  ordenes  del 
General  Zelaya  y  hombre  de  su  confianza,  se  sublevo  contra  este, 
entendiendose  con  los  descontentos  del  Gobierno.  Desde  el  primer 
momento  de  la  subleva'cion  se  pudo  observar  la  benevolencia  con 
que  los  rebeldes  eran  tratados  por  el  Departamento  de  Estado,  y 
se  vio  la  complicidad  del  Consul  americano,  senor  Moffat.  Keci- 
bieron  libremente  elementos  de  guerra  y  municiones  de  todas  clases 
y  dinero  de  capitalistas  americanos;  todo  de  manera  notoria  y  con 
mariifiesta  tolerancia,  y  puede  decirse,  complacencia  de  funcionarios 
americanos.  Como  una  de  las  mejores  pruebas  de  nuestras  aser- 
ciones,  aparecera  la  declaracion  de  Juan  J.  Estrada,  Ex-Presidente 
de  Xicaragua  y  Jefe  de  aquella  revolucion,  la  cual  fue  publicada 
en  el  Xew  York  Times  del  10  de  Septiembre  de  1912.  (Anexo  C.) 

E!  senor  Knox  neeoitaba  im  pretexto  par  obrar  con  mas 
franqueza  contra  el  gobierno  de  Zelaya.  Si  este  pretexto  no  hubiera 
sobrevenido  lo  hubiera  creado.  Lo  tomo  de  la  fusilacion 
de  los  aventureros  Cannon  y  Groce  al  servicio  de  la  revo- 
lucioii  condenados  a  muerte  por  un  Consejo  de  Guerra, 
por  haber  sido  tornados  infraganti  poniendo  minas  para  destruir 
las  embaracaciones  del  Gobierno.  Xo  queremos  discutir,  porque 
no  viene  al  caso,  la  legalidad  de  la  sentencia,  pues  concedemos,  si 
«e  quiere  que  no  la  tuviese.  Dado  el  hecho  indiscutible  de  haber 
sido  tornados  con  las  armas  en  la  mano  y  trabajando  como  dinami- 
teros,  era  bastante  para  que  perdiesen  el  derecho  a  la  proteccion 
de  su  Gobierno,  conforme  a  los  precedentes  universales  de  los 
tiempos  modernos;  y  lo  ha  recpnocido  recientemente  el  Presidente 
Taft.  al  notificar  a  los  ciudadanos  americanos  que  si  se  mezclan  en 
la  actual  contienda  en  Mexico,,  correran  de  su  cuenta  todos  los 
riesgos.,  sin  derecho  a  ereprar  apoyo  de  su  Gobierno.  Si  Cannon  y 
Groce  estaban  al  servicio  de  la  revolucion  por  interes  de  lucre,  debian 
sujetarse  a  las  consecuencias  de  su  gruesa  aventura.  Si  procedian 
'(•ntusiasmados  por  la  justicia  de  la  causa,  combatiendo  a  un  tirano, 
tenian  que  correr  los  riesgos  qne  en  talos  casos  corren  todos  los 


22 

patriotas  que  llegan  a  caer  en  manos  de  ese  tirano.  Mas  en  ningiin 
caso  quien  viola  la  ley  internacional  puede  pretender  ser  amparado 
por  ella. 

En  tales  circunstancias  lo  mas  que  ha  podido  hacer'el  Departa- 
mento,  y  de  ello  hay  precedentes,  ha  sido  interponer  su  amistosa 
influencia  en  favor  de  los  acusados,  para  libraries  de  la  pena  capi- 
tal, y  tuvo  tiempo  de  hacerlo  el  senor  Knox,  oon  seguridad  de 
exito,  si  realmente  hubiera  estado  interesado  en  favor  de  las 
victimas. 

No  procedio  asi  el  senor  Knox;  y  en  su  memorable  nota  al 
Encargado  de  Negocios  de  Nicaragua,  occasionada  por  ese  suceso, 
fechada  el  primero  de  Diciembre  de  1909,  rompe  todos  los  princi- 
pios  del  Derecho  Internacional,  anula  todos  los  precedentes,  y  hace 
retroceder  la  civilizacion  consagrando  la  fuerza  como  ttnica  fuente 
de  la  justicia,  cual  si  viviesemos  en  la  edad  media. 

En  esa  nota  por  si  y  ante  si  el  senor  Knox  declara  injusta  la 
sentencia  del  Consejo :  declara  que  el  gobierno  de  Zelaya  es  tiranico, 
y  abandonado  de  la  opinion  publica,  y  que  todo  el  pals  estaba 
oonmovido,  lo  cual  era  falso,  pues  la  revolucion  estaba  localizada  en 
parte  de  la  costa  atlantica:  declara  que  Zelaya  era  el  perturbador 
de  la  paz  de  Centro  America,  el  violador  de  los  convenios  de  Wash- 
ington, motivando  por  eso  las  justas  quejas  de  los  otros  Gobiernos 
de  C.  A.,  quienes  consideraban  una  necesidad  su  desaparicion  del 
Poder,  siendo  esto  ultimo  tambien  falso,  porque  tal  declaracion 
pudo  oirla  a  lo  mas  del  Gobierno  de  Guatemala,  instrumento 
para  su  politica  de  intervencion  en  aquellos  paises;  y,  en  consecuen- 
cia,  constituyendose  en  Juez  de  una  nacion  extranjera,  resolvio 
desconocer  como  Gobierno  legitimo  al  presidido  por  Zelaya,  cortando 
con  el  sus  relaciones  y  declarandolo  Gobierno  de. facto,  al  cual 
trataria  de  igual  manera  que  al  Gobierno  de  facto  de  la  revolucion. 
No  creemos  que  haya  en  la  historia  de  la  diplomacia  del  mundo 
civilizado  un  ejemplo  semejante.  (Anexo  B.) 

Pero  todavia  seria  menor  el  escandalo,  si  el  Departamento  hu- 
biese  cumplido  lealmente  lo  contenido  en  su  resolucion.  No  fuc 
r.si,  sin  embargo.  Se  coloco  de  manera  manifiesta,  y  sin  guardar  ni 
las  formas,  en  favor  de  la  revolucion,  ayudandole  con  su  poder 
moral  y  material  a  obtener  el  triunfo,  como  vamos  a  demostrarlo 
en  segm'da. 


23 

El  Presidente  Zelaya,  anonadado  por  esa  violenta  actitud  del 
Departamento  de  Estado,  cometio  el  grave  error  de  apresurarse  a 
depositar  el  Poder  en  la  persona,  que  el  Congreso  conforme  a  la 
Constitution  designo  al  efecto,  en  vez  de  empeiiarse  en  obtener  un. 
triunfo  importante  sobre  la  revolution,  para  obligarla  a  considerar 
&u  separation  como  la  solution  mejor  del  conflieto;  y  en  caso  de 
que  el  Departamento  no  se  diese  por  satisfecho,  obligarlo  a  emplear 
la  fuerza  armada  para  hacer  trinnfar  a  los  revolutionaries.  Su 
separacion  prematura,  en  momentos  en  que  estaban  enfrentadas 
las  fuerzas  contendientes  para  librar  una  batalla  decisiva,  produjo- 
logicamente  el  desconcierto  en  sus  filas;  y,  como  consecuencia,  el 
desastre  del  Recreo,  que  dio  alientos  a  los  revolutionaries,  impulsan- 
dolos  a  eontinuar  la  lucha  contra  el  sucesor  de  Zelaya.,  Doctor  Don 
Jose  Madriz,  no  obstante  que  les  constaba  que  durante  mas  de  once 
anos  habia  sido  emigra  do  "politico  bajo  la  Administracion  de  aquelr 
y  por  lo  mismo  estaba  muy  lejos  de  ser  corresponsable  de  los  cargos- 
que  contra  el  hacian.  Pero  lo  que  mas  contribuyo  a  la  prolongation 
de  la  guerra,  fue  la  actitud  del  Departamento,  el  cual  rehuso  re- 
eonocer  al  Gobienro  de  Madriz,  a  pesar  de  estar  legalmente  cons- 
tituido,  y  dentro  de  las  prescripciones  del  tratado  de  Washington 
(Conferencia  Centroamericana  de  Paz),  declarando  que  mantendria 
respecto  a  el  la  mismo  politica  que  h'abia  notificado  al  Representante 
de  Zelaya,  y.  no  conforme  con  eso,  con  \7iolacion  del  tratado  ante- 
dicho,  influyo  cerca  de  los  Gobiernos  de  Guatemala  y  El  Salvador 
para  que  no  lo  reconociesen  tampoco,  siendo  los  tres  los  unices  del 
mundo  eivilizado  que  dejaron  de  hacerlo. 

Continuo  la  lucha  mas  sangrienta  que  antes;  pero,  a  pesar  de 
todas  las  circunstancias  desfavorables  que  quedan  mencionadas,  las 
fuerzas  del  Gobierno  de  Madriz  lograron  derrotar  en  el  interior  del 
pals  a  las  de  la  revolution,  reduciendolas  a  sus  posiciones  del  Rama 
y  a  su  base  de  operaciones,  Bluefields,  ambas  en  la  costa  atlantica. 
Para  conseguirlo,  los  ejercitos  del  Gobierno  hicieron  esfuerzos  y 
sacrificios  inauditos;  y  solo  despues  de  penosi&imas  marchas  por 
entre  los  pantanos,  donde  quedaban  sepultados  centenares  de  hom- 
bres,  caballos  y  vehiculos,  lograron  legar  a  aquellos  lugares,  a  la 
vez  que  una  expedition  maritima  se  apoderaba  dc  todos  los  puertos 
y  desembarcaderos  de  la  costa.  Con  un  ataque  combinado  captura- 
ron  la  fortaleza  del  Bluff,  Have  del  puerto  y  ciudad  de  Bluefields, 


Se  preparaba  el  ataque  por  tierra  y  agua  a  aquella  plaza,  cuando 
•desembarcaron  marinos  de  los  buques  de  guerra  americanes,  y  el 
Jefe  de  la  flotilla  declaro:  que  no  permitiria  hostilidades  contra 
la  ciudad :  que  no  permitiria  que  se  detuviese  ninguna  embarcacion 
mercante,  ni  para  averiguar  si  llevaba  elementos  de  guerra ;  y  tampo- 
•co  permitiria  que  cobrase  el  Gobierno  derechos  de  aduana  en  la  del 
Bluff,  que  era  la  establecida  por  ley,  porque  debian  cobrarlos  los 
revolucionarios  en  la  aduana  interior  que  establecieron  al  perder 
la  fortaleza.,  f rente  a  la  cual,  y  bajo  el  dominio  de  cuyos  fuegos, 
tenian  que  pasar  las  embarcaciones  para  poder  llegar  al  lugar  de 
la  llamada  nueva  aduana. 

Consecuencias  logicas  de  esas  determinaciones  fueron :  que  los 
revolucionarios,  teniendo  garantizada  la  plaza  de  Bluefields,  por  la 
presencia  de  los  marinos,  pudiesen  sacar  sus  fuerzas  todas  para 
•empenarlas  en  la  defensa  de  la  ciudad  del  Raima:  que  la  plaza  de 
Bluefields  se  hizo  intomable,  teniendo  por  lo  mismo  los  rebeldes 
asegurada  contra  todo  riesgo  su  base  de  operaciones :  que  el  panico 
y  complete  desaliento  que  habia  comenzado  a  cundir  en  sus  filas  , 
se  trocaran  en  la  mas  absoluta  confianza  en  su  triunf o :  que  cesase 
la  escasez  de  elementos  de  guerra.  y  de  toda  clase  de  municiones  en 
que  se  hallaban,  porque,  para  que  entrasen  a  la  plaza  sin  ningun 
riesgo,  iban  a  borde  de  las  embarcaciones  neutrales,  americanas  o 
revolucionarias,  marinos  americanos,  portando  la  bandera  de  su 
pais,  previa  notificacion  al  Comandante  del  fuerte  y  al  de  la  marina 
•del  Gobierno,  de  que  si  hacian  un  dispare  contra  ellas  o  intentaban 
detenerlas,  lo  estimarian  come  declaracion  de  guerra  a  EE.  UIL,  y 
sus  buques  bembardearian  el  fuerte  y  hundirian  les  buques  nioara- 
giienses. 

El  gobierno  de  Madriz,  que  estaba  reconocido  como  legitimo  por 
el  de  Iomega,  logro  de  este  que  prohibiera  a  todos  los  buques  quo 
.portaran  bandera  de  aquella  nacion  el  trasporte  de  contrabando  de 
guerra  para  los  revolucionarios.  o  desobedecer  en  cualquier  manera 
las  ordenes  del  Gebierno  legitimo:  pero  el  jefe  de  la  marina  ameri 
cana  en  aquellas  aguas,  apoyado  expresamente  por  el  Departamento 
de  Estado,  impulse  a  los  capitanes  de  los  buques  noruegos  a  la 
desobediencia,  poniende  a  su  bordo  marinos  americanos,  como  ya 
se  ha  dicho,  para  garantizar  su  ontrada  libre :  y,  por  haber  informa- 
<lo  a  FII  gobierno  la  rerdad  on  esc  a>unto  el  Vice  Consul  noruego., 


25 

Mr.  Clancey,  fue  destituido  del  Yice-consulado  americano  que  tam- 
bien  ejercia. 

El  resultado  final  de  todo  esto  fue:  que,  no  pudiendo  continuar 
con  esperanza  de  exito  la  luch'a,  ni  mantenerse  en  sus  po&iciones  las 
fuerzas  de  tierra  de  Madriz,  emprendieron  la  retirada,  que  equiva- 
lio  a  una  derrota,  por  las  circunstancias  del  caso;  y  que,  llegando 
al  interior  desmoralizadas,  contagiaron  el  resto  del  ejercito,  en  el 
cual  penetro  el  convencimiento  de  que  no  tenian  que  luchar  en  verdad 
con  los  rebeldes,  sino  contra  el  incontestable  poder  del  Gobierno 
americano. 

El  Doctor  Madriz  vio  que  la  continuacion  de  la  lucha  significaria 
im  inutil  derramamiento  de  sangre,  y  deposito  el  Poder  en  un  Di- 
putado  al  Congreso,  quien  lo  entrego  en  el  acto  al  jefe  rebelde. 

Publicamos  como  anexo  los  documentos  que  comprueban  nuestras 
precedentes  afirmaciones,  y  principalmente  la  responsabilidad  del 
jbepartamento  de  Estado  en  esos  sucesos.  Tambien  va  como  anexo 
la  relacion  inedita  de  los  mismos  sucesos,  que  tenia  escrita  el  Dr. 
Madriz,  para  presentarla  al  Congreso,  lo  cual  no  tuvo  tiempo  de 
liacer.  (Anexos  E  y  F.) 

Para  quien  hay  a  conocido  personalmente  al  Dr.  Madriz,  hombre 
esencialmente  civil,  culto,  ilustrado,  patriota  y  Iionrado,  causara 
sorpresa  que  el  senor  Knox  se  haya  empenado  en  ^eguirlo  comba- 
tiendo,  en  vez  de  darle  su  apoyo  moral  para  que  lograse  la  re- 
organizacion  del  Pals,  evitandose  asi  que  se  perdiesen  mas  de  cuatro 
mil  vidas  de  nicaragiienses,  y  que  se  causasen  danos  a  la  propiedad 
por  valor  de  millones;  principalmente  cuando  el  senor  Madriz 
demostro  con  evidencia  en  sus  proposiciones  de  paz,  que  su  ambicion 
personal  no  seria  obstaculo  para  llegar  a  ella,  porque,  si  se  ponia 
como  condicion,  renunciaria  a  ser  candidate  al  hacerse  la  organiza- 
cion  definitiva  del  Gobierno.  Y  no  serviria  de  excusa  al  senor 
Knox  el  no  haber  conocido  al  senor  Madriz,  porque  es tamos  seguros 
de  que  recibio  informacion  suficiente  a  ese  respecto  de  quien  no 
podia  parecerle  sospechoso,  del  Almirante  Kimball,  jefe  de  la  escua- 
drilla  que  existia  entonces  en  aguas  nicaragiienses,  quien  trato  per- 
sonalmente al  Presidente  Madriz,  y  nos  consta  que  formo  de  el  el 
inismo  concepto  que  dejamos  expresado. 

Quiza  por  la  sinceridad  con  que  a  ese  respecto  haya  hablado  al 
Departamento  el  Almirante  Kimball,  fue  sustituido  en  el  mando 


26 

antes  de  terminal  la  guerra.  Y,  como  el  seiiar  Knox  ha  liecho- 
cuestion  de  amor  propio  el  sacar  avante  la  Dollar  Diplomacy,  no 
podia  convenirle  Madriz,  quien,  precisamente  por  sus  buenas  condi- 
ciones,  no  servia  como  instrumento  para  la  realizacion  de  planer 
que  envolvian  una  verdadera  traicion  a  su  patria,  j  que  la  condu- 
cirian  a  su  completa  ruina.  Necesitaba  de  hombres  sin  escrupulos, 
que  sin  rubor  viven  haciendo  declaraciones  como  esta:  "Por  tal 
de  que  los  liberales  no  vuelvan  al  Poder,  estamos  dispuestos  a  aceptar 
cualquier  yugo  extrangero,  aunque  fuese  el  de  la  China." 

Y  del  conocimiento  que  de  esos  hombres  tenia  el  senor  Knox, 
surgio  el  convenio  Dawson,  que  se  ha  mantenido  a  tal  punto  secreto. 
que  ni  a  los  Diputados  al  Congreso  de  Nicaragua  que  lo  pidieron,. 
quiso  mostrarlo  el  Poder  Ejecutivo.  Aqu*  tampoco  tenemos  noticia 
de  que  su  texto  integro  se  haya  publicado;  y  ni  alia  ni  aqui  ha  sido 
aprobado  por  el  Poder  Legislativo,  ni  podria  someterse  a  su  rati- 
ficacion,  por  que  no  es  pacto  entre  dos  Gobiernos,  sino  entre  un 
Agente  d.el  Departamento  y  varies  de  los  caudillos  rebeldes,  a 
quienes  aquel  habia  ayudado  a  triunfar,  los  cuales  le  mostraban 
su  gratitud  con  complacencias  de  traidores  a  su  patria.  Sin 
embargo,  el  Departamento  de  Estado  ha  hecho-  de  el  algo  venerable, 
sagrado,  superior  a  la  Constitucion  y  leyes,  no  solo  de  Nicaragua, 
sino  tambien  de  Estados  Unidos,  puesto  que  por  atribuida  viola- 
cion  de  ese  convenio,  se  ha  provacado  y  hecho  mas  sangrienta  la 
ultima  guerra  en  aquel  infortunado  pais,  segun  aparecera  demos- 
trado  adelante. 

Por  lo  que  de  ese  convenio  ha  traspirado  al  publico,  sabemosr 
que  fue  celebrado  entre  el  Delegado  Mr.  Dawson  y  cinco  de  los  que 
ellos  llaman  personajes  conspicuos  del  Partido  Conservador,  a 
saber:  Adolf o  Diaz,  Luis  Mena,  Juan  J.  Estrada,  Emiliano 
Ch'amorro  y  Fernando  Solorzano,  de  los  cuales  ninguno  tenia  repre- 
sentacion  legal  del  pais;  y,  en  cambio  de  compromisos  financieros. 
que  despues  se  tran  llevado  a  la  practica,  aunque  todavia  no  se 
conoce  hasta  donde  llegara  su  alcance,  quedo  convenido  que  el 
senor  Estrada  continuaria  ejerciendo  la  Presidencia  por  dos  anos, 
durante  los  cuales  seria  Vice-Presidente  Adolfo  Diaz;  y  que  aT 
tener  que  practicarse  las  elecciones,  los  cinco  nominados,  (constitui- 
dos  por  si  mismos  y  por  la  gracia  de  Mr.  Dawson  en  grander  elec- 
tores  de  Nicaragua)  escogerian  entre  ellos  mismos  los  que  deberian< 


27 

ser  electos  Presidente  y  Yice-Presidente  para  el  proximo  period®, 
armlando  asi  el  voto  popular,  o  mas  bien,  convirtiendolo  en  una 
repugnante  farsa. 

Sobrevino  un  desacuerdo  entre  dos  de  los  grandes  electores,  el 
Presidente  Estrada  y  su  Ministro  de  Guerra,  Luis  Mena,  a  conse- 
cuencia  del  cual  el  segundo  fue  reducido  a  prision;  pero  intervino 
el  Ministro  Americano  Northcott,  y  obligo  al  Presidente  a  Testable- 
cerlo  en  su  puesto.  Estrada  encontro  muy  dura  la  exigencia,  y 
dijo  al  Ministro  que  era  incompatible  con  su  permanencia  en  ejerci- 
cio  del  Poder.  Al  insistir  el  Ministro,  Estrada  se  retiro,  entregando 
la  Presidencia  a  Adolfo  Diaz. 

Poco  antes,  por  no  estar  satisfechos  Estrada  y  Mena  con  la  Cons- 
titucion  que  la  Asamblea  estaba  dictando,  o  mas  bien  con  BUS 
tendencias  politicas,  porque  h'abia  sido  electa  por  los  partidarios  de 
Emiliano  Chamorro,  la  disolvieron,  convocando  otra,  que  resulto 
electa  a  satisfaccion  de  Mena,  pero  que  en  materia  de  principios  y 
de  legitima  representacion  de  la  opinion  publica,  no  diferia  de  la 
anterior.  Estando  esta  reunida  se  celebro  la  convention  Knox- 
Castrillo,  base  para  un  contrato  de  emprestito,  que  tambien  firmo 
Castrillo  con  un  grupo  de  banqueros  de  New  York.  De  ambos  so 
dio  cuenta  a  dicha  Asamblea;  pero  como  esta  estaba  dominada  por 
Mena,  y  el  se  mostraba  enemigo  del  negocio,  para  amilar  su 
oposicion  se  le  permitio  hacerse  elegir  Presidente  para  el  proximo 
periodo  por  aquel  Cuerpo,  sin  que  nadie  quisiese  acordarse  en  aquel 
momento  del  convenio  Dawson,  que  despues  se  ha  considerado 
violado  con  ese  acto.  Hecha  la  eleccion,  sin  protesta  de  los  grandes 
electores,  ni  del  Ministro  americano,  ceso  la  dificultad  para  la 
ratification  de  los  convenios  Castrillo ;  y,  sin  dar  lugar  a  discusion, 
porque  fue  declarado  el  asunto  de  urgencia  para  resolverlo  en  una 
sola  sesion,  fueron  aprobados  por  una  mayoria  de  antemano  concerta- 
da,  ahogando  la  voz  de  protesta  de  solo  seis  Diputados  patriotas  que 
en  el  seno  de  la  Asamblea  aparecieron,  y  la  de  dos  Secretarios  del 
Gobierno,  que  por  ese  hecho  se  retiraron  de  sus  puestos,  para  no 
mancharse  con  la  nota  de  vendedores  de  su  pa'tria. 

En  la  conducta  del  Departamento  de  Estado  salta  a  la  vista  UB 
fenomeno  curioso,  pero  mas  que  curioso,  absurdo.  Este  gran  pais, 
donde  las  libres  instituciones  son  una  verdad,  que  con  razon  se 
presenta  a  si  mismo  como  el  modelo  de  la  republica,  y  que  es  causa 


28 

de  estimulo  y  objeto  de  imitacion  para  los  pueblos  latino  americanos, 
aparece  impulsando  por  medio  de  su  Gobierno  al  de  Nicaragua,  no 
solo  a  violar  sus  leyes,  sino  todos  los  principios  de  la  democracia, 
t)esgraciadamente  este  fenomeno  se  ha  presentado  constantemente 
tomo  regla  de  conducta  del  Departamento  en  relacion  con  los  paises 
del  Sur,  pues  en  los  ultimos  anos  regularmente  su  intervencion  o 
influencia  se  h'an  ejercido  en  favor  de  las  tiranias  y  en  contra  de 
los  legitimos  derechos  de  los  pueblos.  Cuando  ha  apoyado  revolu- 
ciones,  no  ha  tornado  ningun  interes,  aun  para  explicar  su  accion, 
en  que  se  establezca  un  Gobierno  regular  y  de  garantias.  Bse  feno- 
meno  solo  se  explica,  porque  la  politica  del  Departamento  ha  sido 
inspirada,  no  por  la  conveniencia  de  los  paises,  sino  por  intereses 
del  momento,  o  por  especulaciones  financieras.  Si  otro  hubiera  sido 
el  movil,  si  de  la  intervencion  hubiera  resultado  el  establecimiento 
-de  un  regimen  de  libertad,  orden  y  honradez,  aunque  al  principio 
Imbiese  repugnado  al  amor  propio  naodonal  tal  intervencion,  podria 
haber  llegado  a  ser  perdonada  y  hasta  agradecida,  en  vista  de  lo-? 
beneficios  recibidos. 

Los  convenios  Castrillo  estan  calcadbs  scibre  las  mismas  bases  que 
los  propuestos  a  Honduras,  pero  con  algunas  condiciones  todavia 
mas  gravosas  para  Nicaragua.  Como  Nicaragua  tenia  una  deuda 
'extema  insignificante  y  relativamente  bien  servida,  la  Diplomacia 
del  Dollar,  tuvo  que  recurrir  al  plan  de  amortizacion  de  la  deuda 
interna,  representada  por  el'papel  moneda  circulante  y  depreciado, 
para  tener  pretexto  de  apoderarse  de  las  aduanas;  y,  para  tener  la 
seguridad  de  dominar  en  absoluto  la  situacion  fmanciera,  invento 
la  Comision  mixta  de  reclames,  en  que  hay  una  mayoria  de  norte- 
americanoSj  designados  por  el  Departamento  o  sus  Representantes, 
a  discrecion  de  quienes  queda  elevar  la  cifra  de  la  deuda  publica 
hasta  donde  crean  que  les  conviene,  asi  como  establecer  ventajosas 
preferencias  para  los  reconocimientos  en  favor  de  sus  amigos.  El 
omprestito  contratado  es  de  quince  millones  de  dollars,  al  90%  de 
emision,  fuera  de  gastos  y  otros  gravamenes,  con  interes  de  5% 
amial  y  1%  de  amortizacion.  No  es  nuestra  intencion  entrar  a 
examinar  en  sus  detalles  esta  negociaoion,  que  ha  sido  ampliamente 
discutida  por  la  prensa  en  C.  A.,  y  especialmente  tratada  en  una 
exposicion  nrmada  por  IOP  deeterradoe  politicos  Doctores  Espinoza  e 
Trias.  Bastenos  anrmar  quo  es  la  negordacion  mas  ruinosa  que 


29 

jamas  ha  llegado  a  realizarse  en  pals  alguno,  y  ese  concepto  tiene 
que  ser  ratificado  por  quienquiera  que  se  tome  la  molestia  de  leer 
los  contratos. 

Los  convenios  Castrillo  contienen  la  estipulaqion  de  que  su 
vigencia  dependeria  de  la  ratificacion  por  el  Senado  americano  de  la 
Convencion  que  les  sirve  de  base,  excepto  por  la  sunia  de  un  milloq 
y  medio  de  pesos  que  desde  luego  serian  anticipados,  previa  entrega. 
de  las  aduanas  de  la  Kepubliqa  a  los  colectores  americanos,  Jjos 
centroamericanos  confiabamos  en  que  esos  arreglos  no  se  llevarian 
runca  a  la  practica,  porque  estabamos  seguros  de  que  el  Senada 
americano  nunca  sancionaria  tan  monstruosa  espe. r-ulacion ;  pero,  pa- 
ra f orzar  a  aquel  alto  cuerpo  a  la  ratificacion,  se  introclujo  la  clausula 
referida,  que  permitio  al  senor  Knox  comenzar  a  ensayar  su  sistema 
en  C.  A.  Pero  hay  algo  mas  escandaloso  aiin.  Sin  duda  se  crey6 
que  todavia  quedaba  al  Gobierno  de  Nicaragua  demasiada  vida,  y 
le  impus'ieron  un  contrato  adicional  de  tres  cuartos  de  millon  de 
dollars  con  una  garantia  superabundante,  la  entrega  de  los  ferro- 
carriles  y  vapores  nacionales,  en  forma  que  mas  bien  parece  UA 
regalo. 

Con  la  negociacion  de  tan  fuertes  sumas  de  dinero  deberia  creer&e 
que,  al  menos  en  el  principio,  el  Gobierno  nicaragiiense  estuvo  muy 
desahogado,  y  el  pals  en  una  ventajosa  situacion  economica;  pero 
es  el  hecho  que  jamas  el  tesoro  piiblico  ha  tenido  alia  mayores 
apuros,  ni  ha  habido  mas  pobreza  general  y  estancamiento  del  co 
mercio  y  de  todo  progreso.  La  razon  es  clara :  del  dinero  que 
aparecia  prestandose,  nada  entro  a  Nicaragua;  y  del  producto  de 
la  renta  aduanera,  solo  un  tanto  por  ciento  muy  reducido  era  de- 
vuelto  al  Gobierno  de&pues  de  colectado  por  los  Agentes  extrangeros. 

Cuando  el  Comite  del  Senado  americano  conocio  de  la  Conven- 
cion Knox-Castrillo,  aunque  no  hubo  mayoria  para  hacer  dictamen, 
resulto  claramente  demostrado  que  nunca  seria  favorable,  y  mas 
claro  aim,  que  el  Senado  no  lo  ratificaria,  a  pesar  de  haberse  creado 
de  proposito  y  de  manera  tan  injusta  y  arbitraria  esos  intereses 
americanos  en  aquel  pais.  Pero  los  especiiladores  deben  haber  re- 
cibido  del  Departmento  seguridades  de  que  el  protegeria  esoa 
intereses  en  todo  caso,  y  lo  demostraron  con  la  resolucion  de  retener 
integramente  los  productos  de  las  rentas  que  recaudaban,  violando 
manifiestamente  el  contrato,  y  reduciendo  al  G'obierno  nicaragiiense 


30 

a  la  mas  absoluta  miseria.  No  obstante  esto,  o  mas  bien  por  eso, 
hizo  la  entrega  de  los  ferrocarriles  y  vapores,  para  recibir  en  cambio 
alguna  parte  de  las  sumas  colectadas,  en  calidad  de  limosna,  pues 
no  de  otra  manera  podra  en  adelante  aquel  Gobierno  vivir,  ya  que 
ha  quedado  enteramente  a  merced  de  sus  protector es. 

Tampoco  la  practica  del  sistema  Knox  en  Nicaragua  ha  dado  el 
resultado  que  el  ha  declarado  se  proponia  entre  otros  perseguir: 
el  restablecimiento  del  credito  exterior  de  aquellos  paises.  Anterior- 
mente  se  habia  logrado  en  Nicaragua  atender  con  relativa  regulari* 
dad  al  servicio  de  la  den  da  externa;  desde  qne  entro  en  practica 
el  protectorado  flnanciero,  ese  servicio  ha  sido  completamente  desa- 
tendido,  siendo  muchos  los  acreedores,  entre  ellos  algunos  ameri- 
canos  no  favoritos,  que  tienen  derecho  a  quejarse  por  el  cambio  de 
sistema. 

Pero  en  compensacion  de  tantos  males  <;  se  habra  logrado  al  menos 
el  manteniiniento  de  la  paz  ?  Vamos  a  examinarlo. 

Comenzo  a  hacerse  notorio  dentro  y  fuera  de  Nicaragua  que  la 
eleccion  hecha  por  la  Asamblea  en  el  General  Mena  para  Presidente, 
como  sucesor  de  Diaz,  no  era  del  agrado  del  Departamento  de  Esta- 
do,  alegando  como  razon  ostensible  ser  contraria  al  convenio  Daw- 
son,  siendo  a  la  vez  notorio  que  el  favorecido  con  sus  simpatias  era 
el  mismo  actual  Presidente  Diaz;  y  se  creyo  entonces,  y  los  hech'os 
se  han  encargado  de  demostrar  que  para  ello  habia  razon,  que  el 
Ministro  americano  empujo  al  sefior  Diaz  a  destituir  al  serior  Mena 
del  Ministerio  de  Gnerra,  que  ejercia  por  la  voluntad  de  otro 
Ministro  americano,  prometiendole,  a  no  dudarlo,  el  apoyo  de  su 
Gobierno,  en  capo  de  dificultades.  Esa  fue>la  causa,  o  mejor  dicho 
la  ocasion,  de  la  ultima  guerra  civil  en  aquella  tierra. 

Mena  estaba  en  posesion  de  la  fuerza  publica  del  pals.  La  ge- 
neralidad  de  los  jefes  de  armas  eran  hechnra  suya;  y  era  notorio 
que  el  ejercia  el  poder  ef ectivo  en  el  Gobierno.  Debe  creerse  que 
fl  senor  Knox  estaba  convencido  por  lo  mismo  de  que  su  candidate 
favorito  no  podria  continual  en  el  Poder  por  eleccion,  y  que  para 
lograr  imponerse  contra  la  'fuerza  armada  de  Mena  y  contra  la 
opinion  publica  represent n'rla  por  los  liberales,  era  preci&o  que  hu- 
biese  una  guerra  civil,  en  qre  Diaz  resultase  vencedor  con  el  apoyo 
extranjero.  Si  el  Departamento  hubiese  querido  evitar  el  derrama- 
miento  de  sangre  en  Nicaragua,  tanto  en  la  guerra  anterior  como 


31 

en  la  ultima,  le  habria  sido  muy  facil  prevenirlo,  haciendo  entonces 
lo  que  hizo  mas  tarde,  desembarcar  fuerzas  para  ocupar  las  plazas 
de  importancia.  Pero  siguio  el  procedimiento  contrario.  La 
idestitucion  del  General*  Mena  del  Ministerio  de  la  Guerra,  a- 
consejado  por  el  Ministro  americano  era  un  paso  que 
debia  dar  las  consecuencias  logicas  que  no  se  hieieron  esperar. 
Mena,  poseedor  de  la  mayor  parte  de  los  elem,entos  de  guerra  de 
la  Republica,  puso  en  mano  lo  mas  que  pudo ;  y,  con  la  cooperacion 
de  los  liberales  de  Oriente  con  quienes  entonces  logro  entenderse. 
reunio  un  ejercito  de  voluntarios  muy  superior  en  numero  y  calidad 
al  que  podia  oponerle  Diaz,  con  el  cual  en  poco  tiempo  logro  poner 
asedio  a  la  capital  de  la  Republica,  y  apoderarse  de  muchas  plazas 
de  importancia.  La  opinion  publica  fue  favorable  a  la  revolucion 
desde  el  primer  momento,  porque  el  Gobierno  de  Diaz,  que  nunca 
fne  prestigiado,  se  hizo  absolutamente  unpopular  y  odioso,  desde 
que  consume  con  las  negociaciones  de  emprestito  la  venta  de  su 
patria.  Mas  no  se  hizo  general  el  movimiento,  sino  hasta  que,  re- 
ducido  a  la  ultima  extrenidad  el  ejercito  de  Diaz  durante  el  ataque 
a  Managua,  fue  salvado  solo  por  la  defensa  que  del  palacio  hieie- 
ron los  marinos  americanos.  Entonces  el  pueblo  de  Leon,  que  habia 
permanecido  quieto,  se  levanto  -en  masa,  y  ataco  la  fuerte  guarnicion 
que  habia  en  la  plaza,  que  fue  destrozada.  Derroto  en  seguida  las 
fuerzas  que  enviaron  a  someterlo,  y  llamo  a  los  jefes  emigrados, 
cuyas  ordenes  no  habia  esperado  para  moverse.  Pocos  dias  bastaron 
para  que  el  Gobierno  quedase  reducido  a  la  oeupacion  de  la  capital, 
de  parte  de  los  departamentos  de  Rivas,  Chontales  y  Zelaya,  y  de  los 
puertos,  conservados  bajo  su  dominio,  lo  mismo  que  la  capital,  por 
las  fuerzas  americanas. 

La  fuerza  material  de  los  cien  marinos  que  defendieron  el  palacio 
presidencial  era  de  poca  significacion,  pero  fue  muy  grande  el  efecto 
moral  favorable  causado  en  el  animo  de  las  tropas  de  Diaz,  como 
clcsalentador  en  el  de  las  asaltantes. 

Todavia  en  aquellos  mementos  pudo  el  Departamento,  si  hubiera 
qnerido,  evitar  que  continuase  el  inutil  derramamiento  de  sangre,  si 
hubiera  procedido  con  franqueza,  declarando  que  estaba  resuelto  a 
u?ar  el  poder  de  su  pais  para  debelar  la  revolucion,  empleando 
la  fuerza  armada,  que  mas  tarde  empleo.  Pero  no  lo  hizo  asi. 
Por  el  contrario :  declaro  que  su  objeto  era  unicamente  proteger  las 


32 

vidas  e  intereses  americanos,  comprendiendo  entre  estos  los  ferro- 
carriles  y  vapores  nacionales,  propiedad  absoluta  de  Nicaragua,  que 
habian  sido  entregados  a  los  especuladores  americanos  pocos  dias 
antes,  apresurandose  a  hacerlo,  probablemente  en  prevision  del 
movimiento  que  se  iba  a  provocar.  El  alrnirante  Southerland  hizo 
expresas  declaraeiones  de  que,  si  se  le  devolvieran  los  f errocarriles  y 
vapores,  se  guardaria  absoluta  neutralidad,  sin  poder  trasportar 
fuerzas  ni  elementos  de  guerra  de  ninguno  de  los  beligerantes ;  y 
asi  consiguio  que  no  se  le  hicdera  re&istencia.  Mas  una  vez  aduenado 
de  las  lineas  ferreas  y  estaciones,  y  fortificadas  las  fuerzas  ameri- 
canas  en  ellas,  pretextaron  la  necesidad  de  ir  a  socorrer  las  ninas 
de  un  colegio  f  ranees,  que  estaban  pereciendo  de  hambre,  lo  cual 
era  falso,  pues  en  el  no  habian  ninas  extranjeras,  sino  hijas  del  pals,, 
que  tenian  sus  f  amiliares  o  recomendados  para  atenderlas,  y  no  pasa  - 
rian  mas  necesidades  que  las  que  naturalmente  tenian  que  sufrir 
todos  los  habitantes.  Embarcaron  en  los  trenes  en  Managua  consi- 
derables fuerzas,  y  cuando  las  tuvieron  suficientes  en  Granada, 
cuartel  principal  del  General  Mena,  intimaron  a  este  la  rendicion, 
con  amenaza  de  emplear  contra  el  la  f  uerza,  y  no  dar  cuartel  a  los 
vencidos,  y  Mena  se  rindio  sin  cambatir.  Qirifeo  hacer  lo  mismo  el 
Almirante  con  el  Doctor  y  General  Benjamin  Zeledon,  pero  este, 
joven,  valiente  y  patriota,  aunque  seguro  de  ser  derrotado  y  hasta 
de  perder  la  vida,  quiso  salvar  la  honra  del  nombre  nicaragliense,  y 
rehuso  rendirse.  La  tropa  americana  despues  de  tres  dias  de  ataque 
a  la  ciudad  de  Masaya  por  las  fuerzas  de  Diaz  inicio  el  combate 
con  su  artilleria  contra  la  posicion  de  la  Barranca  el  cual  duro  veinti- 
cuatro  horas,  y  cuando  lograron  silenciar  el  fuego  de  los  defensores,, 
asaltaron  la  posicion.  Al  mismo  tiempo  las  fuerzas  del  llamado  Go.- 
bierno  nicaragiiense  atacaban  por  otro  lado  la  contigua  plaza  de  Ma- 
saya, la  cual  fue  tomada  varias  horas  despues  que  la  Barranca.  Zele- 
don, aunque  herido  logro  salir,  pero  fue  alcanzado  y  muerto  el  mismo 
dia.  Esta  batalla  costo  la  vida  de  cuatro  marines  extranjeros  y 
de  mas  de  cien  nicaragiienses  del  lado  del  Gobierno,  y  un  mimero 
proporcional  de  heridos,  ignorando  nosotros  hasta  este  momento 
c-uantas  bajas  Jiubo  de  parte  de  la  revolucion. 

Quedaba  la  ciudad  de  Leon  y  otras  poblaciones  del  ^orte  en  po- 
der de  la  revolucion,  aunque  escasas  de  elementos  de  guerra.  El 
Almirante  intimo  la  rendicion  a  todos  los  jefes;  y  estos,  sin  duda 


33 

queriendo  evitar  que,  sin  posibilidad  de  triunfo,  se  derramase  mas 
sangre,  se  sometieron  a  la  fuerza  americana ;  pero  el  pueblo,  indigna- 
do  por  el  ultra je  hecho  a  su  patria,  trato  de  resistir,  y  en  masa,  sin 
que  pudiese  orgnizar  defensa,  fue  ametrallado  por  los  marinos 
americanos.  Algo  semejante  habia  pasado  antes  en  Chichigalpa. 
Kesultaron  de  todos  los  encuentros  en  que  intervivieron  los 
americanos  unos  once  marinos  muertos,  y  mayor  niimero  de 
heridos ;  y,  segiin  los  partes  publicados  aqui  por  la  prensa,  centenares 
•de  victimas  nicaragiienses,  entre  muertos  y  heridos,  muchos  de  ello? 
no  combatientes, 

Debemos  creer  que  el  Departamento  trata  de  haeer  recaer  la  res- 
ponsabilidad  de  &u  conducta  contra  el  Senado  de  su  patria,  a 
juzgar  por  el  tono  de  cierta  prensa  inspirada  manifiestamente  en 
el  mismo  Departamento,  y  principalmente,  por  una  informacion 
da  da  a  la  prensa  por  el  Presidente  Taft  en  Beverly,  en 
que  declaro  que  la  culpabilidad  de  lo  ocurrido  en  Nicaragua  (de 
la  sustitucion  de  las  balas  a  los  dollars)  pe&aba  sobre  el  Senado,  por 
no  haber  ratificado  la  convencion  de  emprestito,  que  habria  colocado 
las  aduanas  en  manos  de  los  agentes  americanos,  y  quitado  el 
pretexto  u  objetivo  principal  para  la  revolucion.  Esta  declaracion 
del  Presidente  puede  hacer  pensar  que  el  ignora  muchos  de  los 
actos  de  su  Secretario,  pues  las  aduanas  fueron  entregadas  a  tales 
agentes  desde  muchos  meses  antes  de  la  guerra;  de  manera  que  esa 
entrega  produjo  el  trastorno  en  vez  de  la  paz  prometida  por  la 
Dollar  Diplomacy. 

Tambien  se  ha  tratado  de  justificar  la  intervencion  armada  en 
Xicaragua  porque  la  pidio  el  Presidente  de  hecho  de  aquella  Kepu- 
blica;  pero  eso  equivaldria  a  querer  justificarla  porque  la  h'ubiera 
pedido  al  Departamento  el  mismo  Secretario  Knox,  de  quien  aquel 
gobernante  es  exclusiva  hechura  y  docil  instrumento. 

Debemos  reconocer  que  los  hombres  del  Gobierno  de  Managua 
conservan  todavia  un  re&to  de  pudor,  aunque  sea  el  de  la  mujer 
publica.  En  el  telegrama  en  que  dan  cuenta  de  su  victoria  a  los 
Gobiernos  de  Centro  America,  no  mencionan  la  cooperacion  de 
las  fuerzas  extranjeras  en  la  batalla  de  Massaya;  y,  para  atreverse 
a  privarlas  de  LA  GLORIA  DEL  TRIUNFO,  han  debido  tener  el 
a>OTiritnionto  del  ^[inistro  americano  en  Managua.  Pero  ese  falso 
pudor  lo  tuvieron  unicamente  ante  la  America  Latina,  porque  en 


34 


forma  oficial  el  Secretario  de  Relaciones  Exteriores  de  Nicaragua; 
dio  el  pesame  al  Gobierno  y  pueblo  americanos  por  la  muerte  de 
sus  marinos,  sin  tener  por  cierto  una  palabra  de  elogio  o  siquiero: 
de  conmiseracion  para  los  centenares  de  soldados  nicaragiienses  que 
connesa  haber  perecido  simultaneamente. 

Ha  alegado  igualmente  el  Departamento  como  justificative  para 
su  intervencion  el  bombardeo  de  la  plaza  de  Managua  por  los  revo- 
Jucionarios,,  a  la  que  llama  plaza  indefensa,  causando  la  muerte  de 
muchos  no  combatientes.  Aquella  plaza  no  era  indefensa  desde 
luego  que  estaba  protegida  por  la  fortaleza  de  la  loma  de  Tiscapa,  la 
mas  fuerte  en  aquel  pais,  y  en  ella  tenia  el  G-obierno  concentrado 
easi  todo  el  ejercito  de  que  disponia,  Pero  si  se  creia  que,  conforme 
al  Derecho  Internacional,  tenian  derecho  a  impedir  el  bombardeo, 
debieron  ofiligar  al  Gobierno  a  desocuparla  y  presentar  ace-ion  en 
otro  campo  de  batalla,  en  la  cual  se  decidiria  quien  debia  quedar  en 
posesion  de  la  capital,  y  no  ostentar  la  pretension,  de  que  no  hay 
ejemplo  en  la  historia,  de  que  un  beligerante  deba  privarse  del 
triunfo  que  le  daria  la  captura  de  la  plaza  mas  importante  del 
enemigo,  por  el  peligro  'que  corran  sus  habitantes.  Ese  h'abrla  sido< 
un  proce'dimiento,  aunque  arbitraio,  imparcial,  y  habria  producido  el 
beneficio  de  la  inmediata  terminacion  de  la  guerra.  Pero  h'aciendo- 
lo  asi  tenia  que  resignarse  el  Departamento  a  ver  el  triunfo  de  la 
revolucion,  que  nadie  podia  poner  en  dudaf:  tenia  que  resignarse  a 
>7er  el  triunfo  de  un  pueblo  contra  un  Gobierno  de  traidores,  su 
protegido;  y  a  ver  en  consecuencia  desmoronado  el  edincio  de  la 
Dollar  Diplomacy,  levantado  a  tanta  costa.  Persistiendo  en  &u 
politica,  tenia  que  obrar  como  lo  hizo;  y  para  que  su  parcialidad 
sea  mas  mani fiesta,  no  tuvo  en  seguida  inconveniente  en  autorizar  a 
sus  fuerzas  para  cooperar  en  el  bombardeo  de  la  plaza  de  Masaya, 
y  amenazar  con  igual  suerte  a  las  de  Granada  y  Leon,  plazas  no 
fortificadas,  sin  tomar  en  cuenta  entonces  el  peligro  de  los  no- 
comb  atientes. 

Por  otra  parte  ha  pretendido  justificar  el  Departamento  SIT 
ccn'ducta  con  la  necesidad  de  reprimir  los  excesos  cometidos  por 
los  revolucionarios.  En  la  relacion  que  de  ello  se  ha  dado  a  la 
prensa  encontramos  en  la  mayor  parte  de  los  casos  falsedad,  y  en 
general  calculada  exageracion  de  los  hechos,  todo  con  el  objeto- 
de  predisponer  la  opinion  publica  en  este  pais  en  favor  de  la  in- 


35 

tervencion  que  de  antemano  estaba  resuelta.  Es  natural  que  hay  a 
habido  actos  incorrectos,  pero  es  notorio  que  fue  mucho  mas  mala 
la  conducta  'del  llamado  Gobierno.  Estamos  en  posesion  de  antece- 
dentes  que  nos  permiten  asegurar  que  en  ninguna  guerra  civil,  ni 
en  la  de  EE.  HIT.,  ha  habido  tan  pocos  danos.  relativamente  ha- 
blando,  a  las  personas  y  propiedades  de  los  no  eombatientes,  espe- 
cialmente  de  los  extranjeros,  como  en  la  ultima  de  Nicaragua.  Si 
esa  fuera  una  justification  y  no  un  pretexto,  el  Departamento  ha- 
bria  estado  obligado  con  mayor  razon,  y  des'de  hace  mucho  tiempo, 
a  intervenir  en  igual  forma  en  Mexico,  como  lo  han  hecho  notar 
muchos  organos  de  la  prensa  en  este  pais.  Pero  Mexico  no  e^ 
como  Nicaragua  un  pais  debil  y  pobre,  ni  hay  en  su  Gobierno  ni 
cntre  los  revolucionarios  traidores  a  su  patria  que  pidan  la  interven- 
cion.  AIJi  tendria  que  ser  una  verdadera  guerra  de  conquista,  para 
mantener  la  cual  necesitaria  de  un  poderoso  ejercito  de  ocupacion 
quizas  por  mas  de  dos  generaciones. 

Si  en  los  demas  Estados  de  C.  A.  su?  Gobiernos  hubie- 
ran  cumplido  con  su  deber  demostrando  la  solidaridad 
centroamerieana^  siquiera  con  una  protesta.  con  lo  cual 
habrian  satisfecho  la  opinion  de  los  pueblos,  bieri  claramente 
manifestada  en  contra  de  la  invasion  extranjera,  talve^  se  habria 
logrado  que  esa  actitud  sugiriera  al  senor  Knox  la,  misma  conducta 
prudente  que  ha  observaido  respecto  a  Mexico.  Pero  aquellos  go- 
bernantes  en  general  han  estado  poseidos  del  terror  que  el  senor 
Knox  ha  sabido  inspirarles.  Han  llegado  hasta  a  reprimir  la  prensa 
y  las  manifestaciones  del  pueblo,  enoarcelando  escritores  que  se  han 
atrevido  a  hacerse  eco  de  la  indignacion  popular:  y.  ca?o  eurioso, 
han  llegado  hasta  prohibir  la  reproduccion  de  escritos  de  protesta 
publica'dos  en  EE.  TJU.  por  centro  americanos  patriota?  o  por  anglo- 
americanos  amantes  de  la  justicia. 

Para  explicar  la  inconsecuencia  de  su  conducta.  despues  de  todo 
csto  el  Departamento  de  Estado  sigue  sosteniendo  que  nc  ha  hecho 
la  guerra  en  Nicaragua :  que  ha  mandadp  f uerzas  solo  para  defender 
las  vidas  e  intereses  de  los  americanos,  las  cuales  no  han  estado  en 
ningun  momento  en  peligro,  pues  no  ha  podido  ni  podra  evidenciar 
un  solo  caso  en  que  algun  extranjero  haya  sufrido  en  su  persons 
6  intereses;  y,  por  un  peligro  imaginario,  ha  sacrificado  a  tantos  de 
PUS  compatrriotas?  inmolados  en  aras  de  la  Dollar  Diplomacy.  La 


36 

intervencion  del  Departamento  en  solo  esta  ultima  guerra  ha  costado 
a  Nicaragua  millares  de  victimas,  pues  sin  ella  la  campana  habria 
terminado  en  pocos  dias  con  el  triunfo  de  la  revolucion;  y,  lo  quo 
es  peor,  tratandose  de  la  conveniencia  de  EE.  UU.,  ha  hecho  perder 
en  la  America  Latina  el  buen  n ombre  del  soldado  angloamericano. 
defensor  en  su  propia  tierra  de  la  libertad  y  de  la  ley,  convertido 
en  Nicaragua  en  instrumento  de  tirania.  0  ^creera  acaso  el  senor 
Knox  que  esa  facil  proeza  sera  un  timbre  de  gloria  y  no  de  baldon 
para  las  armas  americanas  ? 

El  senor  Knox  se  muestra  satisfecho  de  su  labor,  porque  la  ha 
llevado  hasta  sus  ultimas  consecuencias.  Ha  mantenido  el  ejercito 
extranjero  de  ocupacion  en  Nicaragua  para  garantizar,  no  una 
-eleccion  libre  de  Presidente  para  el  proximo  periodo,  sino  la  elec- 
cion en  favor  de  su  protegido  Diaz ;  y  ha  conseguido  su  objeto,  por- 
que el  2  de  este  mes,  bajo  el  imperio  de  la  ley  marcial,  teniendo  los 
ciudadanos  el  cuello  bajo  el  tacon  de  la  bota  del  soldado  extranjero, 
el  traidor  Diaz  resulto  electo  Presidente  sin  posible  oposicion. 

Para  el  mismo  dia  se  convoco  al  pueblo  a  eleccion  de  Diputados, 
porque  el  traidor,  derogando  la  Constitution,  asumiendo  el  poder 
absolute  de  Nicaragua,  asistido  tambien  para  dar  ese  golpe  de  Estado 
por  el  poder  americano,  declare  disuelta  la  Asamblea  Constituyente, 
la  misma  a  que  debia  la  somibra  de  poder  legal  que  ha  estado 
ejerciendo;  pero  la  misma  que,  al  cometer  su  traicion,  lo  declaro 
cesante  en  su  funciones,  cuando  se  incio  la  ultima  contienda. 

Para  que  se  juzgue  de  la  clase  de  libertad  electoral  de  que  ha 
podido  disfrutar  el  ciudadano  nicaragiiense  en  esa  eleccion,  inserta- 
mos  a  continuacion  la  circular  del  Comandante  General  del  ejercito 
de  Nicaragua,  Emiliano  Chamorro,  dirijida  a  todos  los  funcionarios 
civiles  y  militares  encareciendoles  hacer  triunfar  las  candidaturas 
-que  recomienda,  por  ser  las  resueltas  de  conformidad  con  el  famoso 
paoto  DAWSON. 

"Ca&a  presidencial.  Managua  Octubre  25  de  1912.  Se- 
iiores  Comandantes  de  Armas  y  Jefes  Politicos. — Participo 
a  Ud.  que  reunidos  los  principales  Jefes  de  la  Eevolucion  de 
Octubre  para  dar  cumplimiento  a  lo  estipulado  en  los  convenios 
Dawson,  hemos  resuelto  de  comun  acuerdo  designar  como  candidates 
del  Partido  Oonservador  en  el  proximo  periodo  constitucional  para  la 
Presidencia  y  Yice-Presidencia  de  la  Republica  a  los  seiiores  Adolfo 


37 

Diaz  y  Fernando  Solorzano,  respectivamente.  Lo  que  tengo  el!- 
gusto  de  decir  a  TJ.  para  que  se  lo  participe  a  todos  los  amigos  y 
correligionarios,  recomendandoles  los  trabajos  electorates  necesarios 
para  hacer  triimfar  las  candidaturas  referidas.  Con  mnestras  de- 
mi  consi'deracion  soy  afectisimo  amigo. — Emiliano  Chamorro." 

Este  mismo  Chamorro  fue  quien  dirigio  al  Presidente  de  Hondu- 
ras el  telegrama  que  en  seguida  insertamos,  que  fue  interceptado 
en  Leon,  segun  dice  el  Diario  del  Salvador  fecha  4  de  Septiembre. 
del  cual  lo  tomamos.  Dice  el  telegrama:  "Debemos  confiar  en  el 
resultado  final.  Contamos  con  EL  ATJXILIO  DE  EE.  UTJ.,  quf> 
ya  no  tardan  en  hacer  sentir  su  poder  a  los  liberales  y  a  los  'demas 
enemigos  de*  nuestra  causa/' 

De  manera  que,  si  pruebas  faltasen  de  la  connivencia 
criminal  de  los  que  mandan  en  Nicaragua  con  los  inva- 
sores  extranjeros,  ese  telegrama  bastaria;  pero  a  ese  respecto 
cxiste  un  documento  que  pasara  a  la  historia  de  la  Diplomacia 
americana  como  una  escandalosa  prueba  del  abuso  de  la  fuerza  de 
un  (robierno  poderoso  contra  un  pals  debil,  solo  comparable  a  la 
nota  'del  Secretario  Knox  a  que  atras  nos  hemos  referido.  Ese 
documento  es  la  nota  dirigida  por  el  Ministro  americano  en  Mana- 
gua, Mr.  Weitzel,  al  Secretario  de  Eelaciones  Exteriores  de  aquel: 
pais,  que  va  como  anexo  "G." 

Hacemos  referenda  a  esa  nota  en  este  lugar,  porque  viene  a 
demostrar  como  las  ultimas  elecciones  en  Nicaragua  ban  sido  una 
farsa  que  llamariamos  ridicula,  sino  fuera  "por  sus  antecedentes" 
sangrienta;  farsa  en  la  cual  ha  intervenido  de  manera  directa  el 
Departamento  de  Estado,  que  pretence  tener  el  proposito  de  ense- 
fiar  a  las  naciones  latino  americanas  la  practica  de  la  verdadera 
republica  :* 

Dice  el  senor  Weitzel,  entre  otras  cosas  "Al  desonocer 
a  Zelaya,  a  cuyo  regimen  de  barbaric  y  corrupcion  puso  termino  la 
nacion  nicaragiiense,  despues  de  una  sangrienta  guerra,  el  Go- 

*  Contra  el  g-olpe  de  Estado,  la  Dictadura  y  la  usurpacion  del  Poder 
del  traidor,  han  protestado  los  ciudadanos  nicaragiienses  que  ban  podido 
hacerlo,  absteniendose  de  dar  su  voto-  todos  los  que  han  tenido  valor 
para  desafiar  a  los  esbirros  del  tirano,  convertidos  en  arg-e-ntes  electorales, 
y  que  no  han  querido  hacerse  c6mplices  de  la  farsa  electoral,  que  no  merece 
otro  nombre,  aunque  tantas  razones  no  hubiera,  por  el  simple  hecho  de 
haber  sido  convocado  el  pueblo  el  18  de  Octubre  para  concurrir  a:  votar 
el  2  de  Noviembre,  catorce  dlas  de  diferencia,  sin  tiem-po  suflciente  ni 
para  conocefr  el  decreto  en  muchos  Departamentos  de  la  Reptibiica. 
Agreg-amos  un  frag-amento  de  la  protesta  publicada  en  Bluefields,  y  otro- 
del  Decreto  de  Dictafdura.  (Anexo  "H.") 


38 

bierno  de  EE.  UU.,  condeno  no  solo  al  individuo  sino  el  sistema, 
y  este  Gobierno  no  PODEIA  TOLERAR  ningun  movimiento  para 
restablecer  el  mismo  regimen  destructor.  El  Gobierno  de  EE.  UU., 
en  consecuencia,  SE  OPONDRA  A  CUALQUIER  RESTAURA- 
CION  del  ZELAYISMO  y  prestara  su  eficaz  apoyo  moral  a  la 
causa  del  buen  Gobierno  legalmente  constituido  para  beneficio  del 
pueblo  de  Nicaragua,  a  quien  ha  tratado  de  ayudar  desde  largo 
tiempo  en  su  justa  aspiracion  hacia  la  paz  y  prosperidad,  bajo  un 
Gobierno  constitutional  y  de  orden"  Y  como  lo  que  Weitzel  llama 
ZELAYISMO,  es  decir  lo  que  no  es  DIISMO,  unico  que  conviene 
al  Departamento,  pudo  restablecerse  con  toda  seguridad  por  medio 
de  una  eleccion  libre,  es  daro  que  la  fuerza  de  ocupacion  se  ha 
jopuesto  a  que  de  esa  eleccion  pudiera  resultar  otro  Presidente  que 
no  fuera  su  complice  DIAZ. 

Lo  que  el  seiior  Weitzel  h'a  expresado  en  el  parrafo  trascrito,  ha 
venido  sien'do  el  caballo  de  batalla  de  Mr.  Knox  ,en  los  liltimos 
aiios  para  provocar  disturbios  en  Centre  America;  y  queremos 
examinar  por  eso  con  mas  detenimiento  la  materia.  Dice  el  De- 
partamento que  "su  Gobierno  condeno  no  solo  al  individuo  sino 
el  sistema,"  refiriendose  a  Zelaya.  No  intentamos  discutir  ahora 
si  tenia  derecho  de  condenar  al  gobernante  de  un  pais  independiente, 
punto  que  ya  tratamos  antes;  pero  si  fuese  cierto  que  condena  el 
sistema,  habria  tornado  precauciones  para  que  el  nuevo  Gobierno 
que  ayudo  a  crear  fuese  un  modelo  de  practicas  republicanas,  de 
honradez  administrativa  y  de  amor  a  su  patria,  en  vez  de  cubrir 
bajo  su  proteccion  inauditos  atropellos  y  atentados  contra  las  per- 
sonas  y  propiedades,  escandalosos  latrocinios  como  antes  no  se  ha- 
bian  presenciado  en  Nicaragua,  y  la  mas  vil  de  las  traiciones.  Pero 
un  Gobierno  de  leyes,  h'onrado  y  patriota  no  habria  secundado  su 
politica  financiera. 

Por  otra  parte,  no  se  explica  como  se  muestra  el  Departamento 
tan  celoso  contra  el  despotismo  y  abuses  de  Zelaya,,  y  a  la  vez 
patrocina  la  tirania  en  otros  paises,  especialmente  en  Guatemala, 
donde  Estrada  Cabrera  la  ejerce  desde  hace  mas  de  catorce  aiios 
de  manera  brutal,  constituyentlo  un  escarnio  para  la  humanidad, 
nna  vergiienza  para  la  civilizacion.  Y,  no  solo  Guatemala  ha  sufrido 
el  j>eso  de  esa  tirania.  Los  demas  paises  'de  C.  A.  han  visto 
perturbada  su  tranquilidad  por  la  politica  tortuosa  de  Cabrera.  Ya 


39 

•dijimos  que  el  dio  los  elemehtos  para  las  ultimas  dos  revoluciones 
en  Honduras,  y  los  dio  tambien  para  la  primera  en  Nicaragua,  que 
cle  el  recibio  los  primeros  auxilios.  Y  sin  embargo,  el  Departamento, 
que  formo  acusacion  contra  Zelaya  como  perturbador  de  la  paz  de 
la  America  Central,  como  el  violador  de  los  convenios  de  Wash- 
ington, jamas  lo  h'a  hecho  contra  Estrada  Cabrera,  ni  ha  intentado 
siquiera  detener  su  accion  perturbadora,  como  lo  hizo  siempre  que 
£>  Zelaya  se  atribuia  un  proyecto  semejante. 

El  senor  WeitzeL,  secundando  declaraciones  hechas  en  igual  senti- 
do  por  el  Departamento  y  hasta  por  el  mismo  Presidente,  Sefior 
Taft.  notifica  que  su  Gobierno  no  consentira  en  la  restauracion  del 
.Zelayismo.  iQue  entienden  por  eso?  Dificil  les  seria  explicarlo, 
porque  no  conocen  suficientemente  ni  la  historia,  ni  la  situacion 
•actual  de  Nicaragua,  ni  la  indole  del  pueblo,  ni  el  caracter  y 
iendencias  de  los  politicos  do  aquella  tierra;  y  esta  ignorancia  ha 
sido  una  de  las  causas  de  los  error es  y  abusos  de  poder  cometidoe 
por  el  Departamento.  Zelaya,  como  todos  los  gobernantes  dc-po 
ticoss,  no  pudo  formar  un  verdadero  parti  do  politico.  El  personal 
que  le  servia  era  mudable  segun  las  circunstancias  o  sus  caprichos. 
Al  dejar  el  poder,  que  era  la  unica  base  de  su  prestigio,  lo  habria 
perdido  del  todo,  sino  fuera  que  la  intervencion  americana  en  su 
patria  hace  pensar  a  muchos  que  repres'enta  la  causa  de  la  autono- 
mia  nacional,  por  mas  que  la  generalidad  no  lo  crea  asi,  porque  no 
supo  caer  luchando  como  heroe.  Llamar  zelayista  al  ultimo  movi- 
miento  revolucionario,  demuestra  grande  ignoranciia  o  mala  fe.  Lo 
inicio  el  General  Mena,  uno  de  los  prohombres  'de  la  revolucion 
contra  Zelaya,  uno  de  los  cinco  candidates  del  pacto  Dawson,  ro- 
deado  de  una  fraccion  del  partido  conservador.  Sin  la  interven- 
cion extranjera  es  seguro  que  el  partido  contrario  se  habria  rruzad ) 
de  brazos  a  presenciar  la  lucha  entre  sus  enemigos  politicos,  para 
resolver  despues  de  terminada,  la  actitud  que  le  conviniera.  Pero 
la  intervencion  hizo  estallar  la  indignacion  en  la  masa  popular  y, 
&in  esperar  ordenes  de  sus  caudillos,  aplastaron  las  fuerzas  del 
Gobierno.  .  Esto  lo  hicieron  principalmente  las  poblacionea  de  los 
Departamentos  de  Leon  y  Chinandega,  las  mismas  que  adversaron 
unanimemente  a  Zelaya  desde  el  ano  de  1896.  ,;Donde  esta  entonces 
el  Zelayismo  de  la  revolucion?  Apenas  se  concibe  que  un  Gobierno 
K-rio  se  ntrcva  a  consignar  en  tfocumentos  oficiales  tales  desaliogo? 


40 

•del  Jefe  de  su  Departamento  de  Estado,  que  revelan  pasioii  per- 
sonalisima  y  a  la  vez  despecho  por  la  resistencia  a  su  DOLLAR 
DIPLOMACY. 

Y  despues  de  tanto  abuso,  de  tanto  escandalo  <j  se  habra  consegui- 
do  la  paz  de  Nicaragua?  La  respuesta  la  puede  dar  como  nosotros 
cualquier  extranjero  que  se  tome  el  trabajo  de  leer  este  escrito. 
Si  fuera  posible  que  el  Gobierno  americano  persistiese  en  mantener 
su  obra  en  Nicaragua,  teridria  necesidad  de  mantener  tambien  alia 
un  ejercito  de  ocupacion,  como  es  precise  en  todo  pals  conquistado, 
para  que  pudiese  librar  a  los  traidores  del  justo  castigo  que  algiin 
dia  ha  de  imponerles  el  pueblo  que  tan  vilmente  ban  vendido..* 

Creemos  que  podria  darse  a  la  dificultad  una  solution  pacifica, 
pero  no  juzgamos  el  momento  ni  las  circunstancias  propicias  para 
indicarla. 

EL  SALVADOR. 

No  tenemos  noticia  de  que  se  hayan  hecho  insinuaciones  de  con- 
trato  de  emprestito  a  aquella  Repiiblica,  sin  duda  porque  tiene 
nna  deuda  extranjera  muy  pequena,  relativamente  a  la  gran  ri- 
queza  del  pais.  Esa  deuda,  creada,  lo  mismo  que  la  enorme 
deuda  interna,  por  la  corrompida  y  torpe  administration  de  ante- 
riores  gobernantes.  no  ha  af ectado  de  manera  irremediable  las  fuentes 

*Para  mejor  comprobar  nuestra's  aserciones  han  llegado  a  nuestras 
manos  peri6dicos  de  Nicaragua,   que  traen  las  noticias  siguientes: 

Nov.  17,  1912. 

El  tren  preaidencial   custodlado  por   mnrinos   americanoai. 


Managua,  Nov.  13. — Hoy  a  las  7  se.  m.  parti6  de  esta  con  destino  & 
Corinto  el  tren  presidetticial  compuesto  de  tres  carrros:  en  el  centro,  va 
el  Presidente  don  Adolfo  Diaz,  el  general  Etniliano  Chamorro,  el 
Ministro  don  Diego  M.  Chamorro,  don  Carlos  Cuadra  Pasos  y  otros 
amigos.  Delante  y  detras  iban  dos  carrros  con  cien  marines  americanos. 
No  llevan  ni  la  banda,  ni  la  guardia  de  honor  por  ser  el  Presidente 
Diaz  enemigo  de  toda  ostentaci6n. 


Suprfmese  la  Guardia  de  Honor. 

Managua,   Nov.    13. — Por   acuerdo   del    9   del   corriente   suprimese   por' 
ahora  la  Guardia  de  Honor  del  Presidente  de  la  Republica. 


Sdlo  quedan  4OO  marlnos. 

Manague,  Nov.  12. — El  quince  6  sea  el  viefrnes  de  la  presente  semana 
partiran  para  Panama,  el  Almirante  Southerland  y  las  fuerzas  americanas 
con  la  excepci6n  de  400  marines  que  se  quedan  distribuidos  asl:  300 
marines  en  Campo  Marte  (Palarcio  Presidencial)  y  100  marines  en  Le6n. 


;Que  triste  papel  el  de  los  marines  americanos!  V£aseles  convertidos 
en  guardias  de  corps  de  un  tirano  usurpa-dor,  para  librarlo  de  las  con- 
secuencias  de  la  justa  indignaci6n  de  su  pueblo.  Nunca  habran  sofiado 
los  contribuyentes  americanos  que  el  dinero  que  pagan  y  que  sirve 
para  sostener  su  fuerza  publica,  resultaria  definitivamc^ite  invertido  en 
el  sostenimiento  de  Dlciaduras  y  en  la  opresi6n  de  pueblos  libres  y 
hermanos. 


.  41 

de  production,  y  aquel  pais  podra  librarse  de  ella  por  su  propio 
esfuerzo,  con  la  sola  condicion  de  ser  regido  por  una  serie  de 
Administraciones  honradas.  Pero  esto  no  quiere  decir  que  el  Sal- 
vador se  veria  libre  de  la  accion  de  la  Dollar  Diplomacy,  si  esta 
llegase  a  imperar  en  las  relaciones  de  Estados  Unidos  con  las 
demas  republicas  del  centre.  Aunque  se  ve  que  habria  sido  la 
ultima  en  que  se  trataria  de  implantarla,  no  habria  faltado  un  pre- 
texto,  por  futil  que  fuese,  para  obligar  a  su  Gobierno  al  sacrificio 
de  su  autonomia. 

Asi  lo  ha  comprendido  el  pueblo  salvadoreiio,  y  por  ello  su.  pa- 
triotismo  ha  hecho  explosion,,  traduciendose  en  manifestaciones  de 
protesta  contra  la  intervencion  americana  en  la  ultima  contienda 
civil  de  Nicaragua.  Su  Gobierno,  presidido  por  el  Doctor  Manuel 
E.  Araujo,  segun  decumentos  que  tenemos  a  la  vista,  supo  colocarse 
a  la  altura  de  su  deber,  secundando  las  demandas  de  la  opini6n 
publica.  No  resistimos  el  deseo  de  agregar  los  telegramas  cmzados 
entre  el  Presidente  Taft  y  el  Presidente  Araujo.  (Anexo  I.) 
porque  en  ellos  se  demuestran  los  siguientes  puntos: 

1°. — Que  el  senor  Araujo  estaba  seguro  de  llegar  a  la  paz  si 
el  Presidente  Diaz  de  Nicaragua  depositaba  el  Poder  en  Don 
Salvador  Calderon  R,  deposito  en  que  ya  habia  consentido  Diaz, 
pero  que  de  seguro  no  se  realize  porque  no  lo  permitio  el  senor 
Taft,  segon  se  desprende  de  la  respuesta  que  dio  a  Araujo. 

2°. —  Que,  el  Presidente  Araujo  queria  ante  todo  la 
paz  de  Nicaragua  conseguida  por  la  mediacion  pacifica 
de  las  otras  Republicas  de  Centro  America;  pero  en  case 
de  no  conseguirse,  llegar  hasta  la  intervencion  armada,  antes  que 
consentir  en  que  la  hiciese  el  Gobierno  de  Estados  Unidos;  lo  cual 
habria  tenido  ademas  la  ventaja  de  que,  despues  de  esa  acci6n  con- 
junta,  habrian  seguido  de  seguro  pasos  mas  avanzados  hacia  la 
union  defmitiva  de  aquellas  naciones  en  una  sola,  sugeridos  por 
el  peligro  comun.  El  senor  Taf-t  se  opuso  a  eso,  declarando  que  su 
Gobierno,  por  ser  completamente  neutral,  seria  el  mas  a  proposito 
para  lograr  el  termino  de  la  contienda,  y  ya  hemos  explicado  c6mo 
fue  su  neutralidad ;  y  recordo  para  apoyar  su  opinion  los  convenios 
de  Washington,  que  en  realidad  prohiben  las  intervenciones  en  las 
guerras  civiles,  convenios  que  el,  Taft,  se  creia  en  el  deber  de  hacer 
cumplir,  pero  reservandose  el  derecho  de  violarlos. 


•gr-  --- vrr  43 

:3°.-^-'Que  el  Departamento  habia  declarado  a  los  representantes 
del  Salvador  en  Washington  y  Managua  que  el  desembarque  de 
marinos  obedecia  solo  al  intento  de  proteger  la  Legacion  y  Con- 
sulados  y  los  intereses  americanos,  pero  que  no  intervendrian  en  la 
•contienda,  declaracion  que,  como  ya  h'emos  demostrado  no  fue 
'cumplida,  por  lo  cual  Araujo  .formulo  reclamacion,  aunque  en 
terminos  muy  corteses  y  suaves,  con  oportunidad  todavia  para  que 
la  fuerza  extranjera  se  hubiese  abstenido  de  derramar  sangre  ni- 
fcaragiiense. 

4°. — Que  el  senor  Taft  da  una  prueba  de  su  alegada  imparciali- 
dad  declarando  que  lo  de  Nicaragua  era  UNA  KEBELION  SIX 
FUNDAMENTO,  haciendo  reminiscencia  muy  acerba  de  la  epoca 
de  ZELAYA,  y  cargos  tan  violentos  como  exagerados  contra  los 
revolucionarios,  a  la  vez  que  proclamando  la  legitimidad  del  Go- 
Tnerno  de  Diaz,  no  obstante  que,  como  ya  dijimos,  es  un  Gobierno 
'de  facto,  que  no  ha  tenido  mas  sombra  de  legitimidad  que  el 
nombramiento  de  una  Asamblea,  la  misma  que  a  ultima  hora  le 
'destituyo. 

Nos  hemos  complacido  en.ver  publicados  en  un  folleto  los  docu- 
mentos  que  demuestran  la  conducta  correcta  y  patriotica  del  Presi- 
dente  del  Salvador,  a  quien,  como  al  de  Honduras,  se  habia  acusado 
!de  haber  enviado  armas  y  municiones  al  Gobierno  de  Diaz,  en 
monrentos  en  que  los  necesitaba  en  absoluto  para  hacer  una  mediana 
resistencia  siquiera  al  empuje  formidable  de  la  revolucion,  con  lo 
cual  habria  contribuido  a  prolongar  y  hacer  mas  sangricntn  la 
lucha,  y  se  habria  hecho  complice  de  la  traicion  cometida  contra 
CJentro  America.  Todas  las  comunicaciones  que  en  dicho  folleto 
aparecen,  indican  que  el  senor  Arajuo  vio  claro  -desde  el  principio 
&1  peligro  centroamericano,  haciendo  esfuerzos  para  conjurarlo,  lo 
cual  no  se  compadece  oon  la  verdad  de  la  grave  acusacion  que 
contra  el  se  lanzo;  pero  mas  complaci'dos  estaremos,  si,  cuando  co- 
nozca  el  senor  Araujo  tan  grave  a-cusacion,  la  desmiente  expresa- 
mente  con  pruebas  directas  y  concluyentes,  porque  podria  quedar 
como  un  punto  dudoso  para  la  historia  patria. 

TRATADO  Y  CONVK\( MONKS  DI:  WASHINGTON. 

En  Noviembre  de  1907  se  runio  en  Washington  la  CONFERFA- 
CIA  CE1STTRO  AMERICANA  DE  PAZ,  que  tuvo  por  objeto  poner  ^ 
ti'rmino  a  las  diferencias  existentes  entre  los  Gobiernos  de  varias 


43 

de  las  Republicas  del  Centre,,  y  establecer  solidas  bases  para  la  paz 
interior  y  exterior  de  todas  ellas.  Para  lograr  el  fin  deseaVlo  ei 
Presidente  Roosevelt  ofrecio  generosa  hospitalidad,  y,  unido  al  de 
Mexico,  sus  buenos  oficios,  que  fueron  desinteresados,  y  hasta  donde 
fue  posible,  eficaces.  Si  la  Conferencia  no  dio  resultados  practices, 
no  fue  culpa  de  los  Gobiernos  mediadores,  sino  de  la  estrechez  de 
miras  de  algunos  de  los  Presidentes  representados  en  dicha  Confe- 
rencia. Las  Delegaciones  de  las  Republicas  de  Honduras  y  Nicaragua 
propusieron  como  remedio  para  todos  los  males  de  Centro  America 
el  restablecimiento  de  la  union  de  todas  ellas  en  una  sola  naciou, 
declarando  no  tener  fe  en  ninguno  de  los  demas  medios  propuestos 
o  que  pudieran  proponerse. 

Este  proyecto  fue  rechazado  por  mayoria,  formada  por  las  otras 
tres?  Delegaciones,,  como  fueron  rechazadas  tambien  otras  mociones 
tendentes  a  restringir  el  poder  absolute  que  ejercen  los  Presidentes. 

Por  la  importancia  que  tienen  para  el  objeto  que  nos  proponemos 
vamos  a  insertar  algunos  articulos  de  los  eonvenios  citados. 

ARTICULO  II  Tratado  General.  "Deseando  asegurar  en-  las 
Republicas  de  Centro  America  los  beneficios  que  se  derivan  de  la 
practica  de  las  instituciones  y  contribuir  al  propio  tiempo  a  afirmar 
su  estabilidad  y  los  prestigios  de  que  deben  rodearse,  declara  que 
«e  considera  amenazante  a  la  paz  de  dichas  republicas,,  toda  disposi- 
tion o  medida  que  tienda  a  alterar  en  cualquiera  de  ellas  el  orden 
constitucional." 

La  Convencion  Adicional  se  compone  de  tres  articulos  que  dicen : 

"ARTICULO  I.  Los  Gobiernos  de  las  Altas  Partes  Contratantes 
no  reconoceran  a  ninguno  que  surja  en  cualquiera  de  las  cinco 
republicas  por  consecuencia  de  un  golpe  de  Estado,  o  de  una  revolu- 
cion  contra  un  Gobierno  reconocido,  mientras  la  representacion  del 
pueblo,  libremente  electa,  no  haya  reorganizado  el  pais  en  forma 
constitucional. 

ARTICULO  II.  ISTingun  Gobierno  de  Centro  America  podra,  en 
caso  de  guerra  civil,  intervenir  en  favor  ni  en  contra  del  Gobierno 
del  pais  donde  la  contienda  tuviere  lugar. 

ARTICULO  III.  Se  recomienda  a  los  Gobiernos  de  Centro 
America  procurar,  por  los  medios  que  esten  a  su  alcance,  en  primer 
termino  la  reforma  constitucional  en  el  sentido  de  prohibir  la 
reeleccion  de  Presidente  de  la  Republica,  donde  tal  prohibicion  no 


44 

exista,  y  en  segundo,  la  adopcion  de  todas  las  disposiciones  necesaria? 
para  rodear  de  completa  garantia  el  principio  de  alternabilidad  en 
el  Poder." 

En  la  Convencion  para  el  establecimiento  de  una  Corte  de  Jus- 
ticia  Centre  Americana,  se  encuentra  el  siguiente. 

"ARTICULO  ANEXO.  La  Corte  de  Justicia  Centroamericana 
conocera  tambien  de  los  conf lictos  que  pueda  haber  entre  los  Poderes 
Legislative,  Ejecutivo  y  Judicial,  y  cuando  de  hecho  no  se  respeten 
los  fallos  judiciales  o  las  resoluciones  del  Congreso  National." 

Mas,  aunque  hemos  leido  y  releido  el  Tratado  y  Convenciones 
que  nos  ocupan,  no  h'emos  encontrado  un  solo  articulo,  una  sola 
palabra,  que  autorice  la  pretension  que  despues  han  ostentado  el 
Departamento  de  Estado  Americano,  y  el  mismo  senor  Presidente 
Taft  (Cablegrania  al  Presidente  del  Salvador  fecha  5  de  Septiembre 
de  1912)  de  que  el  Gobierno  Americano  tiene  derecho,  segun  los 
mismos  convenios,  para  obligar  a  las  paries  a  su  fiel  cumplimiento. 
En  el  protocolo  preliminar,  origen  'de  la  Conferencia,  encontramos 
el  articulo  II  que  dice : 

"Los  Excelentisimos  Senores  Presidentes  de  las  Eepublicas  de 
Centro  America  invitaran  a  los  Excelentisimos  Senores  Presidentes 
de  los  Estados  Unidos  de  America  y  de  los  Estados  Unidos  Mexi- 
canos,  para  que  si  lo  tienen  a  bien  se  sirvan  nombrar  sus  repre- 
sentantes  respectivos,  a  fin  de  que,  CON  UN  CARACTER  PURA- 
MENTE  AMISTOSO,  presten  sus  buenos  e  IMPARCIALES  ofi- 
cios  para  la  realizacion  de  los  propositos  de  la  Conferencia." 

Por  lo  que  antecefde  se  comprende  bien  que  ningun  derecho  de 
intervencion  se  ha  concedido  al  Gobierno  de  Washington  ni  al  de 
Mexico,  (el  cual  nunca  lo  ha  pretendido)  ;  y  por  el  contrario,  en 
el  Tratado  General  citado  se  declaran  derogados  todos  los  anteriores 
convenios  centroamericanos,  inclusive  el  celebrado  a  bordo  del 
Marblehead,  que  se  ratifico  en  el  de  San  Jose  de  C.  R.,  entre 
Guatemala,  el  Salvador  y  Honduras.  En  los  convenios  derogados 
se  designaban  como  arbitros  permanentes  para  todas  sus  diferencias, 
los  Presidentes  de  EE.  UU.  y  Mexico;  y  entonces  podrian  haber 
pretendido  intervenir  para  prevenir  las  oontiendas,  alegando  con 
razon  que,  en  vez  de  tener  que  molestarse  en  dirimirlas  cuando  ya 
hubiesen  causado  males  irreparables,  preferian  ponerles  termino 
cuanto  antes. 


Pero,  en  el  estado  actual  cle  las  cosas,  lo  unico  que  podrian  y 
clcbcrian  hacer  los  Gobiernos  mediadores  seria  continuar  en  sus  bue- 
110*  y  amistosos  oficios  para  hacer  efectivo  el  cumplimiento  de  los 
convenios  que  con  la  misma  amistosa  influencia  ayudaron  a  crear. 

Ahora  examinemos  si  el  Gobierno  de  Washington,  en  una  forma 
o  en  otra,  con  o  sin  derecho,  ha  intentado  siquiera  que  los  Presi- 
dentes  Centroamericanos  cumplan  lo  pactado,  como  lo  pretende. 

El  articulo  III  de  la  convencion  adicional  preinserto,  declara 
principio  de  Derecho  Internacional  centroamericano  el  de  la  alter- 
nabilidad  en  el  ejercicio  de  la  Presidencia ;  y  ese  principio,  aunque 
surgio  de  la  Conferencia  como  una  simple  recomendacion,  fue 
aceptado  por  los  Presidentes  y  ratificado  por  los  Congresos.  Despues 
de  estar  en  vigenda  los  convenios  el  senor  Estrada  Cabrera  se  hizo 
reelegir  en  Guatemala,  y  no  tenemos  noticia  de  que  el  Departamento 
'de  Estado  le  h'aya  recordado  al  menos  su  deber  de  entregar  la 
Presidencia  a  un  sucesor  libremente  electo.  Por  el  contrario,  ba 
seguido  siendo  uno  de  los  gobernantes  favorites  del  Departamento. 
En  cambio  combatio  a  Zelaya  de  la  manera  que  hemos  relacionado, 
no  obstante  que  su  reeleccion  era  anterior  a  la  fecha  de  los  convenios. 

En  varios  de  los  Estados  centroamericanos  se  ha  entronizado  el 
despotismo  y  hasta  crueles  tiranias,  y  sin  embargo,  no  recordamos 
que  una  sola  vez  el  Departamento  de  Estado  haya  intentado  algiin 
remedio  para  prevenir  los  alzamientos  populares  que  regularmente 
ban  tenido  por  causa  la  desesperacion  de  los  pueblos  privados  de 
todas  las  garantias,  aiin  de  las  necesarias  para  vivir ;  y  pudo  apoyarse 
en  el  articulo  II  del  Tratado  General  antes  trascrito,  que  declara 
atentatoria  a  la  paz  de  C.  A.  toda  alteracion  del  orden  constitucional. 
Por  el  contrario,  con  excepcion  de  Zelaya,  han  merecido  la  confianza 
y  el  apoyo  del  Departamento  los  Gobernantes  mas  despotioos. 

Pudo  apoyarse  en  el  articulo  II  de  la  Convencion  Adicional 
citada,  que  queda  trascrito,  para  prevenir  a  los  Gobiernos  de  C.  A. 
sobre  su  deber  de  no  reconocer  al  Gobierno  que  surgio  de  la  revolu- 
cion  en  Nicaragua  en  1910  y  que  existe  todavia,  porque  el  pais  no 
>e  ha  reorganizado  constitucionalmente,  ya  que  no  se  ha  practicado 
ninguna  eleccion  antes  del  2  de  Noviembre,  y  esta  ya  hemos 
demostrado  que  no  mereoe  ese  nombre;  pero  en  vez  de  hacerlo,  se 
nprcsuro  a  reconocerlo  el  mismo  y  a  darle  su  apoyo,  aim  con  la 
fuerza  armada,  contra  su  propio  pueblo.  En  cambio  ya  hemos  visto 


46 

como  se  nego  a  reconocer  al  Gobiemo  Constitucional  del  Dr.  Madriz, 
e  influyo  para  que  no  lo  reconocieran  los  de  Guatemala  y  el 
Salvador. 

La  Corte  de  Justicia  Centro  Americana  en  las  dos  revoluciones 
de  Nicaragua  ha  intentaJdo  el  restablecimiento  de  la  paz  ejerciendo 
su  mediation;  pero  sus  esfuerzos  han  fracasado,  principalmente, 
por  que  una  de  las  partes  contendientes  contaba  con  el  decidido 
apoyo  del  Departamento,  llevado  hasta  donde  lo  hemos  patentizado. 

Si  el  Departamento  hubiese  querido  que  el  establecimiento  de  esa 
Corte  no  fuese,  como  ha  sido,  un  complete  fracaso,  le  habria  ayudado 
en  su  labor  pacifista.  Pero  hay  algo  mas :  segun  el  articulo  anexo,  de 
la  Convencion  sobre  el  establecimiento  de  dicho  Tribunal,  antes 
copia'do,  toca  a  la  Corte  conocer  de  los  conflictos  que  pueda  haber 
entre  los  altos  Poderes ;  y  pudo  el  Gobierno  americano  influir  para 
que,  si  la  election  del  General  Mena  por  la  Asamblea  se  consideraba 
indebida,  o  si  despues  se  consideraba  arbitraria  la  destitution  del 
Presidente  Diaz  decretada  por  la  misma  Asamblea.  fuese  la  Corte 
Centro  Americana  la  que  resolviese  el  easo,  con  lo  cual  la  guerra 
habria.  terminado. 

Por  ultimo,  el  articulo  II  'de  la  Convencion  adicional  preinserto 
prohibe  a  los  Gobiernos  de  C.  A.  intervenir  en  favor  ni  en  contra  de 
otro  en  caso  de  guerra  civil;  y  el  Gobierno  americano  ha  visto  con 
impasibilidad,  cuando  no  los  Jiaya  impulsado,  los  auxilios  prestados 
por  el  Gobierno  de  Guatemala,  a  las  revoluciones  de  Honduras  y 
Nicaragua.  Mas  ha  hecho  algo  peor :  arrogandose  un  derecho  que 
los  Convenios  de  Washington  niegan  a  las  mismas  partes  roiitra- 
tantes,  el  Departamento  de  Estado  ha  intervenido  directa  o  indirecta- 
mente  en  favor  o  en  contra  de  esas  revoluciones,  empleando  la 
fuerza  armada  para  debelar  la  ultima,  no  solo  contra  los  comba- 
tientes,  sino  hasta  contra  multitudes  indefensas.  Y  todo  eso  lo  ha 
hecho  invocando  los  Convenios  de  Washington,  que  dice  querer 
ensenar  a  cumplir,  con  el  ejemplo  de  tan  escandalosas  violaciones 
de  los  mismos  como  dejamos  anotadas. 

Creemos  conveniente,  por  tratarse  de  la  voz  autorizada  de  un  go- 
hernante,  reproducir  un  parrafo  de  la  contestacion  da  da  por  el 
Presidente  Araujo  a  la  Corte  de  Justicia  centro-america.na,  re- 
firiendose  a  la  ultima  guerra  de  Nicaragua,  y  especialmente  a  la 
verdadera  interpretacion  de  los  Convenios  de  Washington.  Dice 
asi: 


47 

"Cinco  Estnclos  independientes  sin  abdicar  su  soberania,  ajustaron 
Tiatados  que  crean  relaciones  eficaces  de  amistad,  paz,  comercio  y 
mutua.  correspondencia.  Y  ejerciendo  buenos  oficios,,  los  Gobiernos 
de  Estados  Unidos  de  Xorte-America  y  Mexico,  por  medio  de 
ihistres  repre?entantes,  presenciaron  las  deliberaciones  que  precedie- 
ron  a  la  conclusion  final  de  aquellos  contratoe  internacionales,  cele- 
brados  en  Washington,  merced  a  bondadoso  y  de&interesado  asilo 
ctorgado  por  el  ex-Presidente  de  la  Union  Americana.  Pero  es 
de  advertir,  que  en  el  texto  de  aquellos  documentos,  en  el  protocolo 
preliminar  ni  en  las  actas  respectivas,  se  consignan  para  aquellos 
nobles  Gobiernos  derechos  u  obligaciones  provenientes  de  las  rela- 
ciones contraetuales  llevadas  a  termino  por  los  negociadores  centre- 
americanos.  ISTada  hay  en  la  letra  6  espiritu  de  aquellos  pactos,  que 
pudiera  considerarse  como  restrictive  del  libre  ejercicio  de  la  so- 
berania  de  estos  pueblos,  y  solo  se  nota  en  ellos  el  espiritu  de  amor, 
re?peto  y  mutua  correspondencia  que  estan  obligados  a  tributarse 
ospontaneamente  6  mediante  la  sancion  del  arbitrage  encomendado 
u  u n  Tribunal  netamente  centroamericano,  oomo  la  Corte  de  Justicia 
de  la  ciial  Vnestra  Senoria  es  digno  organo/7 


Yamos  a  terminar.  Tenemos  la  esperanza  'de  haber  logrado 
demostrar  que  la  politica  de  la  "DOLLAR  DIPLOMACY"  envuelve 
una  gran  injusticia,  y  esta  causando  la  ruina  de  los  paises  a  que 
se  aplica,  a  la  vez  que  perjudicando  el  credito  de  los  EE.  UU.  en  la 
America  Latina  y  sus  legitimos  intereses  en  beneficio  de  unos  pocos 
privilegiados  ciudadanos  americanos.  Para  conseguir  la  reparation 
de  esa  injusticia,  no  tenemos  los  centroamericanos  medios  a  nuestro 
alcance,  pero  confiamos  en  la  rectitud  y  honradez  del  pueblo  ameri- 
cano  y  de  sus  dignos  representantes  en  el  Congreso,  especialmente  el 
Senado,  llamado  a  conocer  de  esos  asuntos.  Somos  admiradores  de 
este  gran  pueblo;  y  muy  lejos.  esta  de  nosotoros  el  creer  que  es 
culpable  de  los  errores  de  algunos  de  sus  gobernantes.  Ansiamos- 
ver  que  se  nos  hace  justicia,  y  que  renace  la  fraternidad  panameri- 
cana  que  ha  de  dar  la  paz,  el-progreso  y  la  libertad  a  toda.-  l^is 
naciones  del  continente. 

New  Orleans,  Noviembre  de  1912. 

JUAX  LEETS. 


ANEXOS 


51 

-&nexo  "A." 


MEMORANDUM. 


Con  instrucciones  de  mi  Gobierno,  que  acabo  de  recibir  por  tele- 
grafo,  tengo  el  honor  y  el  placer  de  informar  al  Gobierno  de  Hon- 
duras que  la  firma  de  J.  Pierpont  Morgan  &  Co.  ha  avisado  a  mi 
'Gobierno  que  estan  preparados  para  convenir  en  el  arreglo  de  la 
deuda  Extranjera  de  Honduras,  la  entrega  del  ferrocarril  y  muelle 
de  Puerto  Cortes  y  la  suministracion  de  una  cantidad  sustancial 
para  las  mejoras  interiores  que  sean  necesarias,  adquiriendo  bonos 
nu&vos  que  serdn  debidam«ente  garantizados.  Los  Sres.  Morgan  & 
Co.  han  notificado  a  mi  Gobierno  que  la  Junta  de 
'Tenedores  de  Bonos  Extranjeros  ha  aceptado  la  propuesta 
-de  Morgan  &  Cia.,  que  tiene  ahora  control  de  las  obli- 
gaciones  Inglesas  y  Americanas,  incluyendo  el  ferrocarril 
y  muelle,  y  que  la  Junta  de  Tenedores  de  Bonos  Extranjeros,  obran- 
tio  de  parte  de  los  Tenedores  de  Bonos,  ha  informado  al  Ministro 
de  Negocios  Extranjeros  Britanico  de  lo  anterior  y  que  el  Ministro 
•de  Negocios  Extranjeros,  habiendo  aprobado  lo  mas  cordialmente  el 
nuevo  proyecto,  ha,  a  solicitud  de  la  Junta  de  Tenedores  de  Bonos, 
-dado  aviso  al  Ministro  Garden  del  cambio  de  la  situation. 

Tengo  instrucciones  de  manifestar  que  si  el  Gobierno  de  Hon- 
duras enviara  un  Agente  Especial  a  los  Estados  Unidos  con  amplios 
Poderes  para  negociar  con  Morgan  &  Co.,  el  Gobierno  de  Estados 
Unidos  le  extenderia  toda  facilidad. 

Me  permito  agregar  que  el  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos  se 
siente  feliz  al  ver,  en  las  propuestas  indicadas,  toda  persepctiva  de 
buen  exito  para  un  arreglo,  sobre  una  base  favorable  para  la  amorti- 
^acion  de  la  deuda  nacional,  que  seria  en  pro  de  la  prosperidad, 
tranquilidad  y  fuerza  nacional  de  Honduras. 

(f )  PHILIP  BROWN. 
Ministro  Americano  en  Honduras. 
Tegucigalpa,  Julio  17  de  1909. 


52 
Anexo  "B." 


CABLEGKAMAS. 


Tegucigalpa,  Dieiembre  10  de  1910. 
Paredes, 

Consulado  Honduras, 

ISTueva  York. 
Acepte  propuesta,  firme  arreglo  y  regrese. 

DAVILA. 


Nueva  York,  Dieiembre  11  de  1910. 
Presidente  Davilla, 

Tegucigalpa,  Honduras. 

Consulte    situacion    personas    importantes,    resolver    suerte   Ee- 
publica. 

PAREDES. 


Anexo  "B." 

Nueva  York,  Dieiembre  24  de  1910. 
Presidente  Davila, 

Tegucigalpa,  Honduras. 

He  rehusado  firmar  Convencion  protectora'do   Americano  plan 
Santo  Domingo.     Cumplido  mi  deber,  presento  mi  renuncia. 

PAREDES. 


Tegucigalpa,  Dieiembre  29  de  1910. 
Paredes, 

Consulado  Honduras, 

Nueva  York. 

Pais  esta  al  borde  de  una  desastrosa  guerra  civil.  Solo  el  em- 
prestito  puede  salvarlo.  Medite  patrioticamente.  Hay  que  hacer 
esfuerzos  por  ganar  tiempo.  Emprestito  se  hara  a  despecho  de 
nosotros.  Procuremos  siquiera  no  ensangrentar  Republica.  Espero 
detalles. 

DAVILA. 


53 

Anexo  «B." 

Tegucigalpa,  Enero  20  de  1911. 
Paredes, 

Consulado  Honduras, 

Xueva  York. 

No  se  a'dmite  renuncia.  Firme  emprestito  mayor  brevedad.  Toda 
la  responsabilidad  la  aoepta  el  Gobierno.  Guerra  civil  se  preserita 
formidable.  Emprestito  puede  evitar  derramamiento  de  sangre  j 
preparar  evolucion  provechosa  impidiendo  que  Bonilla  llegue  al 
poder.  Suscriba  contratos  esta  semana.  Conteste. 

DAVILA. 


Anexo  "B." 

Tegucigalpa,  12  de  Enero  de  1910. 
Sr.  Ministro  de  Honduras, 

Gral.  Juan  E.  Pare'des, 

Consulado  General  de  Honduras, 
66  Beaver  St., 
New  York. 
Muy  estimado  amigo : 

Eecibi  sus  apreciables  cartas  del  28  de  Xov.  y  5  de  Die.  anteriores. 

Ante  todo  debo  manifestar  a  Ud.  que  se  ha  creado  una  situation 
muy  dificil  en  este  pais.  La  emigracion  es  mucha,  como  nunca,  y 
voluntaria,  pues  los  mismos  que  estan  fuera  del  pais  dicen  que  el 
Gobierno  no  los  hostiliza,  pero  que  no  quieren  volver  a  Honduras 
sino.en  arinas  para  ejercer  venganzas.  ESTRADA  CABRERA,  que  es  el 
autor  de  esta  guerra  y  de  la  de  Agosto  del  ano  proximo  anterior, 
ha  desplegado  una  actividad  prodigiosa  para  que  la  revolucion  se 
produzca,  y  los  elementos  todos  se  han  conjurado  contra  el  Gobier- 
no, injustamente.  Para  salir  de  estas  dificultades  tenemos  que 
batallar  mucho. 

El  Gobierno  de  Honduras  estaba  notificado  oficialmente  de  que 
si  no  firm-aba  el  emprestito,  este  se  llevaria  a  cabo  'de  todos  modos, 
en  peores  condiciones  para  la  Eepublica.  Sinembargo  nada  dijimos, 
ninguna  promesa  hicimos  sino  hasta  esperar  indicaciones  de  Ud. 
La  ultima  propuesta  h'echa  por  los  Banqueros  que  tTd.  nos  trasmitio 
por  cablegrama  la  consideramos  como  decisiva,  y  por  eso  se  le  dio 
orden  de  que  firmara  y  regresara.  El  Ministro  Americano  me 


54 

pidio  copia  de  ese  cable  y  se  la  di.  Cuando  ITd.  rehuso  firmar  el, 
Convenio  en  Washington,  el  disgusto  del  Departamento  rayo  en. 
indignacion. 

DA  VILA. 


Anexo  "B." 

Tegucigalpa,  Enero  27.de  1911. 
Paredes, 

Consulado  Honduras, 

Nueva  York. 

Tomada  La  Ceiba.  Tambien  tornado  San  Marcos  Colon  por  in- 
vasion frontera  Nicaragua.  La  guerra  segiin  declaracion  oficial 
produjose  por  tardanza  en  firmar  emprestito,  no  obstante  promesa 
heeha  desde  10  Diciembre.  Guerra  es  cruel  de  partidos  enconados 
que  aniquilaran  pals,  y  el  emprestito  se  hara  todos  modos.  Depon- 
gamos  el  amor  propio  y  evitemos  ruina  de  Honduras.  Si  Ud.  no- 
quiere  firmar  ayudele  a  Lazo.  Trabajemos  en  la  obra  comun  de  la 
paz. 

DAVILA. 


Importantes  Manifestaciones  Del  Ex-Presidente  Juan  J.  Estrada 
en  New  York 

Asegura  que  las  revoluciones  estalladas  en  Nicaragua  ban  sido 
fomentadas  por  companias  norteamericanas. 

j  Y  pide  el  Protectorado ! .   .   .   . 

Del  New  York  Times  (fecha  10  de  Septiembre)  traducimos  lo  si- 
guiente : 

"En  el  curso  de  una  entrevista  que  tuvo  ayer  un  reporter  del 
Times  con  el  general  Juan  J.  Estrada,  quien  vive  en  Brooklyn  en 
el  Hotel  St.  George,  dijo  que  sin  la  intervencion  efectiva  del  Go- 
bierno  de  Estados  Unidos,  el  estado  de  guerra  continuaria  en  Ni- 
caragua y  traeria  complicaciones  a  este  pals  con  Inglaterra  y  Alema- 
nia. 

El  general  Estrada  declare  que  el  tiene  perfecto  derecho  &  la. 


55 

Presidencia  de  Nicaragua,  y  expreso  el  convenciniiento  de  que  ciertos 
norteamericanos  son  los  causantes  de  la  situacion  actual  de  aquella 
Republica. 

Acompana  a  Estrada  el  general  J.  M.  Moncada,  su  ex-Ministro. 

— Quiero  dirigir  por  medio  de  The  New  York  Times,  dijo  Es- 
trada, algunas  palabras  al  pueblo  norteamerieano,  y  expresar,  sobre 
todo  que  sin  el  Gobierno  de  Estados  Unidos,  Nicaragua  jamas  podra 
vivir.  .  .  . 

— I  Altfde  usted  al  protectorado  de  Estados  Unidos  ?  le  pregunta- 
mos. 

— Si,  contesto,  sin  embarazo  alguno.  Hablo  de  un  protectorado  al 
e&tllo  del  de  Panama  y  Cuba.  Desearia  yo  que  el  Gobierno  de  Esta- 
dos Unidos,  republioano  6  democrata,  no  quite  sus  ojos  de  Nicaragua 
y  vigile  alia  las  elecciones;  en  una  palabra,  que  sea  el  arbitro  y 
el  juez  de  nuestros  destines.  Hablo  en  nombre  mio  y  en  el  del 
Presidente  Adolfo  Diaz.  Mis  i'deas  son  sus  ideas  y  las  del  partido 
conservador.  Ese  es  el  unico  camino  por  donde  podemos  llegar  a 
la  paz  y  al  progreso.  Yo  soy  todavia  el  Presidente  titular  de  Ni- 
caragua. Yo  no  he  renunciado  ese  titulo,  como  se  ha  dicho,  sino- 
que  simplemente  deposite  el  poder  en  el  vice  Pre&idente  Diaz  du- 
rante  mi  ausencia,  y  el  esta  mandando  dentro  del  periodo  de  mi 
eleccion. 

Y  el  general  Estrada  continue  expresandose  como  sigue: 

"Durante  los  ultimos  veinte  anos  Nicaragua  ha  sido  gobernada 
por  un  sistema  salvaje.  Alia  no  ha  habido  realmente  elecciones. 
Todo  ha  sido  una  farsa.  Todos  han  querido*ser  Presidentes.  El 
resultado  h'a  sido  la  anarquia,  hasta  llegar  al  estado  caotico  actual. 
Pero  no  hemos  sido  solamente  los  nicaragiienses  la  causa  de  todas 
esas  dificultades ;  de  ellas  somos  los  menos  responsables.  Yo  aseguro 
que  la  mayoria  de  las  revoluciones,  sino  todas,  en  los  ultimos  tiem- 
pos,  han  sido  fomentadas,  apoyadas  y  'dirigidas  por  companiaa 
norteamericanas  ansiosas  de  obtener  de  nosotros  concesiones  y  mono- 
polios  de  negocios.  ^Cual  ha  sido  el  resultado?  Cuando  llegue  a. 
la  Presidencia,  me  encontre  con  conspiraciones  por  todos  lados. 
El  general  Menas  mi  Ministro  de  la  Guerra,  estaba  fraguando  una. 
revolucion.  El  general  Chamorro,  otro  'de  los  jefes  que  me  acom- 
pafiaron  en  la  revolucion  contra  Zelaya,  tambien  estaba  conspirando 
por  su  cuenta.  Se  que  una  compafiia  norteamericana,  que  iba  tra& 


56 

de  una  concesion  de  ferrocarril,  era  la  que  alentaba  el  golpe  revo- 
lucionario  en  contra  mia,  para  hacer  su  negocio.  Tuve  las  pruebas. 
y  la  revolucion  iba  a  estallar  el  14  de  mayo  de  1911.  Fuse  en 
arresto  a  Mena.  Aleje  de  mi  lado  a  Chamorro.  Los  conservadores 
que  me  rodeaban.  clamaron  unos  por  la  libertad  de  Mena,  y  otros 
se  declararon  sostenedores  de  Chamorro.  Para  evitar  la  guerra, 
deposite  el  poder  en  el  vice  Presidente  Diaz,  habiendo  podido  ro- 
dearme  de  los  liberales,  en  cuyas  filas  habia  yo  figurado.  En  la 
conspiracion  contra  mi  Gobierna  estuvieron  interesadas  cqmpanias 
norteamericanas." 

Termina  el  reportaje  de  The  Times,  asi: 

"El  general  Estrada  fue  rudamente  franco,  demasiado  franco, 
cuando  eoncluyo  diciendo  que  admitia  que  la  revolucion  que  el  ha- 
bia encabezado  contra  Zelaya,  habia  recibido  la  ayuda  nnanciera  de 
ciertas  companias  norteamericanas,  establecidas  en  la  costa  atlantica 
de  Nicaragua.  Dijo  que  tales  companias  contribuyeron  para  la 
revolucion  de  Bluefields,  con  un  millon  de  dolares;  y  la  casa  de 
Joseph  W.  Beers  con  unos  doscientos  mil,  y  la  de  Samuel  Weil  con 
cerca  de  ciento  cincuenta  mil  dolares." 

Diario  del  Salvador,  Octubre  2,  1912. 


NOTA  DE  MR.  KXOX  AL  ENCARGADO  DE  ^EGOCIOS  DE  NICARAGUA. 

"Es  notorio  que  desde  que  se  firmaron  las  Convenciones  de  Wash- 
ington de  1907,  el  Presidente  Zelaya  ha  mantenido  a  Centroamerica 
en  constante  inquietud  y  turbulencia ;  que  ha  violado  flagrantemente 
y  repetidas  veces  lo  estipulado  en  dichas  Convenciones,  y  por  una 
influencia  poderosa  sobre  Honduras,  cuya  neutralidad  aseguran 
las  Convenciones,  ha  tratado  de  desacreditar  aquellas  sagradas 
obligaciones  internacionales,  con  detrimento  de  Costa  Eica,  El 
Salvador  y  Guatemala,  cuyos  Gobiernos  solo  con  mucha  paciencia  han 
podido  mantener  lealmente  el  compromiso  solemne  contraido  en 
Washington  bajo  los  auspicios  de  los  Estados  Fnidos  y  de  Mejico. 

"Es  igualmente  notorio  que,  bajo  el  regimen  del  Presidente 
Zelaya,  las  instituciones  republicanas  han  dejado  de  existir  en  Nica- 
ragua, excepto  de  nombre;  que  la  opinion  publica  y  la  prensa  han 
sido  estranguladas,  y  que  las  prisiories  han  sido  el  precio  de  toda 
demostracion  de  patriotismo. 


57 

"P'or  consideration  personal  hacia  usted,  me  abstengo  de  discutir 
innecesariamente  los  penosos  detalles  de  un  regimen  que,  por 
desgracia,  ha  sido  un  borron  en  la  historia  de  Nicaragua,  y  un 
desengario  para  un  grupo  de  Republicas  que  solo  necesitan  la 
oportunidad  para  llenar  sus  aspiraciones  de  un  Gobierno  libre  y 
honrado. 

"Por  razon  de  los  intereses  de  los  Estados  Unidos  y  de  su  partici- 
pation en  las  Convenciones  de  Washington,  la  mayoria  de  las  Re- 
publicas de  Centroamerica  ha  llamado  desde  hace  tiempo  la  atencion 
a  este  Gobierno  contra  tan  irregular  situation.  Ahora  se  agrega 
el  clamor  de  una  gran  parte  del  pueblo  nicaragiiense  por  medio  de 
la  revolution  de  Bluefields,  y  el  hecho  de  que  dos  americanos,  que, 
segun  conviction  adiquirada  por  este  Gobierno,  eran  oficiales  al 
servicio  de  las  fuerzas  revolucionarias,  y,  por  consiguiente,  tenian 
derecho  a  ser  tratados  conforme  a  las  practicas  modernas  de  las 
naciones  civilizadas,  han  sido  fusilados  por  orden  directa  del  Presi- 
dente  Zelaya,  habiendo  precedido  a  su  ejecucion,  segun  informes, 
las  mas  barbaras  crueldades.  Ahora  viene  informe  oficial  de  que 
el  Consulado  americano  en  Managua  ha  sido  amenazado,  y  con  esto 
se  colma  el  proceder  siniestro  de  una  administration  caracterizada 
tambien  por  la  tirania  sobre  sus  propios  ciuda.danos,  y  que  hasta 
el  reciente  ultra je  hacia  este  pals  se  habia  manifestado  en  una  serie 
de  pequenas  molestias  e  indignidades  que  hicieron  imposible  desde 
hace  algunos  meses  mantener  una  Legation  en  Managua.  Desde 
todo  punto  de  vista  es  evidente  que  ha  llegado  a  ser  dificil  para  los 
Estados  Unidos  retardar  mas  una  actitud  decidida,  en  atencion  a 
los  deberes  que  tiene  para  con  sus  propios  ciudadanos,  con  su 
dignidad,  con  Centroamerica  y  con  la  civilization.  ' 

"El  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  U'nidos  esta  convencido  de  que  la 
revolution  actual  representa  los  ideales  y  la  voluntad  de  la  mayoria 
de  los  nicaragiienses  mas  fielmente  que  el  Gobierno  del  Presidente 
Zelaya,  y  que  con  su  centro  pacifico  es  tan  extenso  como  el  que  tan 
cruelmente  ha  tratado  de  mantener  el  Gobierno  de  Managua. 

"A  todo  esto  se  agrega  ahora  que,  segun  informe  *oficiado  de 
diversas  fuentes,  han  aparecido  indicios  en  las  provincias  occi- 
dentales  de  Nicaragua  de  un  levantamiento  en  favor  de  un  candi- 
date presidencial  intimamente  ligado  con  el  viejo  regimen,  en  el 
cual  es  facil  ver  nuevos  elementos  que  tienden  a  una  condieion-de, 
anarquia,  que  pueden  llegar  con  el  tiempo  a  destruir  toda  fuente  de 


58 

Gobierno  responsable  con  el  cual  pueda  el  de  los  Estados  Unidos 
discutir  la  reparacion  por  la  muerte  de  Cannon  y  Groce,  y  hasta 
dificultar  la  proteccion  con  que  debe  asegurarse  a  los  ciudadanos  y 
los  intereses  americanos  de  Nicaragua. 

"En  estas  circunstancias,  el  Presidente  de  los  Estados  Unidos  ya 
no  puede  sentir  por  el  Gobierno  del  Presidente  Zelaya  aquel  respeto 
y  confianza  que  debia  mantener  en  sus  relaciones  diplomaticas,  que 
comprenden  el  deseo  y  la  facultad  de  conservar  el  respeto  debido 
entre  un  Estado  y  otro. 

"El  Gobierno  de  Nicaragua  que  usted  ha  representado  hasta 
ahora  se  servira  quedar  enterado  por  la  presente  notificacion,  que 
lo  sera  tambien  al  jefe  de  la  revolucion,  de  que  el  Gobierno  de  los 
Estados  Unidos  le  hara  estrictamente  responsable  de  la  proteccion 
de  la  vida  de  los  americanos,  e  igualmente  a  las  facciones  de  hecho 
que  dominan  las  regiones  del  este  y  del  oeste  de  la  Republica  de 
Nicaragua. 

"Respecto  de  la  reparacion  que  debe  hacerse  por  la  muerte  de  los 
Sres.  Cannon  y  Groce,  el  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos  se  resiste 
a  imponer  al  inocente  pueblo  de  Nicaragua  un  castigo  tan  pesado 
en  expiacion  de  las  culpas  de  un  regimen  mantenido  por  la  fuerza, 
6  a  exigir  del  Gobierno  que  surja,  si  este  sigue  una  politica  diferente, 
en  pago  de  aquella  penalidad. 

"Al  discutirse  esta  reparacion,  debe  discutirse  al  mismo  tiempo 
la  existencia  en  Managua  de  un  Gobierno  capaz  de  responder  a  la 
demanda. 

"Debe  tambien  considerarse  hasta  donde  puede  llegar  la  responsa- 
bilidad  de  los  que  perpetraron  el  hecho,  y  las  torturas  que  pre- 
cedieron  a  la  ejecucion,  si  esto  se  comprueba;  y  la  cuestion  de  si 
el  nuevo  Gobierno  esta  enteramente  desligado  de  las  presenter 
intolerables  condiciones,  y  es  digno  de  que  se  le  tenga  confianza  de 
evitar  la  repeticion  de  actos  semejantes. 

"El  tal  caso,  el  Presidente  de  los  Estados  Unidos,  como  amigo 
que  es  de  Nicaragua  y  de  las  otras  Repiiblicas  de  Centroamerica, 
estara  dispuesto  a  reducir  la  indemnizacion  a  lo  que  realmente  se 
deba  a  los  padres  de  los  fusilados,  y  exigir  el  castigo  solamente  de 
aquellos  que  lo  merezcan. 

"De  acuerdo  con  esta  politica,  el  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos 
suspendera  temporalmente  su  demanda  de  reparacion,  mientras 
tanto,  dara  los  pasos  necesarios  para  la  debida  proteccion  de  los 
intereses  americanos. 


"Para  asegrirar  la  futura  proteccion  de  los  legitimos  intereses 
americanos,  y  en  consideracion  a  los  intereses  de  la  mayoria  de  las 
Kepiiblicas  centroamericanas,  lo  mismo  que  con  la  esperanza  de 
hacer  mas  efectivos  los  oficios  amistosos  establecidos  por  las  Con- 
venciones  de  Washington,  el  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos  se 
reserva  para  tiempos  mas  oportunos  el  discutir  las  estipulaciones 
con  que  el  Gobierno  constitucional  de  Nicaragua  se  obligue,  por 
medio  de  una  Convencion,  en  beneficio  de  todos  los  Gobiernos 
interesados,  a  garantizar  en  lo  futuro  el  mantenimiento  de  las  Con- 
venciones  de  Washington  y  sus  ideas  pacificas  y  progresistas. 

"Por  todo  lo  anterior.,  usted  debe  de  comprender  que  ha  terminado 
su  mision  de  Encargado  de  Xegocios,  y  tengo  el  honor  de  remitir 
adjunto  su  pasaporte  para  el  caso  de  que  usted  quiera  salir  del  pais. 

"Debo  agregarle  al  mismo  tiempo  que,  aunque  su  mision  diplo- 
matica  ha  terminado,  tendre  mucho  gusto  en  recibir  a  usted,  lo 
mismo  que  tendre  el  gusto  de  recibir  al  representante  de  la  revolu- 
cion;  uno  y  otro  como  medios  no  oficiales  de  comunicacion  entre  el 
Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos  y  las  autoridades  de  facto,  con 
quienes  habre  de  tratar  para  la  proteccion  de  los  intereses  ameri- 
canos,  mientras  se  establece  en  Nicaragua  un  Gobierno  con  el  cual 
puedaii  los  Estados  Unidos  mantener  relaciones  diplomat! cas. — 
Knox." 


AXEXO  "E." 

MEXSAJE  dirigido  por  el  S.erior  Presidente  Madriz  al  de  los 
Estados  Unidos  Mr.  Taft,  con  motivo  del  desembarque  de  marinos 
de  los  buques  de  guerra  americanos  en  Bluefields. 


Campo  Marte,  15  de  Junio,  1910. 
Exmo  Senor  Presidente  William  H.  Taft,  Washington: 

Permitame  V.  E.  referirme  a  ciertos  hechos  relacionados  con 
nuestra  guerra  civil. 

El  27  de  Mayo  ultimo  las  fuerzas  de  este  Gobierno  tomaron  por 
asalto  el  Bluff,  posicion  fuerte  que  defiende  a  Bluefields.  El  jefe 
de  esas  fuerzas  tenia  orden  de  proceder  inmediatamente  a  tomar  la 
eiudad  que  se  hallaba  desguarnecida,  lo  que  habria  asegurado  el 
termino  de  la  eampaiia.  Esto  se  frustro  por  la  actitnd  del  Co- 


60 

mandante  del  Crucero  Americano  Paducah,  que  intimo  al  jefe  do 
nuestras  tropas  que  se  opondria  con  sus  fuerzas  a  la  toma  do  la 
ciudad  y  que,  al  efecto,  desembarco  marinos  americanos  para 
ocuparla.  Con  esto  la  revolucion  aseguro  su  base  de  operaciones, 
pudo  sacar  de  la  ciudad  todas  sus  fuerzas,,  para  oponerlas  a  una  sola 
de  nuestras  oolumnas,  y  &e  frustro  una  combinacion  preparada  cuida- 
dosamente  y  de  exito  seguro. 

Este  Gobierno  compro  en  Nrueva  Orleans  el  barco  ingles  VENUS, 
hoy  Maximo  Jerez,  que  salio  para  San  Juan  del  Norte  con  licencia 
de  las  an  tori  dad  es  americanas,  despues  de  exh'ibir  BONA  FIDE 
todos  los  elementos  de  guerra  que  traia  a  bordo  como  articulos  de 
libre  comercio.  En  San  Juan  del  Norte  fue  nacionalizado  como 
buque  nicaragiiense,  armado  en  guerra  y  destinado  a  bloquear  el 
puerto  de  Bluefields.  El  bloqueo  tenia  por  objeto  impedir  que  Li 
revolucion  siguiera  recibiendo  como  antes,  armus,  provisiones  y 
recursos  de  New  Orleans.  El  Gobierno  de  V.  E.  ha  negado  a  nues- 
tro  barco  el  derecho  de  bloqueo  respecto  de  los  buques  americanos 
y  ha  quedado  abierta  a  la  revolucion  la  fuente  de  New  Orleans. 

La  toma  del  Bluff  dio  a  este  Gobierno  posesion  de  la  Aduana  de 
Bluefields,  con  lo  que  esperaba  privar  a  la  revolucion  de  la  renta 
de  la  Aduana.  El  Gobierno  de  V.  E.  ha  declarado  que  los  derechos 
de  Aduana  cleben  pagarse  a  la  revolucion,  y  esto  ha  frustrado  en 
gran  parte  la  victoria  de  nuestras  annas  en  el  Bluff. 

El  Gobierno  de  Y.  E.  nos  ha  negado  el  derecho  de  impedir  el 
paso  f rente  al  Bluff  de  la  naves  americanas  que  vayan  con  destino 
a  una  aduana  revolucionaria  que  acaba  de  establecerse  en  Schooner 
Key,  sobre  el  rio  Escondido,  no  obstante  el  decreto  de  este  Gobierno 
que  cierra  el  puerto  y  prohibe  ese  transito  como  medida  necesaria 
de  defensa  y  pacificacion. 

Un  dia  el  Comandante  del  Paducah  amenazo  al  del  Maximo 
Jerez  con  hacer  fuego  contra  este  y  hundirlo,  si  nuestras  fuerzas 
-intentaban  atacar  a  Bluefields. 

Habiendo  notado  el  jefe  de  nuestras  tropas  en  el  Bluff,  quo 
embarcaciones  al  servicio  de  la  revolucion  usaban  la  bandera  ameri- 
cana  para  pasar  f  rente  a  la  fortaleza  sin  ser  detenidas,  notifico  al 
Comandante  del  Paducah  su  resolucion  de  impedir  el  libre  transito 
de  esos  barcos  f  rente  a  sus  posiciones.  Los  Comandantes  del  Pa- 
ducah y  del  Dubuque  contestaron  que  harian  respeiar  con  los  fuegos 


61 

de  sus  canones  el  comercio  americano,  aunque  consistiese  en  armas 
y  mumdones  para  la  revolucion  y  que  un  disparo  contra  esas 
embarcaciones  significaria  declarar  la  guerra  a  los  Estados  Unidos. 

For  ultimo  .se  que  en  Bluefields,  guardaclo  aun  por  marines 
americanos  se  prepara  un  ataque  sobre  nuestras  posiciones  del  Bluff 
y  Laguna  de  P'erlas.  La  intimacion  del  Comandante  del  Paducah 
LOS  impide  anticiparnos  a  la  accion  -del  enemigo  como  por  legitima 
defensa  tenemos  derecho  de  hacerlo. 

Es  mi  deber  deeir  francamente  a  V.  E.  que  no  hallo  modo  de 
conciliar  los  hechos  enumerados  con  los  principios  de  la  neutralidad 
proclamados  por  la  ley  de  las  naciones;  y  teniendo  confianza  en 
la  -alta  rectitud  del  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos,  no  vacilo  en 
•dirisrirme  a  V.  E.  para  pedirle  respetuosamente  la  rectificacion  de 
las  ordenes  dadas  a  sus  autoridades  navales  en  Bluefields.  Asi 
podra  este  Gobierno  concluir  facilmente  con  una  revolucion  san- 
grienta  y  asoladora  que  carece  de  vida  propia  y  que  esta  labrando 
la  ruina.  de  Nicaragua. 

Presidente 

(f)  JOSE  MADRIZ. 


AXEXO  "E." 

A  Ministro  Relacionep,  Managua: 

WASHINGTON,  junio  19  de  1910. 

Permanece  inalterable  la  politica  de  los  Estados  Unidos  expuesta 
en  la  carta  del  Secretario  de  Estado,  del  1°  de  diciembre  de  1909, 
al  sefior  Rodriguez  entonces  Encargado  de  Negocios,  por  la  cual  se 
rompieron  las  relaciones  con  el  Gobierno  de  Zelaya. 

Esta  carta  y  la  aplicacion  conforme  de  la  misma  politica  a  la 
situacion  que  ha  venido  creandose,  han  sido  debidamente  publicadas. 
Respecto  a  lo  que  dice  el  telegrama  del  Dr.  Madriz  al  Presidente, 
el  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos  no  hizo  mas  que  dar  el  paso 
acostumbrado  de  prohibir  el  bombardeo  6  combates  a  cualquiera  de 
las  dos  facciones  dentro  de  la  indefensa  ciudad  comercial  de  Blue- 
fields,  protegiendo  de  ese  modo  los  intereses  americanos  y  otros 
intereses  extranjeros,  de  la  misma  manera  que  lo  habia  heeho  el 
comandante  britanico,  respecto  de  San  Juan  del  Korte,  en  donde 
hay  grandes  intereses  britanicos.  El  Gobierno  de  los  Estados 


62 

Unidos  ha  reconocido  el  derecho  de  ambas  facciones  de  mantener 
el  bloqueo,  pero  ha  rehusado  permitir  a  buques  que  han  sido  ilegal 
y  clandestinamente  alistados  en  aguas  americanas,  molestar  al 
comercio  americano. 

El  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos  simplemente  exige  que  cada 
faccion  cobre  derechos  solo  en  el  territorio  que  se  halle  bajo  su 
dominio  de  facto  j  no  permitira  que  se  recauden  dobles  dereclws.. . 

Si  hubiese  ocurrido  alguna  violacion  de  la  neutralidad,  eso  fue 
en  relacion  con  la  salida  del  Venus,  de  Nueva  Orleans  en  calidad 
de  expedicion  de  la  faccion  de  Madriz.  (f.) — Kxox. 


ANEXO  "E." 

COPIA. 


Managua,  23  de  Junio  de  1910. 

For  el  derecho  de  gentes  ningun  Gobierno  neutral  puede  impedir 
ni  estorbar  en  tiempo  de  guerra  las  operaciones  militares  que  los 
beligerantes  ejecutan  legitimamente.  Los  extranjeros  estan  sujetos 
£  todas  las  contingencias  de  esas  operaciones  lo  mismo  que  los  na- 
cionales.  En  consecnencia,  no  puedo  considerar  legal  el  hecho 
de  que  marines  americanos  hayan  impedido  las  operaciones  de 
nuestro  ejercito  sobre  Bluefields. 

Eespecto  de  la  salida  del  "Venus"  de  Nueva  Orleans,  tengo  la 
conviccion  de  que  no  ha  habido  violacion  de  las  leyes  de  los  Estados 
Unidos.  Ademas,  el  zarpe  dado  por  las  autoridades  de  ISTueva 
Orleans  unicamente  obligaba  a  la  nave  a  guardar  neutralidad  du- 
rante  el  viaje,  como  sucedio  en  efecto.  Terminado  el  viaje  para 
el  cual  se  habia  dado  el  zarpe,  entrada  la  nave  en  aguas  agenas  y 
nacionalizada  conforme  a  las  leyes  nicaragiienses,  las  leyes  y  auto- 
ridades  de  los  Estados  Unidos  nada  han  tenido  que  ver  con  el 
destino  ulterior  del  buque,  el  cual  ha  podido  y  puede  de  derecho 
ejercitar  todas  las  operaciones  de  la  guerra,  entre  las  cuales  figura 
el  bloqueo. 

Omito,  por  ahbra,  observar  otros  detalles  de  la  nota  de  Mr.  Knox ; 
pero  quiero  hacer  constar  la  seguridad  que  abrigo  de  que  sin  la 


63 

interposicion  de  las  autoridades  navales  de  los  Estados  Unidos  en 
Bluefields,  en  la  forma  que  explica  mi  cablegrams  al  Senor  Presi- 
dente  Taft,  Bluefields  estaria  tornado,  la  revolucion  vencida  y  Nica- 
ragua en  paz. 

(f)  MADRIZ. 


ANEXO  "E." 

TELEGEAMA.  4 

Bluff  a  las  5  p.  m.  del  23  de  Julio  de  1912. 
Senor  Comandante  General,  Managua. 

El  Senor  Delegado  del  Ejecutivo  me  trascribio  de  San  Juan  del 
ISTorte  el  telegrama  que  Ud.  le  dirijio  a  el,  trascribiendole  el  cable 
del  Senor  Consul  General  de  Noruega  en  la  Habana;  tambien  me 
trascribe  los  telegramas  en  que  le  habla  de  los  vapores  "Hiriam"  y 
"Ulstein"  y  me  dio  instrucciones  de  lo  que  debia  hacer  a  la  llegada 
de  dichos  vapores.  Como  se  me  anuncio  que  estaban  a  la  vista 
vapores,  crei  fuere  el  "Hiriam,"  nice  dos  comunicaciones :  una 
dirijida  al  Capitan  del  vapor  y  otra  al  Comandante  de  las  fuerzas 
iiavales  de  EE.  UU.  f  rente  a  esta  fortaleza,  las  que  dicen  asi : 

"Bluff  21  de  Julio  de  1910.  Senor  Capitan  del  vapor  "Hiriam," 
f  rente  el  Bluff.  Trascribole:  "(Aqui  el  cable  trascrito  por  el  senor 
Delegado  del  Ejecutivo  y  dirijido  por  el  Senor  Consul  General  de 
ISToruega  en  la  Habana)"  Tengo  informes  fidedignos  que  Ud.  trae 
Mementos  de  guerra  a  bordo  para  la  revolucion  encabezada  por  el 
General  Juan  J.  Estrada,  En  consecuencia  y  de  conformidad  con 
las  clausulas  del  cable  antes  trascrito,  prevengo  a  Ud.  entregar  a 
este  mando  dichos  elementos  y  de  no  hacerlo  asi,  sera  confiscado  el 
vapor  de  su  mando  de  conformidad  con  la  leyes  de  mi  pais,  decli- 
nando  en  Ud.  de  una  vez,  toda  responsabilidad,  y  ademas  le  ad- 
vierto  que  la  conducta  que  Ud.  observe  en  este  asunto,  la  pondre 
en  conocimiento  de  mi  Gobierno  para  que  el  a  su  vez,  la  ponga  en 
conocimiento  del  Gobierno  de  Noruega,  si  asi  lo  estimare  con- 
veniente.  No  dudo  que  Ud.,  penetrado  del  derecho  y  justicia  que 
nos  asiste,  no  opondra  dificultades  para  la  entrega  de  dichos  ele- 
mentos. El  presente  es  duplicado  para  que  al  pie  de  uno  de  los 
ejemplare?,  se  sirva  acusarme  recibo.  De  Ud.  S.  S.  (f )  F.  M.  Eivas. 
Inspector  General  de  la  Costa  Atlantica." 


64 

La  segunda  es  como  sigue:  "El  Bluff,  21  de  Julio  de  1910. 
Sefior:  Me  permito  trascribir  a  Ud.  la  comunicacion  que  con 
fecha  16  del  mes  y  ano  corrientes,  he  recibido  del  Sefior  Delegado 
del  Ejecutivo.  San  Juan  del  Norte  16  del  Julio  de  1910.  Senor 
General  don  Fernando  M.  Kivas.  El  Bluff.  Con  fecha  12  del 
corriente  mes,  me  dice  el  Sefior  Presidente,  por  telegrafo,  que  el 
Ministro  General,  Dr.  Baca,  ha  recibido  del  Consul  General  de 
Noruega  en  la  Habana  el  siguiente  cable.  (Aqui  el  cable.)  Este 
mando  ha  tenido  noticias  fidedignas  que  el  vapor  "Hiriam"  trae 
elementos  de  guerra  para  revolucion  que  encabeza  el  General  don 
Juan  J.  Estrada.  Dirijo  una  comunicacion  al  Capitan  de  dicho 
vapor  pidiendole  la  entrega  de  dichos  elementos  a  este,  apoyado  en 
los  coneeptos  del  cable  antes  trascrito.  No  dudo  que  Ud.,  impuesto 
de  dicho  cable,  se  convencera  de  la  justicia  y  derecho  que  nos  asiste, 
al  expedir  dichas  ordenes  a  las  cuales  creo  no  pondra  dificultades  de 
ninguna  especie,  y  caso  tuviera  objecion  que  hacer,  espero  se  servira 
participarmelo  por  escrito  antes  de  que  Ud.  permita  la  entrada  del 
Vapor  "Hiriam"  para  Bluefields,  cosa  que  dudo  por  el  conocimiento 
que  tengo  de  la  neutralidad  del  Gobierno  y  del  modo  como  Ud. 
lo  ha  sabido  interpretar.  De  Ud.  atto.  SS.,  (f)  F.  M.  Eivas, 
Inspector  general  de  la  Costa  Atlantica,  al  Comandante  de  las 
fuerzas  tfavales  de  EE.  UU.  frente  al  Bluff/' 

Este  me  contesto  lo  siguiente: 

"Xo.  B  6110,  U.  S.  A.  "Dubuque"  3ra.  clase,  en  la  Eada  de 
Bluefields,  Nicaragua,  C.  A.,  22  de  Julio  de  1910.  Senor.  Iro. 
Tengo  el  honor  de  acusar  recibo  de  &u  comunicacion  de  21  de  Julio 
de  1910.  Requerire  a  los  vapores  para  que  anclen  cerca  de  mi 
buque  mientras  se  determina  la  calidad  de  su  cargamento ;  entonces 
tomare  la  actitud  que  las  circunstancias  demanden  de  acuerdo  con 
las  instrucciones  de  mi  Gobierno  con  relacion  a  la  proteccion  del 
comercio  Americano  y  al  mantenimiento  de  la  neutralidad.  Respe- 
tuosamente,  (f)  H.  R.  Rines,  Comandante  Naval  de  los  EE.  UU. 
al  mando  de  los  marines  presentes  en  la  costa  Oriental  de  Nicara^ 
gua,  al  General  F.  M.  Rivas,  Comandante  del  Bluff." — "Nicaragua. 
C.  A." 

Anoche  llego  el  vapor  "Ulstein;"  inmediatamente  le  mande  un 
oficio  igual  al  que  diriji  al  Capitan  del  "Hiriam,"  pero  se  nego  a 
recibirlo,  manifestando  que  si  algo  querian  con  el,  que  se  entendie- 


65 


ran  con  el  Comandante  del  "Dubuque."  Las  comunicaciones 
f ueron  entregadas  a  este  Jef  e,  el  cual  manifesto  que  no  respondia 
de  que  el  Capitan  del  "Ulstein"  quisiera  6  no  recibir  la  comunica- 
eion,  ni  mucho  menos  firmar  el  duplicado  que  le  mandaba  como 
comprobante  de  que  le  habia  enviado  dicha  comunicacion.  Adema?, 
el  Comandante  del  "Dubuque"  manifesto  a  los  senores  General 
Francisco  Altschul  y  don  Ofilio  Argiiello,  que  me  sirve  de  interprete, 
que  el  era  partidario  de  los  revolucionarios  y  que  le  habia  dicho 
al  Capitan  del  "Ulstein"  que  si  queria  no  se  pusiera  en  comunica- 
cion con  nosotros;  que  el  lo  apoyaba  de  una  inanera  incondicional 
y  al  efecto,  puso  soldados  y  le  ordeno  entrara  al  puerto  de  Blut> 
fields,  lo  que  verifico  hoy.  He  dirijido  una  protesta  al  representante 
•del  Consul  de  Xoruega  en  Bluefields  contra  la  conducta  del  Capitaa 
del  '^tristein,"  encabezando  dicha  protesta  con  la  trascripcion  del 
cable  del  Consul  General  de  Xoruega  en  la  Habana,  Esta  comuni- 
cacion sera  remitida  a  su  destine  por  medio  del  Comandante  del 
"Dubuque"  en  caso  quiera  llevarla,  dada  la  hostilidad  de  esto 
Oficial  de  la  Armada  Americana,  dudo  llegue  a  su  destino.  Mien- 
tras  en  esta  no  haya  una  embarcacion  de  guerra  al  mando  de  un 
Jefe  neutral  que  pertenezca  a  otra  Xacion,  los  intereses  del  Go- 
bierno  de  Ud.  estan  a  merced  de  los  oficiales  de  la  Armada  Ameri- 
cana, que  se  inspiran  en  los  consejos  del  Consul  Americano  en 
Bluefields,  que  es  mas  revolucionario  que  Estrada  y  Chamorro. 

Su  subalterno, 

(f)  F.  M.  KIVAS. 


Anexo  E 

"Nueva  York,  a  la  1:15  p.  m.  del  7  de  diciembre.  Presidente, 
Managua.  Revolucion  y  este  Gobierno  no  aceptan  nunca  Iriae. 
Deposito  en  Dolores  Estrada  impedira  mas  derrame  de  sangre  y 
desembarque  americanos.  Lea  nota  Knox  a  Rodriguez.  Bolanos." 

"Xueva  York,  a  las  6  :40  p.  m.  del  -17  de  diciembre.  Presidente. 
Managua.  Juzgase  falso  nombramiento  Madriz,:  no  sera  recono- 
cido  por  este  Gobierno  ni  los  de  Centroamerica,  y  no  terminaru 
revolucion.  Bolanos." 

"Xueva  Orleans,  a  las  3  p.  m.  del  6  de  noviembre.  Presidente. 
Managua.  Adolfo  Diaz  cablegrafio,  via  Guatemala,  pidiendo- 
urgentemente  1,000  rifles  y  300,000  cartuchos.  Altschul." 


66 


Orleans,  a  las  7  p.  m.  del  9  de  noviembre.  Presidente. 
Managf  a,  Guatemala  avisa  a  Bluefields  cargamento  aun  no  ha 
sido  pagado.  Ultimo  octubre  enviara  Bocas  una  gran  cantitad 
cartnch'os ;  tambien  hombres.  De  Bluefields  contesto  Diaz :  "Tra- 
taremos  sostener  hasta  llegada  vapor/5  Altsch.ul/3 

"JSTueva  Orleans,  a  las  7:40  a.  m.  del  17  de  noviembre.  Presi- 
dente. Managua.  Elementos  de  guerra  llegaron  a  Bluefields ; 
parecen  ser  los  mismos  avisados  por  telegrafo  semana  pasada,  pro- 
cedentes  Bocas.  Buque  "TTlstein"  sale  ahora  para  Puerto  Barrios: 
lleva  elementos  de  guerra.  Altschul." 

"Nueva  Orleans,  a  las  8  :38  del  18  de  noviembre.  Presidente. 
Managua.  ULSTEUST  llegara  a  Puerto  Barrios  domingo,  para 
trasladar  44  cajas  rifles  y  114,000  oartuchos  a  una  gasolina  que 
los  llevara  a  Bluefields.  Guatemala  usa  Puerto  Barrios  como  base 
xevolucion.  Altschul/' 

"Bluefields,  15  de  noviembre.  Presidente  de  Guatemala.  Si 
no  se  reciben  ekmentos  de  guerra  antes  del  20,  revolucion  debe  ser 
abandonada.  DIAZ."  Cabrera  contesto:  "ULSTEIN,  con  ele- 
mentos de  guerra,  llegara  dentro  pocos  dias." 

"Nueva  Orleans,  a  las  11  a.  m.  del  24  de  noviembre.  Presidente. 
Managua.  ULSTEIN"  salio  para  Bluefields  lunes,  procedente  de 
Puerto  Barrios;  llegara  manana  a  Bluefields.  Altschul." 


Anexo  E 

"Bluefields,  Feb.  4/10. 

Eita  Guatemala.     (Estrada  Cabrera.) 

Las  ultimas  nuevas  son,  Chamorro  Camoapa.  Mena  en  Santo 
Tomas  ahora  listo  combinar  con  Chamorro.  Con  ansias  espero 
"ARTE."  Diaz." 

"Bluefields,  Feb.  5/10. 

Saenz  Guatemala.     (Estrada  Cabrera.) 

ISTenesi tamos  urgentemente  200.000  cartuchos  Remington  43  y 
50,000  cartuchos.  Puede  listed  ordenar  pronto  envio?  Ofrezco 
mi  garantia.  Adolfo  Diaz." 


67 

-"Boaco,  Feb.  4/10,  via  Bluefields. 

Saenz  (Guatemala. 
Triunfando. 

Antonio  Mendez  M."     (General  Guatemalteco.) 

"Bluefields,  Marzo  7/10. 

Saenz  Guatemala.     (Estrada  Cabrera.) 

Asuntos  de  Estado  en  actualidad.  Paz  esta  enteramente  en  sus 
manos.  Washington  TANZIMAT  sin  consultar  a  Ud.  en  materia. 

"Bluefields,  Nov.  8 

Aramburu  New  York. 

Pregunta  Castrillo  cual  es  la  opinion  en  Washington  referent* 
a  la  nueva  Kepublica.  Salio  vapor?  si  no,  cual  es  la  causa? 
Cuando  saldni?  Conteste  inmediatamente  por  clave  Western 
Union.  Diaz." 

"Washington,  D.  C.?  Enero  13. 

Estrada  Bluefields. 
Aconsejan  no  escuchar  Kimball. 

Castrillo." 

"Washington,  D.  d,  Enero  14. 

Estrada  Bluefields. 
Departamento  no  autoriza  Kimball. 

Castrillo/' 

"Washington,  D.  C.,  Enero  14. 

Estrada  Bluefields.  ' 
Departamento  informa  Madriz  debilisimo. 

Castrillo." 


Anexo  E 

•^Washington,  Feb.  IS/10. 
l^strada  Bluefields 
Departamento  procedera  favor  nuestro. 

Castrillo." 


68 


"Bluefields,  Feb.  11/10. 

Castrillo  Washington.  m 

Sabemos  positivamente  %ladriz  no  tiene  elementos  guerra  y 
trata  conseguirlos  Costa  Rica,  Honduras.  Nuestras  operacione? 
continuan  fuertemente.  Ejercito  Chamorro  cada  dia  mas  fuerte. 
Corea  alienta  Madriz.  Continue  lueha  pretendiendo  apoyo  moral 
armada  americana  Corinto  y  gabinete  Washington  influencia  Me- 
xico. 

Estrada." 
"Bluefields,  Feb.  9/10. 

Chamorro  Panama. 

Quiero  saber  cuantos  americanos  puede  Ud.  alistar  inmediata- 
mente.  Puedo  mandar  vapor  Senator.  Depende  de  su  contesta- 
cion. 

Diaz." 

"Colon,,  Feb.  14/10. 

Diaz  Bluefields. 

Puedo  alistar  no  mienos  de  25  americanos.  Si  puede  mandar 
vapor  avise  que  dia  llegara  con  seguridad  al  puerto  de  embarque. 

Chamorro." 


ANEXO  F 

FEAGMENTO  DEL  MENSAJE  QUE  EL  PRESIDENTS  MADRIZ  DE  NICA- 
RAGUA ESCRIBIO  DE  su  PROPIALETRA  PARA  SER'I^RESENTADO  AL 
CONGRESO  NACIONAL  SIN  TENER  TIEMPO  DE  HACERLO. 

Sin  embargo  no  puedo  dejar  de  referifme  a  la  principal  de  ellas,. 
por  que  es  la  que  explica  la  transicion  politica  que  acabo  de 
comunicaros.  Me  refiero  a  la  intervencion  de  los  Estados  Unidos 
en  nuestra  contienda  domestica. 

Esa  intervencion  ya  la  conoceis  por  el  mensaje  cablegrafico  que 
sobre  el  particular  dirigi  al  Presidente  Taft.  Suscintamente  os 
dare  una  idea  de^ella. 

Frustradas  las  negociaeiones  de  paz  que  hubo  a  mediados  de 
Marzo  ultimo,  entre  este  Gobierno  y  la  faccion  de  Bluefields  por 
haber  pretendido'  el  General  Estrada  establecer  condiciones  que  TO 


e  incompatibles  con  la  dignidad  de  la  Eepiiblica,  fue  precise, 
para  tratar  de  definir  la  situacion,  continuar  nuestras  operaciones 
militares  sobre  al  campo  enemigo.  Al  efecto  se  enviaron  por  la  via 
de  tierra  dos  ejercitos :  uno  sobre  Bluefields  a  las  ordenes  .del  General 
Don  Paulino  Godoy  y  otro  sobre  Eama  a  las  del  General  Don  Benito 
Chavarria.  Por  mar  se  despaeharon  de  San  Juan  del  Norte  dos 
barcos  armados  en  guerra,  el  Maximo  Jerez,  antes  Venus,  y  el  San 
Jacinto,  bajo  el  mando  del  Delegado  del  Ejecutivo,  Dr.  Julian 
Irias  y  el  Jefe  Expedicionario  General  Fernando  M.  Rivas.  Las 
naves  llevaban  fuerzas  suficientes  de  desembarco  para  asaltar  El 
Bluff  y  atacar  a  Bluefields,  en  tanto  que  la  columna  del  General 
Godoy  empenase  combate  con  las  fuerzas  revolucionarias  que  se 
hallaban  fortificadas  fuero  de  la  ciudad.  Los  barcos  debian  desde 
luego  establecer  el  bloque  de  Bluefields  y  cerrarlo  por  complete  al 
comercio  exterior  para  privar  a  los  revolucionarios  de  los  refuerzos 
y  auxilios  que  les-llegaban  de  ^j"ew  Orleans.  La  combinacion  de 
estas  operaciones  debia  dar  por  resultado  la  caida  de  Bluefields,  que 
liabia  quedado  sin  defensa,  y  la  derrota  6  el  sometimiento  de  la 
revolucion,  privada  por  el  bloqueo  de  toda  cooperacion  exterior,  sin 
la  cual  no  podia  subsistir. 

En  la  brillante  Jornada  del  27  de  Junio  las  tropas  del  Maximo 
Jerez  tomaron  por  asalto  El  Bluff,  que  se  creia  inexpugnable.  Su 
posesion  ponia  en  nuestras  manos  a  Bluefields.  El  ejercito  del 
General  Godoy  empeno  contra  las  posiciones  enemigas  formidables 
y  sangrientos  combates  que  habrian  sido  coronadbs  por  la  victoria 
si  nuestras  fuerzas  del  Bluff  hubieran  podido  despojar  al  enemigo 
de  su  base  de  operaciones  y  atacarle  por  la  retaguardia.  La 
columna  del  General  Chavarria  derroto  a  los  revolucionarios  en 
El  Toyal,  cerca  de  Eama,  y  si  nuestras  fuerzas  hubiesen  vencido  en 
Bluefields,  Eama  habria  caido  necesariamente. 

Pero  en  el  momento  decisive,  cuando  todo  el  pais  contemplaba 
con  satisfaccion  el  advenimiento  de  la  paz,  el  poder  de  los  Estados 
ITnidos  se  cruzo  en  nuestro  camino,  impidio  nuestra  victoria,  y 
condense)  de  nuevo  esa  nube  de  sangre  y  de  muerte  que  con  dolor 
Temos  toda  via  flotar  en  el  horizonte  de  la  patria. 

El  Comandante  del  crucero  americano  Paducah,  estacionado  en 
aguas  de  Bluefields,  aduciendo  razones  inconsistentes  a  la  luz  del 
derecbo,  intervino  directamente  en  la  contienda,  protegiendo  a  los 
rebeldes,  coartando  la  accion  de  nuestras  annas  v  frustrando  el 


70 

resultado  de  nuestros  sacrificios  y  de  nuestra-  victoria  en  El  Bluff. 
Al  efecto  desembarco  marines  para  proteger  a  Bluefields  e  impedir 
el  ataque  de  nuestras  fuerzas  a  la  ciudad  rebelde,  y  segiin  el  relata 
de  americanos  imparciales,  cuyos  informes  ha  publicado  la  prensa 
de  los  Estados  Unidos,  los  marinos  americanos  han  ido  a  reforzar 
las  posiciones  del  ejercito  de  Estrada,  desempenando  el  oficio  de 
soldados  de  la  revolucion.  Esta  pudo  sacar  de  la  ciudad  todas  sus 
fuerzas  y  llevarlas  a  combatir  contra  las  nuestras,  segura  de  que 
su  base  estaba  invenciblemente  defendida  por  los  marinos  ameri- 
canos. No  se  justifica  esa  conducta  con  la  proteccion  debida  a  los 
intereses  extranjeros  y  principalmente  a  los  americanos  radicados 
en  Bluefields. 

El  Derecho  Internacional  no  autoriza  esa  excepcion  a  los  incon- 
testables  fueros  de  la  soberania  y  de  la  beligerancia.  Como  soberanos 
podiamos  imponer  nuestra  autoridad  en  una  ciudad  nicaragiiense : 
como  beligerantes  podiamos  atacar  y  destruir  al  enemigo  en 
cualquiera  parte  que  no  fuese  territorio  ageno.  Bluefields  era  la 
cuna  y  el  asiento  de  la  revolucion;  alii  estaba  su  Gobierno,  alii  el 
deposito  de  sus  recursos,  provisiones  y  armas.  Tomarla  6  rendirla 
era  destruir  la  base  de  la  revolucion.  En  cuanto  al  peligro  de  los 
intereses  americanos,  la  ley  internacional  establece  que  los 
extranjeros  residentes  en  un  lugar  estan  sujetos  a  todas  las 
contingencias  de  las  operaciones  de  guerra  ejecutadas  legitimamente 
por  un  beligerante.  Esta  tesis,  indiscutible  en  principio,  fue 
sostenida  por  el  Gobierno  americano  cuando  el  bombardeo  de  San 
Juan  del  Norte,  ciudad  abierta,  desarmada,  puramente  comercial, 
,por  el  buque  Cyane,  de  la  marina  de  guerra  de  los  Estados  Unidos 
el  ano  de  1854. 

Hay  mas :  este  Gobierno  compro  en  New  Orleans  el  buque  Venus, 
de  la  marina  mercante  inglesa.  Antes  de  zarpar  el  buque  con  destino 
a  San  Juan  del  Norte,  los  agentes  de  la  revolucion  en  New  Orleans 
trataron  de  impedir  su  salida  por  medio  de  las  autoridades  de  aquel 
puerto,  alegando  violacion  de  las  leyes  de  los  Estados  Unidos.  Las 
autoridades  examinaron  cuidadosamente  el  caso,  inspeccionaron  la 
nave,  oyeron  las  pruebas  pfoducidas  por  una  y  otra  parte  v  con 
consulta  de  los  Departamentos  de  Justicia  y  Comercio  del  Gobierno 
Americano,  resolvieron  que  el  viaje  de  la  nave  no  podia  impedirse 
conforme  a  las  leyes  de  los  Estados  Unidos.  El  Venus  traia  a  bordo 
armas  destinadas  al  Gobierno  de  Nicaragua  en  San  Juan  del  Norte, 


71 

pero  en  los  Estados  Unidos  el  comercio  de  armas  es  libre,  salvo  el 
derecho  del  beligerante  para  confiscarlas  como  contrabando  de- 
guerra. 

El  Venus  salio  de  New  Orleans  llevando  sus  papeles  en  regla  y 
el  zarpe  de  las  autoridades  del  puerto.  La  licencia  que  se  le  habia 
otorgado  a  lo  sumo  obligaba  a  la  nave  a  guardar  neutralidad 
durante  el  viaje.  No  podia  extenderse  a  mas,  sobre  todo  no  siendo 
americana  la  bandera  del  buque.  El  Venus  guardo  las  condiciones 
del  zarpe  hasta  el  puerto  de  su  destino  y  llego  desarmado  a  San 
Juan  del  Norte.  Alii  se  verifico  a  presencia  y  con  intervencion  del 
senor  Consul  Britanico  el  cambio  de  la 'bandera  inglesa  por  la 
nicaragiiense,  despues  de  lo  cual  se  armo  la  nave  en  guerra  y  se  la 
destino  a  operar  contra  los  rebeldes  de  Bluefields.  Nada  hubo  en 
todo  eso  que  lesionara  las  leyes  de  los  Estados  Unidos,  ni  la  ley 
internacional.  Con  todo,  el  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos  ha 
declarado  que  el  Venus  no  puede  ejercer  contra  el  comercio  ameri- 
cano  el  derecho  de  registro  en  alta  mar  ni  el  de  bloqueo,  so  pretexto- 
de  que  habia  salido  de  New  Orleans  enganando  a  la's  autoridades  de- 
les Estados  Unidos. 

Con  eso  quedaron  abiertas  para  la  revolucion  todas  las  fuentes 
exteriores  de  que  habia  venido  alimentandose,  en  especial  la  de 
New  Orleans,  de  donde  han  salido  ultimamente  considerable- 
remesas  de  pertrechos  de  guerra  con  destino  a  la  revolucdon.  Este- 
hecho  explica  claramente  el  empeno  que  ha  habido  en  impedir  el 
bloqueo. 

En  El  Bluff  se  hallaba  establecida  la  aduana  principal  de  la  costar 
por  una  ley  anterior  a  la  revolucion.  La  posesion  de  este  puerto  nos 
dio  el  dominio  de  la  aduana  y  el  derecho  de  hacer  nuestro  el  pro- 
ducto  de  la  renta.  El  G-obierno  americano  declare  que  ese  producto- 
correspondia  a  la  faccion  de  Estrada  y  dispuso  que  el  comercic* 
americano  lo  pagase  a  la  revolucion  en  una  nueva  aduana  que  esta 
ha  creado  en  Schooner — Key,  sobre  el  rio  Escondido. 

Estando  nosotros  en  posesion  del  Bluff  podiamos  todavia  impedir 
la  entrada  al  rio  a  todas  las  embarcaciones  que  intentasen  penetrar 
hasta  la  aduana  revolucionaria.  Los  Comandantes  del  Paducah  y 
del  Dubuque  amenazaron  con  el  fuego  de  sus  canones  al  Jefe  de 
nuestras  fuerzas  en  El  Bluff,  si  intentaba  interceptar  el  comercio- 
americano.  Un  disparo,  le  dijeron,  hecho  contra  una  embarcacion 
que  lleve  bandera  americana  sera  considerado  como  una  declaracion 
de  guerra  contra  los  Estados  Unidos. 


72 

Para  asegurar  la  impunidad  del  transito  de  las  naves  por  delante 
del  Bluff,  los  Comandantes  notificaron  que  pondrian  siempre  a 
bordo  de  aquellas  una  guardia  .de  marinos  americanos,  *y  eso  ban 
hecho  invar  iablemente.  Hoy,  por  virtud  de  aquella  intimacion, 
pasan  frente  al  Bluff  con  la  bandera  americana  toda  clase  de 
embarcaciones,  inclusive  goletas  de  San  Andres  y  Providencia, 
cargadas  de  provisiones  para  Bluefields.  Mas  aun,  hasta  un  re- 
molcador  empleado  por  el  enemigo  en  operacoines  de  guerra  y  que 
una  vez  hizq  fuego  sobre  una  lancha  que  llevaba  gente  nuestra,  pasa 
frente  al  Bluff  protegido  por  la  bandera  americana, 

Cuando  nuestras  fuerzas  hubieron  ocupado  toda  la  costa,  desde 
'San  Juan  del  Norte  hasta  el  Cabo  de  Gracias,  el  Delegado  del  Poder 
Ejecutivo  mando  establecer  una  aduana  en  Laguna  de  Perlas  para 
el  cobro  de  derechos  sobre  la  importacion  y  exportacion  de  los 
distritos  sujetos  a  nuestra  autoridad.  El  Comandante  del  Dubuque 
contesto  a  la  notificacion  que  se  le  hizo  de  este  acuerdo,  imponiendo 
restricciones  que  practicamente  equivalian  a  dejar  siempre  en  manos 
de  la  faccion  de  Estrada  las  rentas  de  la  Costa.  En  fin,  no  obstante 
la  ocupacion  de  Bluefields  por  los  marinos  americanos  y  la  neu- 
tralidad  en  que  se  aparentaba  mantenerla,  se  preparo  alii  un  ataque 
sobre  nuestra  posicion  de  Laguna  de  Perlas,  sin  que  nos  haya  sido 
posible  prevenir  el  intento  del  enemigo  llevando  antes  nuestras 
armas  al  centro  de  sus  maquinaciones. 

Como  algunos  de  los  buques  que  navegan  entre  los  puertos  de 
los  Estados  Unidos  y  Bluefields  son  de  nacionalidad  noruega,  este 
Gobierno  gestiono  ante  el  de  Xoruega  para  que  hiciese  respetar 
por  su  bandera  la  clausura  del  puerto  de  Bluefields.  Ese  Gobierno, 
que  habia  reconocido  la  legitimidad  del  mio,  se  creyo  en  el  deber 
de  deferir  a  la  peticion  y  al  efecto  dio  sus  instrucciones  en  ese 
sentido  a  sus  legaciones  en  Washington  y  la  Habana,  y  al  Vice- 
consul  noruego  en  Bluefields.  El  Gobierno  americano  intervino 
oficiosamente  con  una  comunicacion  dirigida  al  Ministro  noruego 
en  Washington,  objetando  aquella  orden  so  pretexto  de  que  el 
bloqueo  de  Bluefields  era  imperfecto  y  fyue  perjudicaba  los  intereses 
del  comercio  americano. 

Habiendo  llegado  a  Bluefields  el  vapor  noruego  Tlstein,  del  que 
teniamos  aviso  que  era  portador  de  elementos  de  guerra  para  la 
revolucion,  se  le  dirigio  un  oficio  por  nuestro  Comandante  en  El 
Bluff  previniendole  la  entrega  del  contrabando  de  guerra  que  trajese 


73 

a  bordo.  El  Capitan  del  Ulstein  se  nego  a  recibir  la  comunicacion, 
y  contraviniendo  a  nuestras  ordenes  y  a  las  de  su  propio  Soberano, 
entro  a  continuacion  en  el  puerto  custodiado  por  los  marinos  del 
Dubuque. 

Con  motive  de  haber  contestado  el  Comandante  del  Bluff  al  fuego 
de  artilleria  que  le  han  hecho  los  revohicionarios  estacionadas  en 
Halfway — Key,  y  de  que  uno  de  sus  proyectiles  cayo  cerca  de  Blue- 
fields,  el  Comandante  del  Dubuque  le  comunico  que  la  repeticion 
de  ese  heclio  seria  considerado  como  bombardeo  a  Bluefields. 


AXEXO  "G." 

Depositado  en  Managua  a  las  11  p.  m.  del  14  de  Setbre.  1912. 
Kecibicio  en  Bluefields  a  las  12  m.  del  15. 

Senores  Jefes  PoKticos,  Gobernador  e  Intendente  y  Comandantes 
de  Armass 

Trascribo  a  Ud.  la  siguiente  comunicacion  que  con  fecha  13  del 
corriente  dirigio  a  esta  Secretaria  el  Exelentisimo  Seiior  Ministro 
de  los  EE.  UU.  George  F.  Weitzel,  a  fin  de  que  se  sirva  darle  la 
mayor  publicidad : 

"Legacion  de  los  EE.  UU.  de  America,  Managua  13  de  Setiembre 
de  1912. — Excelencia. — Tengo  la  honra  de  informal  a  V.  E. 
que  el  Departamento  de  Esta  do  me  ha  dado  instrucciones  por  cable 
de  trascribir  al  Gobierno  de  V.  E.  y  de  modo  no  oficial  a  los  jefes 
rebeldes,  asi  como  hacer  publica  la  siguiente  declaracion  autorizada 
de  la  politica  de  los  EE.  UU.  en  los  presentes  disturbios.  La  poli- 
tica  del  Gobierno  de  EE.  UU.  en  los  presentes  disturbios  de  Nica- 
ragua, es  tomar  las  medidas  necesarias  para  una  proteccion  adecua- 
cla  de  la  Legacion  de  Managua,  mantener  abiertas  las  comunica- 
ciones,  protejer  la  vida  y  la  propiedad  americana.  Al  desconocer  a 
Zelaya  a  cnyo  regimen  de  barbaric  y  currupcion  puso  termino  la 
Xacion  Xicaragiiense  despues  de  una  sangrienta  guerra,  el  gobierno 
de  Estados  Unidos  condeno  no  solo  al  individuo  sino  el  sistema  y 
este  gobierno  no  podria  tolerar  ningun  movimiento  para  restablecer 
el  mismo  regimen  destructive.  El  gobierno  de  Estados  Unidos  en 
consecuencia  se  opondra  a  cualquier  restauracion  del  Zelayismo  y 
prestara  su  eficaz  apoyo  moral  a  la  causa  del  buen  gobierno  legal- 


mente  constituido  para  beneficio  del  pueblo  de  Nicaragua  a  quien  ha 
tratado  de  ayudar  hace  largo  tiempo  en  su  justa  aspiracion  had  a 
la  paz  y  prosperidad  bajo  un  gobierno  constitutional  y  de  orden. 

Un  grupo  como  de  125  plantadores  amerieanos  residentes  en  una 
region  de  Nicaragua,  han  pedido  proteccion.  Como  dos  docenas 
de  casas  americanas  que  hacen  negocios  en  aquel  pals  han  pedido  pro- 
teccion, los  bancos  amerieanos  que  han  hecho  inversiones  de  fondps 
en  ferrooarriles  y  vapores  en  Nicaragua  como  parte  de  un  plan  para 
el  alivio  de  la  angustiosa  situacion  financiera  de  aquel,  han  pedido 
proteccion.  Los  ciudadanos  amerieanos  que  estan  ahora  en  servicio 
del  gobierno  de  Nicaragua  y  hasta  la  propia  Legacion  se  han  visto 
expuestos  a  peligro  inmediato  durante  los  fuegos.  Dos  ciudadanos 
amerieanos  se  dice  que  han  sido  barbaramente  asesinados :  ademas 
del  reclamo  Emery,  dedido  a  ciudadanos  ameriaanos,  y  de  la  indem- 
nizacion  por  la  muerte  de  Cannon  y  Groce  durante  la  guerra  de 
Zelaya,  hay  varias  reclamaciones  de  amerieanos  e  intereses  origina- 
dos  por  concesiones  en  Washington.  Los  Estados  Unidos  tienen  el 
compromiso  de  ejercer  su  influencia  para  el  mantenimiento  de  la 
paz  general  que  esta  seriamente  amenazada  por  el  presente  levanta- 
miento  y  en  este  sentido  hacer  cumplir  extrictarnente  las  conven- 
ciones  de  Washington  y  prestar  debido  apoyo  a  sus  designios  y  pro- 
positos.  Todas  las  republicas  Centro  Americanas  pueden  contar 
con  poderosos  medios  de  cooperacion.  He  aqui  los  importantes 
intereses  morales,  politicos  y  materiales  que  requieren  proteccion. 

Cuando  el  ministro  americano  pidio  al  gobierno  de  Nicaragua 
que  protegiera  la  vida  y  propiedades  americanas,  el  ministro  de 
Relaciones  Exteriores  respondio  que  las  tropas  del  gobierno  debian 
ocuparse  en  debelar  la  rebelion,  agregando  en  consecuencia :  "Mi 
gobierno  desea  que  el  gobierno  de  Estados  Unidos  garantice  con 
sus  propias  fuerzas  la  seguridad  y  la  prosperidad  de  los  ciudadanosr 
amerieanos  en  Nicaragua  y  que  haga  extensiva  la  proteccion  a  todos 
los  habitantes  de  la  Republica."  En  esta  situacion  la  politica  de 
los  Estados  Unidos  sera  protejer  la  vida  y  propiedad  de  sus  ciuda- 
danos de  manera  indicada  para  protejer  al  gobierno  legal  y  organic 
zado  de  tal  manera  que  Nicaragua  puede  reanudar  su  programa 
de  reforma,  libre  del  obstaculo  puesto  por  los  viciosos  elementos  que 
querian  restaurar  los  modos  de  Zelaya,  incitando  al  General  Mena 
a  rebelarse  con  flagrante  violacion  de  sus  promesas  dadas  a  su 


75 

propio  gobierno  y  al  ministro  americano  y  Facto  Dawson,  por  el 
cual  estaba  solemnemente  obligado,  y  su  tentativa  para  derrocar  al 
gobi-erno  de  su  propio  pals  con  miras  exclusivamente  egoistas  y  sin 
tener  siquiera  la  pretension  de  luchar  por  un  principio,  hacen  que 
la  presente  rebelion  sea  desde  su  origen  la  mas  inexcusable  en  los 
anales  de  Centro  America.  La  indole  de  los  actuales  disturbios  y 
los  procedimientos  empleados  imprimen  a  esos  disturbios  el  oaracter 
de  una  anarquia  mas  bien  que  el  de  una  revolucion  ordinaria. 

La  condicion  moral  recomendable  de  aquellos  que  inmediatamente 
hicieron  causa  comun  con  Mena  asi  como  su  conducta  incrvilizada 
y  salvage  al  romper  un  armisticio,  maltratar  mujeres,  violar  su 
palabra  de  honor,  torturar  a  ciudadanos  pacificos,  exigir  contribu- 
ciones  y  sobre  todo  el  bombardear  barbaramente  la  ciudad  de  Mana- 
gua con  destruccion  deliberada  de  vidas  inocentes  y  de  propiedades 
y  la  muerte  de  mujeres,  ninos  y  enfermos  en  el  Hospital,  los  crueles 
y  barbaros  asesinatos  por  centenares  que  se  refieren  de  Leon  identi- 
fiean  a  la  rebelion  de  Mena  con  el  aborrecible  e  intolerable  regimen 
de  Zelaya. 

Acepte  Y.  E.  las  renovadas  seguridades  de  mi  estima  y  mas 
distinguida  consideracion. 

GEORGE  F.  WEITZEL, 

Ministro  Americano. 

A.  S.  E. 

DOX  DIEGO  MANUEL  CHAMORRO, 

Ministro  de  E.  R.  E.  E" 

De  Ud.  Atto.  S.S. 

DIEGO  M.  CHAMORRO, 

Ministro  de  R.  R.  E.  E. 


Anexo  "H." 

DECRETO  DEL  DICTADOR  DIAZ. 


,  "El  Pre&idente  de  la  Eepublica.,  Considerando :  que  la  Asamble^ 
Xacional  Constituyente  convocada  por  decreto  de  5  de  abril  de 
1911  se  extralimito  en  el  ejercicio  de  su  mandato:  por  tanto,  y  ei? 
consejo  de  Ministros,-Descreta : 


76 

Art.  1°.  Mientras  la  Asamblea  National  Const! tyente  que  ense- 
.gnida  se  convocara,  nor  disponga  otra  cosa,  la  constitution  actual 
solo  queda  vigente  en  cuanto  determine  las  atribuciones  del  Poder 
Ejecutivo  y  del  Poder  Judicial — El  Poder  Ejequtivo  asume  el 
Poder  Legislative.. 

Art.  2°. — Deelaranse  concluidas  las  funciones  de  la  Asamblea  Na- 
cional  Constituyente  convocada  por  decreto  de  5  de  abril  de  1911. 

Art.  3°. — Convocase  a  los  pueblos  a  elecciones  para  diputados  a 
nna'  Asamblea  Constitucional  que  reformara  definitivamente  la 
'Constitucion.,  y  leyes  constitutivas ;  al  propio  tiempo  que  ejercera 
las  funciones  de  Legislativa. 

Dado  en  Managua,  en  la  Casa  Presidential  el  dia  18  de  Octubre 
de  1912. — Adolfo  Diaz. — El  Ministro  de  la  Gobernacion — Miguel 
Cardenas — Ministro  de  Hacienda — Pedro  Eafael  Cuadra — El 
Ministro  de  RE,  EE.  e  II.  PP.— Diego  M.  Chamorro— El  Sub-Srio, 
de  Guerra  y  Marina — Benjamin  Cuadra — El  Ministro  de  Fomento 
v  Obras  Piiblicas — Elsias  Pallais. 


Anexo  H. 

„  PROTISTA,  PARTE  FIXAL. 


Nosotros,  ciudadanos .  nicaraguenses,  amantes  de  la  soberania  y 
dignidad  de  la  Republica,  enemigos  de  toda  intervention  extraiii 
en  nuestro  suelo,  sin .  connivencia  alguna  con  los  habitantes  del 
interior,  cuya  actitud  no  conocemos  hasta  h'oy  por  la  falta  de  conm- 
nicaciones  y  la  premura  del  tiempo,  resolvemos  unanimenente : 

1°.  Abstenernos  de  tomar  ninguna  participation  en  las  elec- 
ciones de  que  habla  el  decreto  mencionado. 

2°.  Protestar  con  todo  el  vigor  de  nuestras  almas  contra  el 
proceder  in  fame  y  r.gresivo  que  el  Gobierno  americano  ha  observado 
coil  nuestra  querirla  Nicaragua;  y 

3°.  Condenar  la  conducta  bochornosa  de  los  nicaragiienses  que 
estan  traicionando  a  la  Patria  y  mancillando  el  honor  de  la  raza 
indo-espanola. 

Bluefields,  Nic.  C.  A.,  Octubre  de  1912. 

TCosendo  Argiiello,  Jacob  Jaen,  Manuel  H.  Giron,  Jose  M.  Zacarlas 
0.,  Juan  Ignacio  Eivas,  J.  Eamon  Cisneros,  Ciriaco  Pineda  G.,  A. 


77 

Hunter,  Pio  E.  Guzman,  Salvador  Lejarza,  Juan  Davila  R,  J.  P. 
Chevez,  J.  P.  Delgadillo,  Guillermo  Childres  Eaudales,  Gustavo 
Cortes,  Samuel  Gutierrez,  M.  Ig.  Argiiello,  F.  E,  Baldovinos,  Carlos 
A.  Espinosa  E.,  E.  Castrillo  Z.,  Eduardo  Delgadillo,  J.  M.  Araica, 
Carlos  Alberto  Castro,Jesus  Sierra,  T.  Narciso  Bermudez,  Ignacio 
Dinarte,  Patricio  Soils,,  B.  Herrera,  Franco  Aviles. 


Anexo  "I" 

San  Salvador,  26  de  Agosto  de  1912. 

A  Presidente  Taft,  Washington. 

La  situation  de  Nicaragua  se  agrava  de  dia  en  dia  y  temo  serias 
complicaciones  si  las  tropas  americanas  penetran  en  territorio  iri- 
caragiiense.  En  Leon  el  pueblo  se  amotino  a  la  llegada  de  los 
marinos,  y  a  no  haber  si  do  por  la  intervention  del  Ministro  de  El 
Salvador  tendriamos  ahora  que  lamentar  graves  consecuencias. 
Eespetuosamente  ruego  a  TJd.  insinuar  al  Presidente  Diaz,,  que 
entre  en  algun  arreglo  de  paz,  aceptando  una  tercera  persona.  Hago 
<?sta  manifestation  movido  por  mi  ardiente  deseo  de  paz  en  Centro- 
America  y  mi  sincera  amistad  al  Gobierno  y  pueblo  Americanos. 

Presidente  ARAUJO. 


Anexo  "F 

Washington,  5  de  Setiembre  de  1912.  A  Legacion  Americana* 
San  Salvador.  El  sefior  Presidente  desea  que  usted  solicite  una 
audiencia  con  el  Presidente  Araujo  y  ponga  en  sus  propias  manos* 
lextualmente,  la  siguiente  comunicacion,  en  respuesta:  "Su  Exce^ 
lencia,  el  Presidente  de  EE.  UU.  estima  en  alto  grando  la  se- 
guridad  del  ardiente  deseo  de  usted  por  la  paz  de  Centro- America 
y  en  las  protestas  de  su  sincera  amistad.  Estos  motives  induda- 
blemente  garantizaran  una  estricta  adhesion  y  una  forzoza  obe- 
diencia  a  las  estipulaciones  de  la  Convencion  de  Washington  en 
la  parte  que  pueda  corresponder  al  Gobierno  salvadoreno  e  induda- 
blemente  garantizara  el  cumplimiento  por  parte  del  Gobierno  del 
Salvador,  de  las  medidas  que  ^ara  afianzamiento  de  la  paz  en 
la  America  Central  esta  tomando  el  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos, 
.apoyado  en  lo  que  estatuye  la  Convencion  de  Washington  por  ser 


78 

quien  mejor  puede  hacerlo,  a  causa  de  su  completa  neutralidad  en 
las  conveniencias  locales,  las  cuales  pudieran  inclinarse  a  neutralizar 
6  frustrar  las  propuestas  de  una  cualquiera  de  las  Kepublicas  de 
Centro  America.  Opino  como  listed  en  que  la  situacion  en  Nica- 
ragua h'a  llegado  a  aer.  muy  grave. 

El  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  tJnidos  no  ha  tenido  la  intencion  de 
dejar  su  Legacion  y  las  vidas  e  intereses  de  sus  ciudadanos  en  Ni- 
caragua a  la  merced  de  una  rebelion  sin  fundamento  y  que  por 
sus  acciones  hace  pensar  en  la  epoca  de  Zelaya,  cometiendo  los- 
atropellos  mas  flagrantes  a  los  principios  del  honor,  de  la  humani- 
dad,  del  orden  y  de  la  civilizacion,  como  Yuestra  Excelencia  me  lo 
indica.  No  temo  de  Nicaragua  cualquier  arreglo  con  las  personas 
que  han  demostrado  que  no  cumplen  los  compromisos  contraidos 
con  las  autoridades  locales,  representados  legalmente  y  en  el  ejerci- 
cio  de  sus  derechos.  En  vista  de  todas  estas  circunstancias  y  para 
hacer  mas  prontannente  eficaz  el  cumplimiento  de  sus  obligaciones. 
el  Gobierno  de  los  Estados  Unidos  se  propone,  de  conformidad  con 
lo  solicitado  por  el  Gobierno  de  Nicaragua,  tomar  las  medidas  mas 
convenientes  para  proteger  sus  intereses  y  el  afianzamiento  de  la 
paz  y  tomando  en  cuenta  que  cada  una  de  las  republicas  centroa- 
merinanas  se  ha  comprometido  solemnemente  ante  este  Gobierno  a 
mantener  la  Convencion  de  Washington,  ha  tenido  la  pena  de 
saber,  aunque  no  le  he  dado  credito,  que  la  presente  revolucion  da 
Nicaragua  esta  recibiendo  auxilios  de  territorio  salvadoreno.  No 
creo  necesario  manifestar  a  Vuestra  Excelencia  que  la  vindicacion 
tie  la  politica  salvadorena  encontrara  una  oportunidad  en  la  Con- 
rencion  de  Washington. 

WILLIAM  H.  TAPT/' 


Anexo  "I" 

Cablegrama  del  Presidente  Araujo  a  la  Legacion  salvadorena 
en  Washington. 


"San  Salvador,  23  de  Septiembre  de  1912.  Legacion  Salvador. 
Washington. — Sirvase,  en  conferencia  verbal,  entregar  al  sefior 
Subsecretario  Wilson,  copia  textual  de  este  despacho,  rogandole 
elevarlo  al  conocimiento  del  Exoelentisimo  Seiior  Presidente  Taft, 
para  qviien  va  dirigido.  El  despacho  es  el  siguiente: 


79 

"Se  supone  aqui,  que  las  fuerzas  navales  que  ocupan  territorio 
nicaragiiense,  han  entrado  en  sccion  belica  contra  los  revolucionarios 
que  ocupan  Granada.  Tan  grave  acontecimiento  compromete 
seriamente  la  responsabilidad  de  los  demas  Jefes  de  Estado  oentroa- 
raericanos.  Para  resguardar  la  mia,  y  cumpliendo  altos  deberes  de 
Kumanidad,  que  estoy  seguro  hallaran  eco  generoso  en  .el  Presi- 
dente,  sirvase  insinuarle  la  conveniencia  de  que  para  evitar  mayor 
derramamiento  de  sangre  de  un  pueblo  hermano  del  nuestro,  se 
presenta  al  Gobierno  americano  oportunidad  propicia  de  prestar 
•altos  oficios  de  humanidad,  coadyuvando  con  mi  Gobierno.,  en  accion 
conjunta  6  separada,  para  que  don  Salavdor  Caleron  se  haga 
cargo  provisionalmente  del  Mando  Supremo  de  Nicaragua,  mien- 
tras  se  restablece  el  orden  constitucional,  por  vias  pacificas  y  legales. 
El  senor  Calderon  es  persona  de  antecedentes  intachables,  ilustrado 
y  probo,  persona  tambien  grata  al  Gobierno  americano  y  amigo  del 
Presidente  Diaz,  quien  ha  manifestado  a  mi  Gobierno  que  lo  acepta- 
ria  en  tal  caracter.  Mi  Gobierno  se  compromete  a  ejercer  presion 
moral  sobre  cabecillas  rebeldes  para  la  aceptacion  del  senor  Calderon, 
de  acuerdo  con  ese  Gobierno,  que  prestaria  asi  servicio  imborrable 
en  la  memoria  del  pueblo  centroamericano,  evitando  la  conmocion 
profunda  que  ha  causado  en  este  pais  la  gravedad  de  los  sucesos, 
que  tambien  repercutiran  hondamente  en  la  opinion  moral  de 
todo  el  Continente." 

"Explique  ITd.  al  Presidente  la  reetitud  de  mis  intentos  en  esta 
grave  emergencia,  que  yo  no  esperaba,  porque  el  Departamento  de 
Estado  habia  deferentemente  manifestado  a  Ud.  que  la  accion  naval 
americana  se  limitaria  a  garantizar  vidas  y  propiedades  extran- 
jeras  y  resguardiar  la  Legacion  y  Consulado  americanos  en  aquel 
pais;  manifestacion  que  recibimos  con  la  mas  grata  complacencia, 
tanto  mas  cuanto  que  fue  confirmada  por  el  Mmistro  Weitzel  ^ 
nue^tro  Ministro  en  Managua." 

"No  pueden  e&capar  a  la  elevada  penetracion  del  Presidente  las 
consecuencias  indeclinables  que  para  Centro  America  traeria  la  con- 
tinuacion  de  esa  luoha  ineficaz  en  la  forma  y  caracter  con  que  hoy 
se  presenta,  y  haga  Ud..  un  esfuerzo  mas  en  el  sentido  propuesto, 
interesando  vivamente  los  sentimientos  humanitarios  del  Jefe  dc 
ese  <Gobierno."  .  ^aaooft  Libfiu 

aVeo  con  pena  que  los  compromisos  contraidos  en  Washington, 


80 

por  los  Delegados  centroamericanos,  bajo  la  simple  accion  de  buenos 
oficios  y  hospitalidad  generosa  que  les  presto  el  ex-Presidente  Roose- 
velt, parecen  invocarse  en  favor  de  la  actitud  ultimamente  asumida. 
Siendo  El  Salvador  parte  contratante,  juzga  como  deber  indeelinablo 
suyo,  deber  que  se  convierte  en  nn  derecho  cuando  se  trata  de  inter- 
pretar  pactos  que  le  afectan  vivamente,  declarar  ante  el  seiior  Prsi- 
dente  Taft,  en  la  forma  mas  franca  y  respetuosa,  que  los  buenos 
oficios  que  Estados  Unidos  y  Mexico  prestaron  a  los  plenipoten- 
ciarios  centroamericanos.,  son  siempre  reoordados  con  agradecimien- 
to;  pero  que  deben  limitarse  a  lo  que  lealmente  significan.  Las 
firmes  relaciones  de  cordial  amistad  que  vinculan  a  El  Salvador 
con  el  Gobierno  Americano,  me  autorizan  ^para  ejercitar  este  dere- 
ch'o  en  la  forma  mas  cortes  y  bien  intencionada." 

Puede  Ud.  agregar  explicaciones  pertinentes  sobre  contenido  de 
estas  instrucciones  al  Secretario  de  Estado,  apelando  a  s"u  amistosa 
cortesia,  para  que  lo  eleve  a  su  alto  destinatario. 

MANUEL  E.  ARAUPO. 


DR.  JOSfi  MADRIZ, 
Ex-President  de  Nicaragua. 


83 


EL  DOCTOR  MADRIZ. 

Nacio  Jose  Madriz  en  la  ciudad  de  Leon,  Nicaragua,  Centre 
America,  el  dia  21  de  Febrero  de  1866. 

Fueron  sus  padres,  pobres  y  honorables.  A  pesar  de  su  pobreza, 
resolvieron  darle  una  carrera  literaria.  Recibio  su  instruccion 
elemental,  secundaria  y  profesional  sin  sarir  de  la  ciudad  que 
le  sirvio  de  cuna;  y  las  deficienoias  que  por  la  escasez  de  elementos 
para  la  ensenansa  h'abia,  fueron  suplidas  por  el  despejado  talento  que 
desde  nino  mostro,  y  por  su  absoluta  dedication  al  estudio. 

Tuvo  la  suerte  de  desarrollar  su  inteligencia  a  la  luz  de  las  ideas 
en  aquel  entonces  ya  propagadas  por  el  gran  patriota,  y  a  la  vez 
gran  jurisconsulato  y  filosofo,  Maximo  Jerez. 

Corono  con  lucimiento  su  carrera  de  abogado,  y  la  ejercio  con 
provecho  por  varios  anos,  hasta  que  en  1893,  cuando  solo  contaba 
vientisiete  anos,  fue  llamado  por  el  Presidente  Zelaya  a  desempenar 
la  Sec.retaria  de  Relaciones  Exteriores  (Secretarla  de  Estado),  que 
sirvio  con  brillantez  por  algun  tiempo. 

En  esa  epoca  fue  a  la  costa  Atlantica  de  Nicaragua  como  Dele- 
gate del  Poder  Ejecutivo,  para  arreglar  las  dificultades  existentes 
en  el  territorio  conocido  entonces  con  el  nombre  de  Mosquitia,  con 
motive  de  la  especie  de  protectorado  que  ejercia  en  61  el  Gobierno  dc 
Su  Majestad  Britanica.  Su  inteligente  labor  contribuvo  eficazmente 
al  resultado  de  reincorporar  deftnitivamente  a  Nicaragua  todn 
aquella  costa,  que  desde  ese  hecho  ha  venido  desarrollandose  de 
manera  asombrosa.  Por  eso  el  Doctor  Madriz  vi6  con  mayor  mo- 
tivo  que  cualquiera  otro,  con  tanto  dolor  como  indignaci6n,  el 
criminal  proyerto  que  tuvieron  los  revolucionarios  del  1909,  de 
prod  am  ar  en  aquel  territorio  una  Repiiblica,  al  parecer  indepen- 
diente,  pero  en  realidad  para  someterla  al  protectorado  extranjero. 

Por  razones  de  politica  interior,  el  sefior  Madriz  quedo  separado 
del  alto  emplco  que  ejercia  1895,  aunque  volvio  a  desempefinrlo  como 
base  de  una  transaccion  entre  el  Presidente  Zelaya  v  lo*  liberal es 
de  Leon,  a  fin  de  evitar  la  guerra  civil  que  estaba  para  estallar,  la 
que  desgraciadnmente  no  se  contuvo. 

Mientras  Madriz  sirvi6  a  Zelaya  pudo  tenerlo  a  bonra,  porqne 
en  aquella  epoca  e"ste  era  nn  firobernante  de  los  mejores: 
respetwoso  a  las  Icyes  y  pr^cticamentc  lif 


84 

Al  estallar  esa  revolucion,  Madriz  figure  en  sus  filas.  Fue  ven- 
cida,  y  Madriz  emigre  a  la  Repiiblica  de  El  Salvador,  donde  resi- 
dio  hasta  1907.  Alii  contrajo  matrimonio  con  la  hondurena  Dona 
Hortensia  Cobos.  De  su  matrimonio  tuvo  cuatro  hijos :  dos  varones, 
Ricardo  y  Jose,  y  dos  mujeres,  Hortensia  y  Mercedes.  Vivio  del 
ejercicio  de  su  profesion;  y,  aunque  no  pudo  acumular  una  fortuna, 
sostuvo  su  famiilia  con  el  mayor  decoro,  alternando  en  la  mas  alta 
sociedad. 

Madriz  en  el  Salvador,  como  en  su  tierra  natal  Nicaragua,  o 
en  Honduras  y  Guatemala,  donde  estuvo  por  cortas  temporadas, 
supo  captarse  las  generales  simpatias,  por  su  exquisita  amabilidad, 
su  cultura,  y,  principalmente,  por  sus  dotes  inteleetuales  y  su  amena 
conversacion.  Al  hablar  Madriz  se  imaginaban  sus  oyentes  que  eran 
sus  voces  las  de  una  musica  deliciosa. 

En  1907,  no  obstante  su  enemistad  politica  con  Zeleya,  al  ver 
la  conflagracion  de  los  otros  Presidentes  de  Centre  America  contra 
el  Partido  Liberal  nicaragiiense,  resolvio  volver  a  Nicaragua  para 
cooperar  a  la  defensa  contra  la  invasion,  que  se  habia  h'echo  inevi- 
table. Nos  consta  que  Madriz,  como  otros  patriotas  que  entonces 
ayudaban  a  Zelaya,  fueron  impulsados  por  elevados  moviles  y 
perseguian  altos  ideales.  Creyeron  que  de  aquella  conflagracion 
habia  de  resultar  la  union  de  Centro  America,  o  por  lo  menos  la 
de  las  tres  Republicas  del  Centro  que  hirieron  la  ultima  tentativa 
en  pro  de  esa  causa.  Grande  fue  la  decepcion  de  Madriz  cuando 
vio  que  Zelaya  se  quedo  muy  por  bajo  del  gran  papel  a  que  en- 
tonces estaba  llamado,  y  se  conformo  con  un  cambio  de  Gobierno 
en  Honduras,  el  cual  no  dio  ningun  provecho  al  mismo  pais  ni  a 
Nicaragua,  por  graves  errores  que  cometio  Zelaya,  debidos  a  estre- 
chas  miras  personal es. 

Decepcionado  Madriz,  volvio  a  salir  de  Nicaragua,  aunque  sin 
renovar  la  ruptura  con  Zelaya.  Su  traslado  a  Honduras  donde  pro- 
yectaba  arraigarse.  Sus  propositos  fueron  contrariados  por  las 
circunstancias  sobrerinientes. 

Se  acepto  por  los  Gobiemos  la  idea  de  la  reunion  de  la  Con- 
ferencia  Centroamericana  de  'P'az  en  Washington,  y  fue  Madriz 
nombrado  Jefe  de  la  Delegation  por  Nicara.srua.  En  esa  conferencia, 
de  acuerdo  con  los  Delegados  de  Honduras,  abogo  por  la  realiza- 
«i6n  de)  ideal  de  la  restauracion  de  la  antigua  patria^  ideal  que 


85 

cultivaba  con  entusiasmo,  que  rayaba  en  adoracion.  Esos  esfuerzos 
fueron  iniitiles,  y  la  labor  de  la  conferencia  resulto  improlifica. 

Aunque  repre&entaba  al  Gobierno  presidido  por  Zelaya,  Madriz 
siempre  hizo  iniciativas,  o  acogio  las  que  se  hicieron,  con  el  fin  de 
asegurar  en  los  paises  del  istmo  el  imperio  de  las  leyes;  y  debemos 
reconocer  que,  al  ser  consultado  por  Madriz,  Zelaya  siempre  aprobo 
todas  las  proposiciones  tendentes  al  bien  de  los  pueblos,  aunque 
fuesen  en  perjuicio  del  poder  absoluto  de  los  gobernantes.  Por 
desgracia,  la  mayor  parte  de  las  tentativas  hechas  en  ese  sentido 
fracasaron. 

Eesulto  de  aquella  Conferencia  la  creacion  de  la  Corte  de  Justicia 
Centroamericana,  que  debia  residir  en  Cartago,  Costarica,  y  el 
Doctor  Madriz  fue  nombrado  Magistrado  por  el  Congreso  de  Nic- 
aragua. A  su  regreso  de  Washington,  quedo  en  Costarica  ejerciendo 
aquel  cargo,  hasta  que  en  Diciembr.e  de  1909  fue  llamado  por  el 
Congreso  nicaraguense  al  ejercicio  de  la  Presidencia,  a  virtud  de 
la  renuncia  que  de  ell  a  hizo  el  General  Zelaya. 

Era  de  esperarse  que  la  Presidencia  del  Dr.  fuese  para  Nicaragua 
simbolo  de  Paz,  porque  habia  merecido  la  confianza  del  Gobierno 
de  Zelaya,  y  debia  merecer  la  de  los  revolucionarios,  ya  que  Madriz 
habia  sido  durante  muchos  anos  un  companero  de  expatriacion  y 
un  adversario  decidido  de  la  Administracion  de  aquel;  pero  las 
rencillas  locales  y  otras  circunstancias,  que  no  es  del  caso  expresar, 
causaron  la  continuacion  de  la  guerra  mas  desastrosa  que  ha  tenido 
aquel  pais. 

Los  que  conociamos  intimamente  a  Madriz,  al  ver  que  la  paz  no 
se  restablecia,  hubieramos  deseado  que  dejase  el  poder,  porque  no 
era  el  el  hombre  a  proposito  para  aquella  situation.  Madriz  en 
plena  paz  habria  sido  uno  de  los  mejores  Presidentes  de  la  America 
Latina.  Para  la  guerra  no  era  su  caracter  ni  su  educacion.  Hombre 
de  corazon  era  incapaz  de  causar  dano  a  sus  enemigos,  aunque  a  las 
claras  estuviesen  conspirando,  como  sucedio;  y  por  eso  tomaron 
mayor  aliento  para  la  lucha.  No  tenian  miedo  al  Presidente. 
Madriz  no  era  hombre  de  los  que,  por  conservar  el  poder,,  no  vacilan 
en  banarse  en  la  sangre  de  sus  hermanos.  Lo  que  decimos  no  es 
una  censura.  Hizo  bien,  pues  queria  legar  d  sus  hijos  un  nombre 
inmaculado;  pero  habria  sido  mas  conveniente  que  el  hombre  se 
reservarse  para  mejores  tiempos. 

Abriimado  el  Gobierno   de   Madriz   por  el   peso  de  un 


86 

extranjero  incontras Cable,  comprendio  que  la  continuacion  de  la 
lucha  seria  esteril.  Creyo  haber  ya  defendido  suficientemente  el 
honor  nacional,  y  resolvio  retirarse  del  poder.  Salio  del  pais  y  se 
dirigio  a  Mexico,  donde  tenia  numerosos  amigos,  desde  la  epoca  en 
que  estuvo  alii  como  Delegado  por  la  Conferencia  de  Paz  de  Wash- 
ington  para  dar  las  gracias  al  Presidente  Diaz  por  sus  buenos  oficios 
en  favor  de  la  paz  de  Centro  America. 

Tenia  el  proposito  de  establecer  alii  su  residencia  ejerciendo 
su  profesion,  para  gozar  de  tranquilidad,  que  en  ningun  parte  de 
la  America  Central  podria  disfrutar;  pero  la  muerte  e&torbo  todos 
sus  planes. 

Una  enfermedad  repentina  le  tuvo  postrado  durante  pocos  dias 
en  el  lecho,  y  desaparecio  para  siempre  el  14  de  Mayo  de  1911  aun- 
que  no  de  la  memoria  de  los  buenos  centroamericanos.  En  Nicara- 
gua, especialmente,  lleno.  de  duelo  la  mayor  parte  de  los  hogares ; 
y  sus  mismos  enemigos  politicos,  que  en  vida  le  habian  atacado  ru- 
damente,  llegando  hasta  la  calumnia,  ante  &u  tumba  depusieron 
sus  odios.  La  Asamblea  conservadora  le  decreto  honores,  declaran- 
dole  BENEMEEITO  DE  LA  PATTIA.  Esa  declaracion  es  la 
mejor  prueba  de  que  Madriz  representaba  la  causa  nacional.  Sirva 
al  menos  para  satisfaccion  de  su  familia  y  de  los  que  tuvimos  la 
honra  de  llamarnos  sus  amigos;  y  sirva  tambien  para  que  la  ju- 
ventud  centroamericana  busque  un  ejemplo  que  imitar  en  la  vida 
del  patriota  que  en  tan  temprana  edad  abandono  el  mundo  de  los 
vivos.  P.  BON/ILLA, 

Nueva  Orleans,  Octubre.  1912. 


